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
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OUR IMMORTALITY

RHODES



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IMMORTALITY

BY
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OUR IMMORTALITY



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
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PREFACE

O SUFFERING and still fearful peoples; O torn, shaken, overburthened Earth; minds distraught and searching unsteadily amid the ruins of defeat and victory! Is it possible to assemble useful and far-reaching thoughts,— to present them coolly? Possible? Nay, is it not, beyond question, necessary?— our world having slid into a valley of turmoil and distrust where the momentum of events is become a most unsafe reliance. Clearly we are in urgent need of rescue from the consequences of some earlier fault, some omission,— some failure to grasp opportunities for betterment,— which to remedy, not passion, sentiment, ancient faiths and usages, nor single-minded ambitions seem competent. Reason alone remains. And this is an implement that we have worked with oftener and ever oftener as one century has succeeded another. Surely it is possible that an implement so peculiar to our own estate and progress will now save us in our need; neither can such an implement destroy the good in anything that we hold dear. Shall we, then, forthwith try the experiment, as deliberately and conscientiously as we are able, weighing our prepossessions and our emotions, whether horrid

or pleasurable, against their proved implications,—shut present miseries an instant from our eyes, hoping to soften oncoming years? Here is the task, if you are willing.

Evidently we have to prepare for an era of revision. And, in view of the cataclysm of these last four years and of the formidable consequences that may reasonably be feared, it seems probable that this revision will be not merely of the surface of our affairs, such as proceeds in a time of profoundest calm, but rather of the underlying principles of many laws and customs.

Yet many eager participants in the stirring events of the day believe the contrary. To these, preoccupied as they have been with the crucial business of the moment, it has seemed only necessary to crush or severely repress the German power; the world should then go on pretty much as before, but with this important difference: namely, that we should be safe from the maniacal ambitions of autocrats and might even realise a state of universal and enduring peace. There can be no doubt that, since the efforts of these resolute and devoted persons have been rewarded with success, the progress that we all ardently desire seems far less chimerical than if the Prussian dream of world-dominion had been momentarily fulfilled.

It is also true that there exists at present (November, 1918) a striking solidarity amongst the various races opposing the Teutonic league,— a probably unprecedented aptitude for sympathetic co-operation. Hence it is often predicted that these peoples, though widely different in blood, language and custom and subject to unequal physical and economical conditions, will gladly agree, now that the common foe is effectually subdued, to live and let live and to settle all future disputes by discussion. It is, however, to be remembered that close alliances have been formed in the past between nations that subsequently quarrelled, the political or economical situation of one or more of them having changed in the interval. And if the solidarity amongst the Entente and associated powers is indeed unprecedented, it should likewise be remembered that they have been exposed to an unprecedented menace.

In short, there are no tangible and convincing reasons to believe that, once the specific peril of German aggression has been finally removed, the several nations of the earth will enter upon an entirely new phase of their existence,— that they will show a lasting and much greater consideration for one another's needs or that the various classes of which they are composed will become materially less jealous of one another's rights and privileges.

In the course of the present work I shall go much

farther and endeavour to show that such a consummation of good will between nations or between the existing classes of society lies so far beyond the bounds of probability as to be unworthy of practical consideration. This conclusion, however, will represent but a single phase of the argument. For, indeed, the actual war between nations, on the one hand, and between classes, on the other, has only emphasised the condition of acute unrest that has invaded each separate department of human activity. Even amidst the din of battle, minds were busy with schemes of progress and reform. New laws, reorganizations of the social body, new standards of conduct, of language and even of thought itself were being mooted in every land at the very time when the public energy and purse were severely taxed for the development and maintenance of an adequate martial power.

Now, it is notorious that reforms are often exceedingly difficult to carry into practical and lasting effect. When they are of a character materially to affect the lives of a great number of people, they must generally be carried over the heads of a powerful minority or even against the wishes of the majority itself. And many reforms that are ardently, and perhaps rationally, desired seem to have but a meagre chance of realization because there are so few who desire them. For the prepossessions even

of thoughtful people are often as various as their talents. Thus one man may remain comparatively indifferent with regard to questions of religion, of sex and of racial distinctions while giving a rigid adherence to the principles of democracy as operative in the land of his birth. Another may live contentedly under almost any form of government that guarantees him the right to accumulate property and dispose of it as he likes. A third may welcome all manner of reforms that work no prejudice to the church of which he is a member. Another may be singularly receptive of new ideas in so far as they cast no shadow of doubt upon the personality of his God. Still others are equally tenacious of the bonds of kinship or of their own personal liberty, of the majesty of the written law or of the social hierarchy to which they have been bred.

In sum, we have each of us a few,—some of us many,—of these prepossessions which may indeed be difficult to account for but which are therefore held none the less dear. And though the individual in whose mind they assume a relatively slight importance is often regarded as deficient in human feeling, each of us regards the prepossessions of others,—the ones that are not shared by himself,—as either unessential to, or directly obstructive of, human progress. There can be no doubt that the advance

of knowledge has consisted, to a great extent, in the substitution of one set of prepossessions for another set, those of our distant ancestors within historical times being, for the most part, quite different from our own. Yet many of us today regard the most cherished of our prepossessions as unassailable.

Under these conditions of widespread disagreement as to truth, conduct, destiny, is it not desirable to discover, if possible, a prepossession, or belief, that is common to us all? If there be any such, and if it be reasonably grounded in such certain knowledge as we have,— if, furthermore, it relate to a matter of prime importance to us all,— may not such a prepossession, if openly recognised and adequately stated, go a long way towards reconciling some of our disputes over the multifarious business of life?

The purpose of the present work is precisely that of conducting such an inquiry as I have above suggested. To this end, it will first be necessary (Part I) to establish the meaning of *fact*,— to find the knowable, the already known. The one belief, or prepossession, that is undoubtedly the property of all mankind may then (Part II) be examined in its relation to our certain knowledge of fact; its implications in respect of the ulterior destiny of human personality and achievement may be systematically treated. And finally (Part III), the practical con-

sequences of a widespread and unreserved avowal of this belief of ours may be indicated in their bearing on certain important social problems of the present day.

At the very outset of this inquiry, it is evident that I shall have largely to do with generalities. Even in the case of beliefs less widely held, this kind of treatment would, to some extent, be necessary. For example, the belief that *all men are born equal* is held variously by different individuals, and it would be necessary to eliminate much of the specific character of its elements in order to arrive at anything approaching an agreement among those who hold it. The belief in a *God existing personally* is subject to the same necessity. How much more general, then, must be the ground that is taken by every human creature! Perhaps the only satisfactory definition of it will be reached through a demonstration of the impossibility of its not being taken.

Clearly, then, my project is by no means an unambitious one, if I wish to gain the attention and co-operation of others. Not only are there but few of any generation to admit that abstractions may settle anything,—few who will even consider a general principle before a concrete instance of its operation is pointed out to them,—but the present age is notorious for its concentration upon specific considerations and its skepticism regarding logical

inferences that relate to the future. The typical modern thinker rightly contends that specific events, such as a war, a peace, or a scientific discovery, cannot be known in advance of experience; and from this conclusion, as a basis, he often comes to distrust all forecasts, even of alternative events, and to deny that anything is inevitable, no matter how many experiential elements may be involved. In his view, the pursuit of knowledge, as a starting-point for action, should consist in the exhaustive study of one subject after another, the several results obtained by this means yielding the material for useful generalisations.

It is, however, to be observed that our ulterior interest in any subject whatsoever — the interest which alone supplies an incentive for investigation — relates invariably to the future. Even the student of fossil remains looks forward to a personal profit or gratification or to a more widespread benefit to the race. If we do this or that, — so runs the burden of all our thoughts, — such or such is likely to happen. And these calculations are trusted to approach, and do often seem very nearly to approach, the actual dimensions of the event. Hence it would seem futile to discourage speculation upon the future and useful to provide as sound a basis for it as possible.

This basis, as we have seen, is often thought to be

most easily attainable through an exhaustive study of the various branches of science and the various activities of man, taken separately. And undoubtedly such a method, if capable of being rigorously pursued, would yield the surest results. Unfortunately, however, it is only too clear that no subject may be studied both exhaustively and separately. The palæontologist must have frequent recourse to the data of geology and of certain branches of geography and must leave important questions unanswered because of the insufficiency of these data. In order to make an adequate estimate of the significance of his discoveries, he would need to be conversant with the entire subject of Man. Moreover, in this and in all other departments of specific research, it is customary to assume something wherever certain knowledge is lacking and to determine future efforts in accordance with inferences drawn from these assumptions which may subsequently be either brought under suspicion or directly negatived. Religions have grown to a great importance which could have won no favour at the outset if the present data of anthropology and astronomy had then been available. The internal politics of great nations have been shaped to accord with the inference that, even for strictly terrestrial purposes, all men are born equal. And only yesterday,—perhaps also today,—the vital elements both in the human

stock itself, and in our entire scheme of knowledge were in imminent peril through the defects of a social system that has permitted the development and unscrupulous wielding of a formidable martial power.

What is and has been was perhaps indeed inevitable. Yet none of the religious and social systems that have eventually proved inadequate represented anything approaching the best thought of the time when they were born; we cannot even regard them as remarkably successful, under the circumstances. And the hope of considerably mitigating our present perplexities solely through an assiduous study of special sciences and activities grows more delusive with each advance that is made in such studies. For, even as we are learning that a thorough and practical knowledge of any subject implies an equal knowledge of all other subjects, we realise that the sum of human knowledge is at so prodigious a distance from omniscience as to seem trivial by comparison with the unknown.

Another method, then, is clearly desirable, — one that may supplement the method of specific research. To supply such a method, to describe its operation and to formulate the practical consequences of its adoption is the purpose of the present work.

In the first place, as we have seen, it will be neces-

sary to set up categories of the known — what we are certain of beyond a shadow of doubt — and of the unknown, or what we are unquestionably in ignorance of. In the course of this process, one of our beliefs — the belief in a hereafter — irresistibly suggests itself for consideration; which belief, upon further inquiry, will be found inseparable from any human deliberations, — will even be seen to govern the behaviour of the lower animals. The impossibility of sustaining, in action, a disavowal of this belief will be demonstrated. Those elements in various familiar statements of the belief which are unbelievable in view of our certain knowledge of reality will be considered. The indissoluble essence of the belief will then be stated and shown to be in complete accord with this certain knowledge; in other words, the kind of hereafter will be indicated that may form the subject of a tenable and probably inescapable belief. Finally, — and here is the ulterior and most vital purpose of the work — comes the bearing of a rational view of immortality on the salient and most vexatious problems of our social life upon earth.

In brief, the import of the present undertaking is, above all, practical. To be sure, we have here the record of a deliberate search after truth, — not merely possible or probable truth, but absolute and demonstrable truth. And doubtless such truth as

this cannot be wholly implicated in the conceptions that we form of our daily concerns. Yet such measure of it as we may attain must, if adequately stated and widely understood, exert a considerable influence upon all projects of reform and hence, eventually, upon the routine of our lives. It must inevitably serve, even as in the past, to invalidate prepossessions that many of us have deeply at heart and to supply us with new grounds of belief that are helpful in the normal pursuits of the time. It should illuminate the implications of all the appearances in the midst of which we exist; it should suggest new duties in connection with the commonest affairs of life.

The most immediate concerns of men are, then, the objective of the present enterprise. Indeed, it might be difficult to find another incentive for the search after truth. But the method here followed will not be the favourite one of proceeding consistently from concrete appearances to general inferences. Rather shall we derive from a few typical series of appearances a single abstract principle of the highest certainty; we shall then examine the relation between this principle and our belief in immortality; and finally we shall consider, at some length, the bearing of this relation upon the individual and changing problems of human society. That is to say, we shall proceed directly from the

concrete to the highest abstraction now attainable and, after connecting this abstraction with human immortality, shall return by divergent lines to the differentiated elements of the concrete.

The present advantages of this method and the importance of the conclusions to be reached by following it seem to me so obvious as to be worthy of an entirely separate presentation. This book, accordingly, contains little of either a critical or a historical nature. Indeed, I have neither the time nor the knowledge for undertaking a critique of certain doctrines (*e. g.*, of the various ideas of God and of the good) that are widely supported and might be expected to receive consideration in a work of this character. I believe, however, that the relation borne to them by the present doctrine should, in most cases, be easily derived from the constructive work that I am here attempting to describe.

Finally, my adoption of the method that has been briefly indicated above should not be taken to mean that I underrate the value of the method that is now almost universally in vogue. On the contrary, it appears to me self-evident that a continuous specific research in the several branches of human knowledge is indispensable to human progress. It is the first and obvious means of advancement in the pursuit of happiness. The simplest of us are committed to it, in one form or another, in our daily affairs.

My contention is merely that, of itself alone, it is plainly an inadequate safeguard of the most vital interests of the race; one proof, indeed, of its inadequacy is found in our eagerness to embrace mystical religions owning oracular, and often obscure, origins. And even with these important though, at times, disapproving allies, the study of special sciences and human activities has never been competent to avert the development of social crises so acute as to place the whole structure of civilisation in jeopardy.

That there has been progress in altruism since the dawn of history, most of us confidently believe. An important factor in it — perhaps the all-inclusive factor — will be considered in the second division of this book. Yet at times, this progress has seemed to be partially invalidated or even to be converted, for a space, into a backward tendency. Within recent generations, specific research and formal religions have entirely failed to weaken either the prepossessions of nationality or the love of wealth as determinants of important events; an elaborate social system has been established under which it is possible for a vigorous, arrogant and resentful people to terrorise the earth.

This is precisely what has recently happened. In the course of the late conflict, the German people, from force of circumstances and their own defective or distorted altruism, have resorted to acts of treach-

ery, injustice, inhumanity and extreme rapacity. At times, it has seemed entirely possible that they would conquer the earth. And if they were to do this, the disputes that would inevitably ensue would doubtless abound with acts of treachery, injustice, inhumanity and rapacity, these being the proved instruments of immediate success. Racial degeneration would seem, then, the only likely issue. On the other hand, now that the Germans are decisively beaten, we are expected to look forward to a world somewhat more democratic indeed yet substantially like the old one plus a league of nations or some other safeguard of peace that rests upon the threat of force.

The considerations that make virtually impossible the maintenance of any such safeguard for many generations to come will be stated in the third and final division of the present work. If these considerations are valid, as many must already feel them to be, there can be nothing to prevent the development of further international situations similar to that of July and August, 1914. And the Entente Allies and the United States, in so far as their aims are generally understood, must be pursuing a somewhat anomalous course. On the one hand, they were not only wise and logical but were acting even under the pressure of dire necessity in prosecuting the war to the utmost of their power. Yet, with

regard to their posterity, they are fighting in the interest of Germanism. Even the suggested preventive of further predatory wars rests upon the assumption that human nature, fundamentally, is German nature.

What, then, are the alternatives? In July, 1918, be it remembered, it seemed by no means impossible that the house of Hohenzollern should conquer the earth. And, whatever the ulterior event, the existence of such a possibility has undoubtedly meant that civilisation is a failure unless we are by way of constructing some novel channel for human altruism,—unless ideas and projects are in the making that have had little or no part in shaping the world of today. Whether any such ideas and projects will speedily take concrete form or whether they will remain the vortex of a political and intellectual struggle lasting for generations to come,—whether, indeed, they will ever emerge from the realm of impracticable theories,—none may say. Specific events, especially of the near future, are not to be known in advance of experience. It may, however, be possible to demonstrate that the condition of our posterity, if placed at a sufficient distance in the future, will be one of two. We may, for instance, be able to satisfy ourselves that either the human kind will degenerate prematurely,—*i. e.*, in obedience to no obvious natural law,—or else its

controlling elements, regardless of race, language and physical surroundings, will arrive at a community of faith and altruism so substantial as profoundly to affect everyone's conduct towards both his near and his distant neighbours. And if any of us today can find or nearly approach this faith and altruism, may we not advance the general agreement? Let us consider this important question.



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PART I

THE FOUNDATION OF KNOWLEDGE

1

OUR IMMORTALITY

THE FOUNDATION OF KNOWLEDGE

WHENEVER the future of mankind, immediate or remote, is brought under consideration, the question of fact rises up and demands to be answered first. The future of mankind, especially the future of individual men, is everybody's chief concern in life; we recall the past in the interest of the future; and the facts bearing on anybody's individual outlook and on that of the race, as a whole, are often in dispute. Hence it is necessary, before attempting a serious discussion of any problem of the future, to establish, as far as possible, the meaning of fact. A given event, thing, or idea, — has it one value or many, and how shall any value that it may possess be defined?

Evidently each remembered fact in the day's experience possesses for each of us a distinct significance; moreover, it may or may not supply a basis for action; and the kind of action resulting from it may not be susceptible of forecast by any other person than the agent. To the landscape-

painter a new experience of sunlight and shadow may have an appearance of finality, even though it provide a powerful stimulus for future work. Two brothers, a merchant and a student, may regard an inherited store of gold with opposite feelings. Indeed, we are all aware that, in every department of life, each fact has many aspects and many implications. Let us consider this point at some length.

To the mason a trowel, primarily, is all of a trowel and no more,— a thing useful for spreading mortar. He is seldom called upon to regard a trowel in any other light than this. Similarly an event that he remembers, or an abstract idea that he entertains and discusses, may assume for him a definite and, for all immediate purposes, a stable form. His conception of personal liberty, for example, may be all but sufficient for his practical needs. As applied to his own situation in life, it may mean that no man is his master; that he is permitted to sell the labour of his brain and hands wheresoever he likes within certain limits, concerning which he is, himself, consulted; that he may marry any woman who will have him for a husband and bring up his children substantially as he sees fit. Likewise an event may be all but finally represented to him in the election to a legislature of the candidate whom he has supported at the polls; and another and distinct event may be the success of the



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new legislator or his failure to accomplish what was expected of him.

But the least ambitious of masons cannot persistently ignore all considerations but those of bread and beer, stereotyped amusements, material welfare of his household. Everything that his personal liberty may imply and that his political representatives may secure for him must, at times, appear insufficient and a yearning, more or less vague, for betterment possesses him,— a wish to extend the scope of his own experience or of his children's. Such wishes, according to the temperament and capabilities of the person entertaining them, are rare and fleeting or frequent and inexorable. And in order to gratify them, it is almost invariably necessary to acquire wealth or position or both.

Now, the ambitious mason who is likewise shrewd and industrious may live to see the best opportunities of the day open to his son. In this event, all the familiar facts of existence will appear different to the son from what they have appeared to the father; and the degree of this difference may indefinitely approach the extremes that are describable as follows.

If the son is idle and a dullard, the trowel may appear to him, for one thing, as a symbol of ignoble toil. Moreover, he cannot use it, like his father, as a means to advancement but may only hire it in

order to provide for himself a suitable habitation. Far from being eager for an opportunity to take it up and work with it, he must receive any suggestion to this end with amusement or abhorrence. If forced to work with it, he will manage clumsily. It is unlikely that he will ever say to himself, "After all, this is the same trowel that my father used. The thing, itself, is the same; the difference is between our two ways of looking at it." But if this idea should actually occur to him, it would merely indicate a perfunctory agreement, on his part, with traditional notions of reality, since the identity of the trowel, if indeed a fact, is one devoid of importance to either of two persons to whom the trowel invariably suggests different acts and different emotions.

A similar divergence between son and father is certain to appear in their conceptions of events and of abstract ideas. The son may regard the personal liberty of masons as an embarrassing feature of civilisation that may not be openly assailed but should, by indirect means, be kept as far as possible in the background; he may support the political party that was formerly opposed by his father. At all events, the divergence between them, owing to their different positions in life, will affect each item of the daily routine, from the reading of the morning newspaper to the digestion of the evening meal,



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and will cause them to behave differently at similar junctures.

If, on the other hand, the son is by no means idle or thoughtless but possesses all the shrewdness of his father and a keen desire to make the most of his opportunities for new experience, an extensive and manifold scheme of differentiation lies before him.

In the quality of economist, he may be unable to behold a trowel without calculating the available supplies of wood and iron for further trowels.

As a physicist, he will be forced to discredit his father's notions of wood, iron and all the material accessories of existence, for he will learn that immaterial elements constitute an essential portion, perhaps the entirety, of every molecule of matter. Though still unable to account for the iron of his father's trowel, — to explain what it really is and whence derived, — he may satisfy himself that it is not the impenetrable, perdurable substance his father naturally assumed it to be.

As a philosopher, he will recognize the supreme importance of research that bears no direct relation to the immediate concerns of life. Although admitting his own dependence upon the prompt and regular satisfaction of his daily needs, he is well aware that neither he, himself, nor anything resembling his own generation of men would have been possible but for the rare individuals in earlier generations

who have resolutely assailed such problems as were attracting no attention from the mass of their contemporaries. He is therefore perfectly free to conjecture that it would be better for mankind that half the masons of the earth should lay down their tools for ever rather than that a single physicist should be balked in the effort to throw new light upon a material atom. At the same time, he is forced to admit that none of the problems so attractive to the physicist and so important to all men has ever been finally solved. And if the groundlessness of traditional inferences concerning the constitution of matter may now be so conclusively demonstrated as to bring under suspicion all concepts of physical entity, even the abstract science of space and numbers may possess no positive or enduring value. To the son, then, as a philosopher, the one certain value of the physical and mathematical sciences must consist in their competence to displace one set of errors in favour of another set that is more helpful to the race in its adaptation to a changing and perhaps illusory environment.

Similarly, and still as a philosopher, the son must differ from his father in respect of men's relations with one another. Indeed, any agreement between them on this point would seem quite beyond the bounds of possibility by reason of the disagreement as to their material environment. Things, in the

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son's view and not in the father's, may have no solidity, no stability. And not only is man, to some extent, a thing himself, but all his ideas of liberty, government, industry, education, as well as his emotions of love, hate, fear, pity, rest on a strictly material basis of existence.

Moreover, the son may be familiar with certain conditions of the social life of man that are not discussed at political gatherings or in any place where masons are wont to assemble. Two of these may be stated by him somewhat as follows:

It is impossible that the specific act of any person or community in the past should be susceptible of imitation in the present. Not only have conditions changed in the interval, but the particular bearing of the original act, which would be necessary to give it a working value, is always inscrutable. Thus, the grant of a charter of liberty may be an undisputed historical fact. In its general aspect, it may possess a clear significance. It may be legitimately contrasted with contemporaneous acts that were obstructive of the cause of liberty. Other contemporaneous acts may be stated to have proved less efficient in furthering this cause. But the charter cannot be pronounced the best possible expedient in the interest of liberty; no more can the manner of its operation be specifically demonstrated. Its implications stretch forth on every side in a tangled

web of circumstance; and each single thread that may be disengaged defies the historian's efforts to account for it, so intimately is it involved in the entire fabric. Nevertheless, the chief criterion for the affairs of each generation must lie in those of earlier generations. Man could not manage at all without histories; if he should cease, at any time, to study the past, he would forthwith enter upon a series of pitiful blunders that would rapidly bring his earthly career to an end. It is clear, then, that the social and political ideals and practices of bygone days are indispensable to the race by virtue of their competence for mutual elimination; accordingly, the assertion of an ancient ideal often suggests itself as the obvious means of subverting an existing institution or checking a nascent tendency. Such assertion, on the other hand, must be deprived of practical utility in proportion as it is given a constructive character. The necessary data are lacking which, if supplied, would merely prove that the ancient ideal, unless modified beyond the possibility of recognition, could not become a positive force in the modern world. Thus, if our mason believes that practices nearly or quite obsolete may be revived and adapted to present needs, he will find himself at variance with his son's philosophy which may stipulate for a less definite, though no less sanguine, view of the value of historical precedent. The

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younger and more leisured man may find it impossible to deny that all constructive work — if, indeed, there be anything properly so called — is performed from one day or year to another; that it belongs to the future and is derived from the past in the form of an agreement, not as to what is possible or desirable, but as to what is impossible or undesirable.

Again, the notion of personal liberty itself, as a feature of civilised life, will doubtless be modified in the mind of the son to a degree that should render it almost unrecognisable to the father. Personal liberty, to the son, will not appear as the simple and readily intelligible axiom of modern civilisation that his father has always held it to be. Rather will it seem an impenetrable maze of contradictions and self-delusions for which, as for many other perplexities in life, it has been necessary to invent a simple name. He will have learned that the activities of any individual or community are so hedged in with obvious restrictions that the small margin of freedom which appears to be left could, under no circumstances, be made use of for a considerable period of time. Thus the conduct of an individual is limited by the place of his birth, by the condition of his parents, by the accident, as we say, of his associations, by unforeseen fluctuations in the demand for his talents, by the unaccountable vagaries of his workmen, his wife, or his employer, by his accept-



ance of political falsehoods and misconceptions, by the delusive interaction of his own and his neighbours' minds and by innumerable other conditions of his existence, while the action of communities is subject to similar and even more various limitations. In a sense, doubtless, the freedom of individuals is absolute,—as it is hoped that subsequent pages of this work will demonstrate. Moreover, it is impossible for a race of highly individualised beings persistently to regard their motives as predetermined and so to disclaim all responsibility for their acts. But with regard to the usual sense of the word, freedom—the sense in which it is generally accepted for political purposes—it is difficult to imagine a juncture at which an individual, a community, or a state may substantially justify a claim to free agency.

Inasmuch as, roughly speaking, the mason's idea of liberty has been extensively cultivated since the very dawn of history, his son may find no matter for surprise in the invariable failure of governments to safeguard the interests of posterity, in the ever imminent rupture between legislators and their constituents, in the equal impotence of all known forms of autocracy and democracy to dispense with the irritating and sterile preoccupations of politics, or in many other anomalies of civilized life which, in the last resort, are often referred to the vices of an



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immutable human nature. He may nevertheless be unable to repress a feeling of uneasiness as he looks into the future. Misconceptions of fact may indeed form the basis of all human deliberations; they must, however, possess different values in respect of some ultimate standard of knowledge. And any general misconception, such as that of personal liberty, may become the more perilous in its immediate implications as its coexistence with opportunities for displacing it is prolonged.

The elementary conditions of civilised life over which an industrious father and his inquisitive son may find themselves at variance will be considered at some length in the third and final division of this work. Meanwhile, it may be sufficient to add that the son, as a critic of books, of music, or of any other work of art, will be incapable of pronouncing the same judgments as his father. In sum, the thoughts, acts and emotions of the father, as suggested by a given event, abstract idea, or material object, are certain to differ essentially from those of his son. And a similar difference must exist in the case of any two individuals, as, for example, a mason and a fellow-mason, or as two of their sons placed similarly in life. The mere difference in their sense-organs, or in their positions in space, implies a difference in their perceptions and hence in the inferences and muscular acts consequent upon

these perceptions. And inasmuch as all our knowledge of facts is based upon impressions received by our senses, we must therefore conclude that a fact cannot be one and the same when regarded from different points of view.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that a repeated and often continuous agreement as to fact exists among all men under certain circumstances and between some men to an indefinite degree. The possibility of agreement is implied in all human deliberations; and, upon examination, all agreements assume a negative, or relative, character.

If, for example, a nail is to be driven and only a trowel is at hand, the search for, and use of, a hammer will be managed by one person in a manner different, in every particular, from the manner of any other; but neither will take up the trowel. The nature of the hammer and both its total and occasional virtue as a tool are unknown and may not form the subject of human agreements; the hammer may, however, be pronounced a better tool than the trowel for driving a nail; that is to say, the trowel is not so good a tool for this purpose.

The effects upon two persons of the perception of a flash of lightning are likewise different in every particular, even as their faces, voices, nerves, muscles, knowledge of, and associations with, light-

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ning are different. The two sense-perceptions, themselves, cannot be identical in different organs; and the difference in perception must also be inferred from the difference in its sequel in speech and other muscular action. If, at the moment of the lightning-flash, one of the two persons should hear a cry of *Fire!* in the house, their behaviour would appear to a third person to differ more widely than if there had been no such cry, because of the apparent identity of fewer elements in the two phenomena,—an identity that is easily proved unreal, in so far as it is held to distinguish the phenomena in question from any other phenomena.

Of two persons holding diametrically different views on the subject of personal liberty, both may oppose slavery in every form or conspire to depose an autocrat.

In sum, it is clear that, although a positive agreement as to fact has never been reached and is not to be hoped for upon earth, negative agreements prevail widely among men and are doubtless capable, through extension, of producing modifications in human society that are limited only by the conditions of a material existence. Innumerable negative agreements reached in the ordinary course of life are unassailable and cannot be conceived as possessing a merely relative or contingent validity;

hence they stipulate unqualifiedly for reality as a condition of the universe in which we live.

The question, then, arises, what is this ultimate condition of our universe or, if it may not be defined, what relation to it is borne by the definite appearances in the midst of which we exist; what relation to it is borne by human personality? Evidently, this question must be answered before any satisfactory notion may be gained of either the earthly or the unearthly future of our human kind. And inasmuch as our earthly existence is strictly dependent on material processes and as each of our most abstract ideas and subtle emotions is finally referable to a material object or to an immaterial conception not impossibly suggested by a material object, the most convenient point of departure for such an inquiry as thus becomes imperative should be our conception of matter, itself.

In the ensuing discussion of our conception of matter, of the space it occupies and of the time required for its changes of form or of position, it will be unnecessary to refer to the results of recent astronomical and electrical research. These results do indeed supply an interesting commentary on the conclusions here to be reached by another method, especially as both sets of conclusions are in entire agreement in so far as their application may be held

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to extend. Nevertheless, it is by no means necessary to resort to experiments lying beyond the common knowledge of the last few generations of men in order to satisfy oneself that the ultimate constituents of matter cannot possess the properties, such as impenetrability and indestructibility, which we naturally ascribe to matter for the practical purposes of life, or that mathematical concepts can be invested with no deeper significance than that of an obvious and indispensable symbol for describing illusory processes, such as the incessant redistributions of matter and the various changes in its condition that are brought about by the action of immaterial waves emanating from material bodies.

Again, it is of little importance in the ensuing inquiry, whether we begin by regarding matter as an external reality or as a product of the subjective mind. But inasmuch as the former hypothesis is the commoner of the two, let us assume that the source of each of our sense-perceptions is a definite entity presented to us from without; let us then proceed to test the implications of this assumption.

In the image that we form, however variously, of a single cloud in the summer sky, we are all sensible of a phenomenon that may not be described otherwise than with reference to its isolation. Physical science, however, has long been in a position to satisfy us of the intimate relations existing between

the cloud and certain other phenomena presented to, or inferred by, us in various ways, — phenomena such as the earth's total surface and atmosphere and the modifications produced in them by ether-waves emanating from the sun. These relations are as intimate as any others of which we are aware, — as intimate as those of one portion of the cloud to another portion. The relation of the cloud to the sun, for example, is as intimate as that of the sun to any portion of the planet, Mercury, or of the planet, Neptune; that is to say, it is indispensable to the existence of the cloud as a phenomenon, even as the relation of the sun to the surface of any planet is indispensable to the particular physical conditions prevailing upon that planet. Similar is the relation of the cloud to the most distant observed star; if the star were either nearer or farther off, the constituents of our solar system, throughout their evolution, would have occupied a different position in the universe in respect of gravitational and thermal influences, and the cumulative effect of these differences would have rendered unlikely — or, as we shall presently see, impossible — the formation of the cloud or even of the earth, itself.

If, nevertheless, we suppose, at the moment of our perception of the cloud, that there are certain phenomena of which we are aware, by perception or by inference, and of which the cloud is now wholly or



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partially independent, we must conclude that, for all purposes of this present moment, we are living both in a universe to which the cloud, either as a whole or in part, does not belong and in another universe to which the cloud does indeed belong. And the same supposition, if extended impartially to cover all other phenomena of which we are actually, or might conceivably be, aware, must mean that there are as many universes as there are material objects and points of view contained in them,—a theory equivalent to the theory of a single universe in which every phenomenon and conscious subject is all-pervasive and indispensable to every other phenomenon and subject.

Herein would lie the essential unity of a universe whose total existence should be comprised within a single moment of time. Hence the same unity must appertain to a universe whose existence is prolonged through any number of moments of time, as will become clear upon consideration of the formation and dissolution of a cloud. When we witness these phenomena, we may not describe them otherwise than as a beginning and ending of the cloud. Yet, in accordance with the data supplied by physical science, the formation of the cloud was made inevitable by the presence of certain conditions in the atmosphere and by the absence of certain other conditions immediately anterior to the phenomenon,

itself. Similarly, the presence and absence of these conditions were derived from the presence and absence of other conditions; and the relation between these successive processes must be as intimate as between those in operation within the cloud during its period of apparent isolation. If, nevertheless, we suppose that, at some time in the immediate or distant past, there was a break in the continuity of derivation and that there have been similar breaks in the continuity of all processes of all time, we must conclude that universes have succeeded one another as rapidly as the hypothetical units of time, — a conclusion equivalent to the theory of a single universe in which the elements of each of its constituent processes have always been present. In the same manner we may satisfy ourselves that both the formation and dissolution of a cloud will survive as indispensable factors in all subsequent phenomena.

Hence it is clear that, if the universe in which we live bears any relation to reality, the duality or multiplicity of its elements must be illusory; that is to say, the presentation to a conscious subject of an external object must be an impossibility and the reciprocal action of concrete phenomena must be a similar impossibility, — both presentation and reciprocal action possessing an unknown value in respect of reality.

But the images that we form of the phenomena

of the cloud — its formation, isolation, dissolution — constitute a direct negation of the conclusions respecting them from which, in the light of physical science, we are unable to escape; moreover, it is solely by virtue of this negation that the images may exist, possess a meaning, be described. And the same contradiction is readily discernible between our perception of any other material object or natural process and our scientific inferences concerning it and, in equal degree, between our perfunctory and our carefully tested inferences.

If, for example, I have in one hand a pear and in the other a spherical pebble, I may state that I am holding objects different in nature and in antecedents and that the sum of them is 2. I may also mention the properties of the sphere that distinguish it from other solids. But, once I have begun to consider the following necessities of the case, — to wit, the perdurable connection between the pear and the pear-tree and the other pears borne by the same tree; the continuous, if imperceptible, changes in the pear even as I am holding it; the imminent dissemination of its substance throughout the atmosphere and surface of the earth; the vast medley of conflicting forces involved in the rounding of the pebble; the impossibility of the pebble preserving its present size and shape; the futility of any effort to fix its present status in the history of its constit-

uent elements, — I may suspect that I hold the universe in either hand but I must, at any rate, deny that pear and pebble, in respect of the highest physical certainties of their existence, can ever suggest either an abstract addition resulting in the number, 2, or a straight line as the symbol of their diameters. These mathematical formulas, nevertheless, are not only closely related to the conditions under which alone the perception of pear or pebble is possible; they have been largely instrumental, as well, in leading us to the highest certainties attainable in physical research.

Here, again, we are confronted with the question, what is the practical value of these highest certainties and how is the paradox of indispensable knowledge refuting indispensable knowledge to be resolved? The only admissible answer should now be well within our reach.

As we have already seen, it is impossible that human perceptions and inferences alike bear no relation to reality. Such an exclusion of reality from any connection with our existence would merely necessitate the resort to an equivalent conception in order to explain our familiar and unassailable negative agreements as to fact. Moreover, these agreements are, themselves, inferences; and the material for these and for all other inferences is supplied by our perceptions. Both our inferences

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and our perceptions must, then, be somehow related to reality.

Hence we cannot suppose that reality is actually found in our perceptions, which assign limits in space and time to material objects and natural processes, when our least vulnerable inferences, which must also bear some relation to reality other than the mere negation of it, stipulate for the absence of these limits.

No more can we suppose, on the other hand, that reality is found in inferences that are negated by our perceptions or by other inferences.

There remains, then, but one possible solution of the paradox: both perceptions and inferences must be illusions, though possessed of different values in respect of reality. In this difference lies their highest value, shared equally, and easily recognisable in all phases of human experience as the liability and essential need of each perception to be supplanted by another perception and the similar liability and need of all inferences.

Thus the data of science represent the elimination of error, not the establishment of fact. The fundamental nature of the cloud, as well as of the conditions giving rise to its formation, are unknown; but science has shown us, first, that the cloud did not spontaneously spring into existence and, secondly, that the continuity of condition-illusion and cloud-

illusion, although essentially indescribable, forms the substance of a conception, illusory indeed but possessing the provisional and working value now lacking in the conceptions that it has displaced. This value of the scientific inference may appear in various forms. Thus a general inference may be promptly disposed of by a specific inference, of the class commonly known as facts, that has already been stated but is overlooked by the persons drawing the general inference, even as the least assailable inferences plainly announce their imperfection and languish in their enforced security. And any inference that has been widely accepted may be ranged, soon after its rejection, with all manner of curious illusions, variously stated or dreamed. For example, the inference that all the heavenly bodies are set in spherical shells that revolve round the earth is classable with dragons, carnivorous cattle, purple buttercups, or with any other product of a racial or individual imagination. Worms and the solar system, grazing cattle and yellow buttercups, although probably susceptible of both popular and scientific consideration as long as the earth shall last, must eventually share the same fate, all our positive knowledge of them being without basis in reality.

In sum, since our negative agreements stipulate for reality as a condition of the universe in which we live, and since the scientific elimination of dis-

continuity in phenomena means that dual or multiple elements in a given occurrence are impossible and that the absence from any occurrence in any epoch of any of the factors in earlier occurrences is also impossible, and, finally, since our perceptions and inferences join in a reciprocal demonstration of their invariably illusory character, it is evident that the reality conditioning our universe must equal the sum of its impossibilities or the total negation of its constituent processes. No matter how many terms we may introduce between perception and inference, or between matter and perception, — no matter how abstract, or how intuitive, our actual or potential noumena, — we cannot escape from the necessity of a universe differentiated only in impossibility. And the aspect of any illusion, as eliminated by us today in a negative agreement, represents but a portion of the impossibility inherent in this illusion; in other words, it represents the existing phase of our knowledge of reality.

Now, the relation of each illusion to a total, or perfect, knowledge of reality must differ from that of every other illusion, since the reproduction of any illusion would amount to a reproduction of the universe implied in it. For convenience of terms, then, the practical value of any illusion may be called its suggestiveness of perfection. Obviously we must assign a higher value in suggestiveness to the infer-

ential illusion than to the perceptive; for the latter supplies the material through which it is, itself, brought under suspicion while inferential illusions, though always bent on destroying one another, never lead us to place a higher trust in the simple perception. A material object, perceived for the first time, may indeed prove the means by which an accepted inference is displaced, but only through the medium of inferences more suggestive than any that preceded this displacement. Similarly, the most suggestive inferences are those which have been most carefully tested in respect of recorded perceptions.

It is seen that our inquiry into the appearances of the material world has embraced, as was to be expected, the world of ideas as well. Yet, before proceeding to consider the conclusions reached above in their bearing on the lives of individual men or on the general outlook of the race, it may be desirable to scan, as closely as possible, the status, in the universal scheme, of the present system of appearances, — the system with which we are familiar and of which we form a part. First, let us recapitulate and further define the conditions necessarily governing such an enterprise.

Unless a superman flourishes elsewhere, nature or the universe or existence, at its highest value, must now consist in the sum of our perceptions and infer-

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ences; at a lower value, in those of the bee; at a still lower, in the yearning of the oak for its sun, on the one hand, and for its water, on the other; at a still lower, in the physical and chemical reactions of inorganic matter; at a still lower, in the emptiness of space.

But reality, or the sum of impossibilities, cannot resemble the sum of our impressions or any mathematical sum whatsoever. For it must include the universal relations, prospective and retrospective, of every illusion. That is to say, since reality is the total negation of phenomena and noumena alike, it must be independent of time and space and cannot endure any more than it can come into being or to an end.

All illusions, on the other hand, imply both permanence and change. First, a definite impression in our consciousness, or reaction in a material object, is indispensable to any conception of existence; and, secondly, this impression or reaction must forthwith be supplanted by another. Any notion that we gain of form, colour, sound, taste must be single; yet it may not exist except in contrast with other sensations. We are aware of the blue of the sky only by passing from this sensation to that of the green of the trees or the grey of the rock. And even a varied scene may not long be contemplated without fading from view.

Similar is the necessity of any positive inference drawn from a comparison of sensations already contrasted. To possess a meaning, it must be definitely formulated in the mind. Yet, if stated repeatedly, it loses this meaning. If carefully examined, it declines in importance. If discussed with a neighbour, it takes on a new aspect. If read in an old book, it provokes fresh criticism. If projected into the future, it collapses in absurdity. Other inferences, evidently, are at work, undermining the original one and, at the same time, paving the way for a third set. All terms being illusory, only negative inferences are perdurable.

In sum, every illusion must be both individual and universal and must not only begin and end but also be derived and eternal.

Hence reality alone is possible or knowable; having neither permanence nor mutability, it is the sufficient negation of both. Moreover, it is already partially known in the errors that have been eliminated, even as it is unknown in present perceptions and accepted positive inferences and in perceptions and inferences as yet impracticable.

Thus the universe, or nature, or existence, is the total subject of negation. Unlike the total negation, or reality, it contains nothing that may be destroyed save by a thing undestroyed; each error eliminated leaves its place well filled; even doubt

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and ignorance are positive. The attributes and functions of the universe are summarised in permanence and change: first permanence, then change; or first homogeneity, then differentiation. Permanence giving place to change — either in a simple perception, in a scheme of knowledge, or in the relations of material bodies — establishes what we call direction. Everything, as we say, moves forward, even retrospection being a forward process.

Knowledge of reality is ever present, impugning these terms and conclusions; but the subject of negation must yield with the utmost reluctance; else reality would be incomplete. And when the last error is eliminated, — the last shred of permanence snatched up by the ravishing hand of change, — reality is known by the total subject of its negation; and since reality may not be destroyed, triumphant change, the equivalent of all differentiation and knowledge, must yield unconditionally to permanence. For, if change were to retrace its steps, — if errors were to survive their destroyers, the smoke produce the fire, blossoms grow into buds, — existence must be, not a subject of negation but, a negation, itself.

The bearing of the conclusions reached above upon certain manifestations of the permanence, or inertia, inherent in man may be considered parenthetically in this place. In view of the hard-seem-

ing material of existence, man has always been eager for a complete and positive notion of things; — permanence, indeed, makes a stubborn resistance, yielding the least bit at a time; otherwise there could not be a total universe to be negatived. And often, when complete and positive notions have a suspicious look, man demands an explanation of infinitude even while insisting on a material reality. For example, it has often been said, in effect, "The conception of a total and illusory universe is unsatisfactory to me and must forever remain so. As I stand at my open window of an evening, how can I contemplate the stars of the firmament without asking what lies beyond? At the same time, I can see and hear waves of the sea breaking on the shore. How can I question the reality of this occurrence, especially as anybody in the house whom I may call to the window will describe it as I have done?"

The answer to these and similar questions has already been stated in the foregoing pages. In asking what lies beyond the numbered and numberable stars, man thinks of direction in a straight line. Yet various methods of inquiry similar to the one adopted in the present work and to those used in the pursuit of any vocation should readily satisfy him that the significance of a straight line cannot be a fundamental one; that, if he should learn to navigate space, it would little matter by what kind

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of line or lines he should steer his course since, if he had time enough, he must return to the place he had started from. He should as easily satisfy himself that there is no positive agreement amongst the members of his household as to the surf that is visible and audible from his window; that the only attainable agreement as to the phenomenon is a negative one, arrived at by reference of the surf to another phenomenon or of one wave to another wave; and, furthermore, that the error in his conception of the surf which he is able to eliminate represents but a portion of the total impossibility of the surf,— which total is indispensable to his reception of the concrete impression.

In sum, existence clearly implies differentiation, and differentiation may always be proved unreal. Therefore, definite conceptions of events cannot endure; they are useful only in connection with the rudimentary illusions of a material existence. On the other hand, a practical, or workable, conception of the unreality of events cannot be attained by us whose mental processes are always conditioned by material appearances. We cannot treat systematically of universal impossibilities; we may only recognize them as a necessity. This recognition is, itself, conditioned by material appearances yet constitutes a palpable success in the struggle for emancipation from the rule of matter. It may not be

turned immediately to account in the practical affairs of life; it may, however, and probably will, so illuminate the whole subject of men's relations with one another and with their material environment as profoundly to affect everybody's daily routine; and finally, it points unmistakably to human participation in an unearthly existence that includes material preoccupations only in retrospect and is not dependent, for its further development, on our present conceptions of the concrete.

Not that our immaterial counterparts will think of negation as we do upon earth; probably they will not think of it at all except in a historical sense. The specific negative agreements that represent our partial knowledge of reality will remain unassailable, but the form in which we state them will be seen to belong peculiarly to our position in the universe. That a trowel, for example, is not so good an implement for driving a nail as a hammer is will never be disputed; the essence of this proposition will, however, appear quite different to our immaterial successors from what it now appears to us, because its terms — the tools, themselves, and their usefulness in driving nails — will contain for them far less of permanence. In other words, no matter how incontestable a specific negative agreement may be, it must always embody a partial, or imperfect knowledge of reality, — a lesser knowledge than may

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forthwith be aspired to. And it is not to be supposed that incorporeal beings can harbour anything approaching the definite illusions that now compel us to have recourse to the general formula, Reality equals the total negation of universal processes. This formula has no pretension to durability; it is merely the best formula now available for eliminating some of our most useless prepossessions and some of the social evils that are inseparable from them.

The conditions have perhaps been sufficiently defined under which an examination of our actual status in the universe of permanence and change may be attempted. It should, however, be stated that no systematic consideration will here be undertaken of occurrences that may conceivably lie between the present age and the ultimate triumph of change. In subsequent portions of this work, the future of man will make the chief claim on our attention. The immediate purpose is rather to indicate the manner in which the existing system of appearances—the actual physical environment of man—may have been derived from the triumph of permanence. This project, to be sure, has no important bearing on the main purpose of the work. Moreover, it leads us eventually into the field of conjecture where logic proves impotent.

However, it should not prove a wholly unprofitable adventure if it yields nothing beyond a suggestive conception of the origin of certain general conditions that are naturally assumed as governing a material existence and have accordingly been correlated by means of symbols long familiar to us all.

In accordance with the conclusions reached above, absolute permanence is to be conceived as a universal, homogeneous substance. Permanence, universality, homogeneity, substance are jointly, or identically conceivable by virtue of the instant need of modification: that is to say, permanence must cease forthwith to be absolute; the least of changes must occur. If there were more than the minimum of change, there could not be a total universe to be negatived.

Now, change implies the introduction of certain new conditions that may be called quality, position, entity, time.

Any change of a universal substance must be a qualitative change. It is difficult, however, to think of qualitative changes as continuously in operation in the matter and ether of our actual world while it is comparatively easy to regard all observed qualitative changes as derived from changes of position amongst the elements involved. Hence the first modification of permanence is best conceived as establishing position and, therefore, entity. And

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the change of any portions of the universal substance greater than its ultimate units would exclude the necessary minimum of change. Each of these units, then, passes through or by — *i. e.*, changes places with — another unit.

Geometrical units of a continuous substance could pass neither through nor by one another; remaining forever fixed, they could have no existence, — *i. e.*, they could not supply a basis for differentiated illusions. But the units here under consideration cannot in any way resemble the units of matter or of electricity inasmuch as they must be neither numerable, destructible, formed, nor elastic. The sum of their attributes and functions is comprised within the two conceptions of universality, homogeneity, or permanence, and individuality, heterogeneity, or mutability. Each of their changes, then, must be one of position until every position has been taken by every unit, — *i. e.*, until no permanence remains for a further inroad of change.

In a qualitative sense, the first modification of permanence has introduced the minimum of differentiation.

Moreover, the taking of new positions must constitute still another condition of existence. Time, however, is not yet conceivable as a standard for measuring change, nor can it become such until the stubborn resistance to change has been productive

of a cosmic organisation sufficient to evolve the illusion of tri-dimensional space.

Now, the second change of units cannot re-establish absolute permanence without becoming an inadmissible negation. On the other hand, each set of changes must border as nearly on permanence as is compatible with avoidance of repetition of a previous set; otherwise, a total universe could not be established without the aid of retrogression. That is to say, each unit is repeatedly threatened with a renewal of old associations under perilously familiar conditions, the attraction of an insular existence being only less strong than the need to escape from it.

Three new conditions are now imminent; these may provisionally be called distance, direction, organisation. The units reluctantly enter new fields that must be extended with the successive phases of cosmic experience. Old haunts must still be revisited but with ever-increasing care to time the visit appropriately. And the new fields, as they are extended from different directions, must overlap and so create new centres of congestion. Eventually, local or central changes of different sets of units must be established for the purpose of exploiting, in a systematic manner, both the near and the distant regions of the universal substance,—continuous columns of migrants from these changes

ensuring, by virtue of their relative novelty, return columns of units from unfamiliar regions.

After a series of partial successes in this formation, central changes might be established with lines of supply penetrating throughout the universal substance. A further advantage would be derived from the mobility of these centres and from their association in groups possessing a continuously and regularly varied internal organisation. Centres possessing universal implications would be numerable and the groups formed by them might be indefinitely various in organisation, density, durability.

It is possible to indicate the resemblance of these hypothetical groups to the atoms of matter and to show that the attraction they would possess for one another would probably vary with the mass and inversely with the square of the distance. Here would be a condition equivalent to tri-dimensional space. Parallels may also be found for material impact, vibrations productive of ether waves and a number of other features of our physical environment.

The process by which these parallels may be established is a long one and will not be reviewed in the present work; it involves the transition from an ungeometrical to a geometrical point of view; hence, the results are not logically conclusive. But the

general notion, as above stated, of early phases of the universe of permanence and change should already be sufficiently suggestive of our actual environment and its presumable antecedents. Unassailable negative agreements — wherein new illusions supply us with a partial knowledge of reality — have compelled us to accept the universe as the sum of all subjects of negation and to invest it with the two attributes, or functions, of permanence and change; and, when we scan the available records of physical evolution we discover no material entity or process that is not readily conformable to this conception.

The atoms of all the so-called elements of matter have recently been shown to possess an organisation that is far from stable while the behaviour of certain elements seems to indicate that the facilities for a continued existence in the established form are approaching exhaustion. Likewise the mutual aversions and affinities of certain elements are such as would be expected in accordance with the conception of permanence and change.

Conversely, the development of solar and stellar systems from nebulous matter could not take place in the universe of permanence and change if such systems might produce nothing further than incandescent gases, water, solid minerals, and the various electrical phenomena inseparable from these enti-

ties; eventually repetitions of material processes must occur, with chaotic, or nullifying, implications. Somewhere a centre of more diversified activity must be established as a source of relief from the monotonous reactions of inorganic matter. One such centre, if its activity were progressive, might conceivably suffice for a considerable period, since the new activity must, in some degree, modify all universal relations. Such a centre would be supplied by the plants and animals of a planet like the earth, with their regular and various systems of metabolism and reproduction; and the simpler forms of life could not indefinitely support and perpetuate themselves unaided; in time, they must give place to, or exist alongside of, organisms more highly differentiated. Still later, and only under pressure of necessity, something must be developed of the nature of will and intelligent control.

Man's position in the universe of permanence and change is — in general, or as between certain alternatives — readily definable. The growing needs of cosmic differentiation have driven him to invent weapons and tools for hunting, fishing and agriculture, to plan wars and migrations and, finally, to assail with unremitting zeal the most baffling mysteries of his physical environment. Permanence is familiar to him in many forms, conspicuously in his own inertia which, nevertheless, he resolutely over-

comes to the end of self-preservation and the advantage of his posterity. Doubts assail him as to his capability of accelerating universal processes or of retarding them. He is not, however, a unit but a race considerably differentiated within itself; and individuals and communities within the race may, according to their energy or their indolence, participate in the highest or in the lowest activities of the age. Moreover, the importance of man in the universal scheme may vary in accordance with developments extra-terrestrial and mainly obscure; meanwhile, he performs the part that he has inherited along with his peculiar attributes. That is to say, man is accustomed to living in darkness that is relieved by fitful and uncertain gleams. A social revolution or an unforeseen discovery may appear to him to imply more than the minimum of change, even as an age of apathy and persecution may appear as a retrogression. For, in either case, his methods of estimating the underlying and compensative processes, even as confined to earthly events alone, are few and inadequate. Thus he is still painfully in doubt as to most of the elements in his situation that possess for him the deepest interest. He is uncertain, for example, how the numbers of the race may be reduced or its unfruitful preoccupations minimised to the end of an extension and improvement of its culture; has failed to discover

an effective safeguard against the vicious and clan-nish propensities inherent in his nature; finds it impossible either to contemplate, with any degree of equanimity, a future degeneration of the race or to devise any promising measures for averting the catastrophe. All of which perplexities are not only entirely intelligible in a universe of permanence and change but would also seem markedly susceptible of resolution through the establishment of a practical conception of its implications.

For, in the first place, the actual importance of man may be indefinitely great or small. It is certain that neither an earthly nor any other material existence can culminate in anything nearly approaching the triumph of change — that the universe would be as meaningless with any sublimated descendants of man for a final justification as it would have been without the evolution of life, itself. But, on the other hand, it is entirely conceivable that man's present position in the universe is that of a governing centre. Though he is unable to move his earth a hair's breadth from its orbit or consciously to modify the physical processes in operation in distant planets, such inventions as intelligible speech and letters, spectrosopes and radiometers, if indeed novel and peculiar to the earth, must have profoundly altered all fundamental, or universal, relations. Hence, they must have

altered — teleologically and however impalpably — the more superficial relations, or appearances, in which tri-dimensional space becomes a factor and in which man, himself, finds the prime requisites of his existence. And the rate of progressive differentiation in human activities may, or may not, be sufficient to satisfy the cosmic needs for a considerable period to come.

It should depend, then, upon the unestimated apparent magnitude of the universe and upon the unestimated apparent interval between absolute permanence and the present time, whether races similar to mankind must inhabit distant planets or whether man is still without a peer.

In the former case, the disappearance of the human race may occur at any time and in any one of an immense variety of ways.

In the latter case, as well, the race may conceivably perish before a similar race is developed, but not without leaving an active record of its sojourn upon earth. Or, on the other hand, man may continue, for an indefinite period, to improve the standard of his achievements in a progression limited only by the conditions of a material existence. And, at any juncture in his career, the minimum of universal change may be represented by a social revolution more comprehensive or by a scientific discovery more momentous than any that he has

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yet witnessed or dreamed of,— by a seeming defiance of his inertia that would startle the most curious and enterprising spirits of the present day. Thus a practical conception of the implications of permanence and change should serve to stimulate the confidence and mitigate the indolence and pessimism of man, for it should satisfy him that no reason exists why the present painful perplexities of civilised life should not eventually be classed with the difficulties experienced by his primitive ancestors in maintaining a home in the trees.


We have seen, though, how strongly our consideration of permanence and change has emphasised the immensity of this universe and the relative crudity of the highest imaginable phase of earthly existence. How inevitably, then, must our thoughts turn to an immaterial future! Our thoughts; not, perhaps, our eyes! Doubtless we cannot hope to behold human shapes busy with earthly vocations. May we not, however, set apart many things that we shall certainly *not* be doing, thinking, feeling beyond the grave? If so, may we not forecast, within certain limits, the conditions of this immaterial existence? May we not, at the very least, find an ulterior significance of human personality that shall bear directly on our conduct upon earth? ✓

Let us proceed to this central theme of our inquiry; which theme will at first be approached

entirely without reference to the foregoing pages. That is to say, we shall first consider how immortality is regarded by people who seldom trouble themselves with metaphysical problems. Subsequently the two parts of the work will be connected.

PART II

THE MEANING OF IMMORTALITY



THE MEANING OF IMMORTALITY

IT is difficult to bear with one calling the subject threadbare, its discussion unprofitable. Not merely has he taken a temporary leave of his senses; he must be suspected, furthermore, of shamming, — of holding up a mask before his indolence or of explaining in advance the seizure of some particularly luscious fruit of the earth.

That anybody in full possession of his faculties should look forward to the remaining years of his earthly existence — a period comprising some less than hundredth part of the similar existence of his historical ancestors — and say to himself seriously, This is the one affair of real importance to me, is plainly unbelievable. Whenever this remarkable boast is actually uttered, its author implies that the life he values so highly should, by rights, have been no concern of the forbears, immediate or remote, who made it possible; that he should, himself, make no effort to provide for his children, however young, beyond his death, however imminent; that he is living on a plane apart from all those who are capable of making such provision; that he should

ignore all persons, living or dead, who seem unlikely to contribute to his own immediate well-being; hence, that a successful simulation of these and many other of the usual interests of life is essential to his safety and comfort, may prove so engrossing as to leave but a narrow margin of energy for other pursuits and can avail him little in the end, since he is incapable of taking pride even in the name for conspicuous dishonesty that he may leave behind. In accordance with his assumption, books and newspapers, music and pictures, schools and factories,—even the intelligible speech on his own lips,—must appear to him as the products of a visionary and incomprehensible forethought: to but few, if any, of the familiar accessories of human existence can he attach a relative, or practical, value. Even the door of avarice would be closed to one so meagrely equipped for life; mere glut of senses, unrelieved by other activities, would soon make an end of him.

Evidently, no such belief, nor anything nearly approaching it, has ever existed in any mind, although the contrary, and less irrational, belief—namely, that the earthly existence of any man or generation of men is devoid of significance—has been aspired to, and perhaps actually held, by many.

Thus it is clear that posterity is an important concern of all men. But it could not, in any man-

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ner or degree, be the concern of one utterly without hope of knowing it. Hence the inevitable conclusion that man is not only entirely without reason to regard the grave as the goal of life but either is endowed with, or invariably acquires, an active faith in the hereafter. And when the general scheme of life among the lower animals is taken into consideration, — the force, ubiquity and frequently suicidal character of the procreative impulse; the industrious and amazingly ingenious preparations for offspring; the care lavished on its nourishment and training without expectation of earthly recompense, — it is impossible to doubt that, in each living creature, an instinct of immortality goes hand in hand with the fear of death and instinct of self-preservation.

This paradox is well illustrated in the life of man. We have seen that both the most elementary and the most characteristic activities of man imply a faith in the hereafter; it is, however, equally certain that man often behaves, either individually or in groups of any size, as if this faith were practically negligible. Every now and then, one man says to another, Your money or your life! Recently a war broke out that would have been a mere absurdity if the instinct of self-preservation were generally subordinate to the equally fundamental faith in immortality. So the question arises and cannot persistently be ignored, How is this faith in immor-

tality ever-present, all-pervasive, indispensable yet liable, at any moment, to be set at naught? And probably all those who exclaim upon the futility of the question continue, nevertheless, to speculate upon the answer. Let us examine the elements of this paradox.

It is undoubtedly hard to say Good-bye to one's friends, to see one's cherished projects cut off in mid course, to take one's last look at the blue of the skies and the green of the fields. Even if death, itself, be not in question, it is hard to contemplate the adversity that may be worse than death, — to look forward to humiliation and want and the lack of familiar opportunities for betterment. We sometimes deny the right of any one to inflict these injuries and losses upon others in order that he be spared, himself. We may also pronounce such aggression imprudent since, even within the limits of an earthly life, it is generally impossible to give punishment without taking some in return while, the lower the price of the first aggression, the more severe may be the reckoning reserved for the future. Yet, generally speaking, the more there are who fear to be separated from their wives and children or deprived of their possessions, and the stronger is this incentive of fear, the greater will be the number of widows and orphans and the more widespread the confiscation or devastation of property. For it is

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still customary to safeguard one's welfare by destroying or crippling any who threaten it and so incurring the risk of similar treatment from revengeful or suspicious neighbours.

Thus it appears that, in the fear of death, the inertia inherent in man and in all living creatures is strongly in evidence; on the other hand, it is equally clear that this fear also represents a reduction of this inertia since, without the instinct of self-preservation, no creatures could continue to exist and reproduce their kind. For all practical purposes, the inertia, or permanence, here involved is readily separable from the altruism, or change, upon consideration of a general principle that governs the lives of the vast majority of men and of the lower animals,—a principle that may be expressed roughly as follows: We are here; hence we purpose to remain, creating, producing. When we believe, rightly or wrongly, that our productive power upon earth is not exhausted, we fear death and seek to preserve ourselves. When we have lost all hope in life but have retained an active hope in death, or when our death seems the most productive act of which we are capable, we do not fear death; we embrace it.

The lower animals are more strictly subject to this principle than man because, in them, the instinct of immortality, like many of their more

special instincts, has not been exposed to certain hostile influences, presently to be considered, that have accompanied the superior differentiation of the human race. Yet even in man, the interdependence of self-preservation and productive power is sufficiently marked to exclude the possibility of another and incompatible governing principle. The mere fact of physical death, under whatever circumstances, seems unintelligible on any other ground.

In man, then, altruism is manifested in the ability to judge roughly, or in accordance with the best available knowledge,— and whether logically or intuitively,— when life is preferable, when death; what sacrifices are desirable in the interest of self-preservation; what constitutes a reasonable incentive to suicide or its equivalent.

Inertia, on the other hand, is manifested in wars and murders, in the oppression of one individual or community by another without due regard to the ulterior loss or benefit that may result to the oppressor, in the attenuated existence of the aimless and the depraved, in the sedulous rearing of defective offspring. These and certain other forms of human inertia will be discussed in the final division of the present work. Meanwhile we should consider the form of this inertia that is perhaps all-inclusive: namely, man's reasoned doubts of the hereafter,— an aspect of his situation in which

man appears less lucky than the simpler denizens of the woods and waters.

When man descends from his ancient habitation in the trees and proceeds, by virtue of his superior dexterity, to acquire a mastery over the forest, he is not long in discovering that the earth, so far as he knows it, contains no living creature that may rival him. One of the principal factors in his success is a faculty, even a necessity, of organisation; that is to say, all his social life implies subordination. Now, as a race, he is apparently subordinate to none. Yet he is at the mercy of the elements; here, probably, is both the symbol and the effective weapon of an authority higher than his own. The elements, then, and the obvious sources of light and heat should be revered and, if possible, propitiated. Moreover, one's own hereafter has to be considered,—the primeval heritage of the race. Our heroic dead — the strong ones and the shrewd ones that we have seen or been told of — may have a hand in the governing of this world which is clearly not governed by ourselves. Here, too, would be something more easily thought of in time of stress than the elements or the heavenly bodies; here would be rulers in our own shape. Who knows but one of them may have gained possession of the sun! But what of us little people who are not heroes?

Here, upon earth, we are rewarded with the things we most desire when we have served our masters well. And when we have betrayed them, we are punished till we can endure no more. This must be right and proper, for it is evident that no other plan could succeed. But there are many masters and the temptation of reward is great. Sometimes our treachery has prospered; often we have been punished for others' misdeeds; and often we have failed to receive the reward that was our due. Surely these injustices are known to the great ones who will decide what is to become of us when we die. But which will weigh heaviest in the scale, — our good deeds or our transgressions? Shall we have the honey-sweets that we have tasted and still ardently desire or the lash that is terrible to think of, if it is to be wielded forever?

As the race becomes increasingly differentiated, various theories of the kind of hereafter to be expected make their appearance, some of these being of a sufficiently vague, or general, character to appeal to the most curious spirits of many generations. But amongst the most active and materially progressive peoples, the kind of theory mainly in demand is one that represents earthly man as passing directly, or through but few intermediate phases, to his eternal punishment or reward. And the kind

of theory that is in demand is often the kind that must instantly be supplied, if social ruin is to be averted. Man cannot do without religion. As he advances in the devious paths of civilisation, it is imperative that his faith in immortality be made use of for rendering his course more simple, — less subject to stultifying whims of self-interest.

Eventually, however, an improved knowledge of natural processes, together with the growing divergence between the different branches of the race, bring under suspicion any hereafter in which the souls associated with material creatures of the earth may forthwith assume a final or eternal importance. All men are still metaphysicians but the differentiation of their metaphysics is now obvious and comparatively great.

Thus, in the western world, the indolent, the hurried and the incurious still find a Heaven and a Hell all but sufficient for their speculative needs; to these it seems unnecessary to be inquisitive concerning successive steps beyond the grave, especially as the actual existence of the Heaven and the Hell are represented to them as having been vouched for by an omniscient being. Among them, here and there, is a passionate soul whose communion with the God of early lessons is so intimate and overpowering that to contemplate the possibility of similar communions with Gods of other implications

is utterly out of the question. All these are doubtless wise in continuing, as long as they are able, to accept the religion of their fathers on the authority of men who have found in this religion their vocation in life, even as they are unhappy in opposing a prudential resistance to the onset of logical doubts. At all events, it is increasingly difficult to remain indolent; the hurried are given to pauses for reflection that may be useful in their employment; and the incurious are forever being forced to accept ideas that have developed in more enterprising minds. In short, — if the most abnormal individuals and the most backward divisions of the race be left out of account, — anybody is likely, at any moment, to find himself enlisted in an important movement for the elimination of error.

Accordingly, there are many in the western world who, having been brought up in the church only to be beset with doubts as to its doctrine and history, fall back to the point of view — as supplied by an appropriate training of the youthful mind — from which a finer inspiration may be detected in the familiar formulas than in those of other religions.

Others revolt at the injustice of a damnation of the ignorant while any who enjoy better opportunities of enlightenment may profit by the comparison; these perceive an absurdity in the unmerited favour of God.

Still others assert their inability to conceive of souls emerging from human bodies only to be plunged, without further preparation, in an ecstatic reverie and perpetual bliss; they deny the possibility of successive phases of this perfection; and they further deny that souls associated with human beings may suffer torments, physical or moral, that are protracted beyond human endurance. Immortality, according to these, must mean something more than a form of words indefinitely repeated; and, even if they were to be damned for it, they could find no meaning in Heaven and Hell.

On the other hand, the eastern world, given more to reflection and less to material preoccupations, still contains many believers in a hereafter less concrete, and therefore less incapable of being maintained in consideration, than is prescribed in the dogmas of Christianity and Mohammedanism. Eastern doctrines, however, are likewise demanding to be modified or altogether displaced. Among their former votaries agnosticism now claims many of the more educated while a genuine or assumed Mohammedanism or Christianity has become the transient property of great numbers of the simpler people.

In sum, the reduction of human inertia is manifest, within all civilised races, in the flood of logical criticism that gradually overwhelms all theories of the hereafter demanding either the association of

human personality, in a stable form, with ultimate or eternal processes or the subordination, or inequality, of human souls in any final justification of existence.

On the other hand, the tenacity of man's *inertia* is as clearly perceived in the tendency, created by this same logical criticism of specific doctrines, to discredit the universal faith in *immortality* and so to question the possibility of a hereafter on any terms. Here, evidently, is a potent, if not the single, factor in human pessimism. For it is well known that the position of civilised man, in respect of his religions, has always been fraught with the most painful difficulties. In this and in all the lesser concerns of life, man finds it impossible to continue indefinitely in a simple ancestral faith, yet learns that each innovation brings hardship and misgiving in its train. First one, then another, of his possessions must be yielded up as the price of his advancement in differentiation, and he may never recover the precise thing he has lost although he may acquire that which enables him to do without it. Clearly the elimination of error does not consist exclusively in a series of pleasing discoveries.

At certain junctures in history, the peril of a reasoned pessimism has loomed uncommonly big, — seemingly unprecedented. Whether the present age recalls earlier crises of this nature is a question that

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need not concern us here, inasmuch as the obligation to combat pessimism in any form is a perennial and an obvious one and as a deliberate effort to perform this task is certain eventually to bear fruit. Let us inquire, then, what ideas may be formed of the immortality of man in a universe of permanence and change. First, however,— and at some length,— the conditions should be stated, to which this undertaking is necessarily subject.

Our earth is presumably a very special kind of abode. We know of no other planet that closely resembles it; and even if we were to learn of the existence of such a planet, our discovery could not affect the following necessities of our position as the most highly conscious denizens of the earth.

We are unable to create life in a laboratory; no more can we resurrect our dead; if we were able and willing to do both, we should soon render the earth uninhabitable. We can neither expect nor seriously wish for another earth when this one has grown stale, as it will eventually do. Yet all the pain and pleasure and all the simplest sensations, thoughts and acts that may be associated with the souls of men, as we know them in life or may conceive them after death, must likewise be associated with this earth of ours, as it is now and has been in the past. For, if we conceive a planet a little bigger or smaller

than the earth,— a little hotter or colder, with a year a little longer or shorter,— we are conceiving one incapable of the production of actual man who is the resultant of thousands of generations of creatures developing in accordance with strictly terrestrial conditions of life. And if we conceive a soul possessed of a single attribute amongst others that is incompatible with the observed result of these long generations of earthly existence,— a soul magnanimous that recks not of bread and salt; a soul poetic without cognizance of melody, rhythm or the stars of a summer sky,— we are conceiving that which nobody of today could recognize as the soul of a man. In short, we must, ourselves, be very special creatures, not easily separable from our domain.

Evidently, too, we are very rudimentary creatures, in respect of the highest certainties reached by ourselves. We have recently learned that our loaves, our tunes and the stars of our firmament are not the fundamental entities we used to think them, but illusions produced we know not how. Hence our morality, our politics and all systems of knowledge and conduct resting on these supposed entities are awaiting dissolution. In short, we have become so enlightened as to acquire a meagre but unassailable notion of the obscurity in which we live. And the significance of this achievement is increasingly



in evidence. Thus the man who was hungry and said, "Anyhow, a loaf is a loaf to me," is more than ever liable to ask, "And now, what?" after he is satisfied. And when he has eaten his last loaf, he may again ask, "And now, what?" and with a greater insistence than would have been possible to his forbears. In this connection, certain conditions necessarily governing the sequel of death may be summarised as follows.

Matter, as we have seen, must be a product of immaterial processes; and permanence figures in it so conspicuously as to necessitate an elimination of the material illusion at an indefinite distance, probably very great, from the perfection of existence, or triumph of change. Yet matter is the basis of all human calculations, — even of those involved in the disintegration of the material illusion. And the geometrical concepts invariably suggested by inmaterial appearances are indispensable, both in the ordinary business of life and in the elimination of geometrical error. Thus, for any immediate purpose whatsoever, a man can no more acquire and maintain an ungeometrical outlook on the world than he can persistently forget his own name and identity. A hypothetical pedagogue of superhuman intellect would be powerless to divorce him from his material preoccupations except through a modification of his entire physical and mental constitution,

in comparison with which the gulf between men and the lower animals must be slight. And if the divorce should eventually be complete, the man in question — in so far as he should retain his individuality — must be a long way from perfection, on the one hand, and from the concerns of his earthly career, on the other.

These conditions, then, cannot be absent from the hereafter. The soul of a man cannot be separated from material considerations without losing its earthly identity. And death cannot be an introduction to eternity; it must, however, be one of many stepping-stones to perfection. Eternity, for that matter, — in accordance with the conclusions reached in the first division of this work, — can only be conceived as an equivalent of the universe, or total subject of negation, within which are found the various traditional conceptions of eternity, such as those of a never-ending absorption of the knowable and of a state of bliss or torment indefinitely maintained. Perfection, as we have seen, — *i. e.*, the triumph of change, or total knowledge of reality, — may not endure; it contains, however, the eternal, or universal, necessity of perfection.

The first conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations may be stated as follows. In view of the individuality, or localism, of man, as well as of the law of minimum change, it is inevitable that

each human soul, in response to posthumous influences of either an earthly or an unearthly character or both, will reach a point of view from which its possessor's forefathers, contemporaries and earthly posterity may be surveyed. Equally inevitable is the eventual association of all the developing souls of humanity upon a plane of immaterial existence where punishments and rewards of an earthly character may no longer produce the old sensations and emotions although possessed of an import more extensive and intelligible than before.

Such an evolution of the soul of man, together with the preservation of a total record of the earth, is implied in the conclusions that we have already reached respecting the universe of permanence and change. Let us, however, consider this necessity exclusively from the standpoint of man, himself, rather than from that of his physical environment. To this end, we should first inquire, what are the circumstances that have suggested to man the idea of his own soul.

For one thing, he is a conscious and rational being provided with an instinct of immortality. But it remains to be asked why he should ever have entertained so exalted a notion of his own soul as to fancy that it might emerge from his dead body and, either forthwith or after an interval of blankness, participate in the perfection of existence. This

notion, though rapidly becoming obsolete, cannot have been produced out of blind arrogance. Indeed, its origin in honest ratiocination is not far to seek.

As a race, man possesses but a single obvious standard by which to judge himself. Gods and heroes having been taken from the race, itself, or derived from its ideals of superlative manhood, have always proved inadequate as a basis of comparison. But man did not create the lower animals; and here alone, in all the world, he may find something resembling himself. The animal kingdom, to be sure, is more highly diversified than any single species; yet man is able to generalise liberally in the distinctions that he draws between his own life and that of large classes of the other animals or even of the whole kingdom, exclusive of himself. The purpose of the present work would not be served by a lengthy recital of particulars in which the life of man differs from that of the lower creatures. A brief survey of the main points should, however, help to explain our traditional notions of the human soul, and, therefore, to suggest the kind of immortality and the kind of belief in it to which man is logically entitled.

In the first place, man, as we have seen, has lost much of the simple, unquestioning faith in immortality that is implied in both the instinctive acts and the systematic parental training of many ani-

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mals. There is no reason to doubt that this faith has belonged to all animals including primitive man, while the possibility and general need of reproduction would be unintelligible upon any other supposition. This faith, moreover, is an essential characteristic of the present generation of men. But with the increasing differentiation of intellectual activity has come a clearer sense of human ignorance and crudity. This new consciousness is probably almost entirely absent from the reckoning of the lower animals; in man it is attended with misgivings in every department of life and with the insistent demand for a rational solution of doubt. When one fear is allayed, another springs up in its place,—a process that will be everywhere in evidence in the total record of human thought upon earth. Yet if man were to be satisfied with a blind faith in the hereafter for which no word or characteristic sign had been invented, it is obvious that he would have ceased to be man and would again resemble the lower creatures from which he sprang.

Hence it is not surprising that, in the affairs of life and death, the lower animals often exhibit a better judgment and truer sympathy than do the vast majority of men. Many of them kill off the weakly and useless members of the tribe while providing for their normal offspring with a solicitude that most human parents would hardly care to

emulate. The decrepit, or mortally wounded, denizen of the forest seeks out a hiding-place; here a peaceful sleep overtakes him from which he never awakens. It is exceedingly rare for a wild animal to kill except for the purpose of securing food, a mate, the safety of the family, or of settling the important question of leadership of the tribe,— all of which considerations are implied in an instinct of immortality.

On the other hand, the human parent, though often neglectful of his normal offspring, has acquired a sense of sin that sometimes impels him to lavish consideration on a hopelessly unhappy child on the theory that it should be compensated, as far as possible, for deficiencies for which it is not responsible. Generally the aged and the incurable, far from wishing to curtail an empty or miserable existence, have recourse to a multitude of devices for deferring to the utmost the last day that they shall spend upon earth; and what seems the imminence of death is often but the introduction to a prolonged and painful struggle with the inevitable. The provocations upon which men kill one another when the questions of livelihood, mating, protection of the young, welfare of the community are either not directly implicated or may easily, by virtue of the killing, assume a new aspect unfavourable to the killer are too many to be mentioned in this place:

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some of them will be discussed in subsequent pages.

Likewise the following peculiar activities and susceptibilities of civilised man undoubtedly bear a close relation to the modifications in his faith in immortality.

Scientific research has enabled man slightly to increase his length of life; he is, however, terrorised by a long list of diseases from which the less inventive animals leading a simpler life are immune.

Similarly, the business of reproduction is attended with new and manifold perils. Some of these are due to various abuses of the reproductive faculty in which the restless brain of man has found a sorry advantage in his peculiar anatomy. Not only has Mother Earth been introduced to the offence of rape by the ablest of her sons; she has been compelled to witness, from the same source, other perversions of sex that bear not the least resemblance to the practices of her humbler children. Moreover, the individualism of man has now become so powerful a factor in his life as often to conceal from him the essential character of the reproductive instinct. Thus, for the most part, his performance of the procreative act is no longer the rare and seasonable consummation of an overmastering and altruistic impulse; on the other hand, it frequently appears to him only as a means of sensual gratification while the production of offspring is reckoned as a for-

tuitous and perhaps undesirable consequence. Or again, forgetting that the procreative impulse is generally strongest in young and untaught animals, he seems to perceive in sensualism the means by which nature ensures the propagation of species.

The word, sensualism, is doubtless intelligible in as broad a sense as any one may like to give to it; however, there can be no question that, in respect of any conceivable sensualism, man differs profoundly from most of the wild creatures. Indeed, to call him the inventor of sexual and all other sensualism is no great exaggeration, since markedly sensual propensities amongst the lower animals are, by comparison, exceedingly rare. Men vary greatly, to be sure, in respect both of bodily temperament and of intelligent control; yet, when the occasion is ripe, civilised men, individually or collectively, may be seen engaged in orgies of cruelty, lust, or intoxication which are generally called brutal because of the prominence of elemental appetites in the lives of simpler animals, although all these excesses merely emphasize the width of the gulf separating man from all other living creatures.

The loss of a simple faith is equally in evidence amongst many of the censors of these carnal sinners,—the numerous class of prim, pious and unenterprising persons whose meagre experience of

life explains their reluctance to condone any weakness not their own.

And finally,—since it is both unnecessary and impossible here to run over the whole gamut of human misfortunes,—the greedy and cantankerous propensities of skeptical man are well illustrated in the relations between the different classes of modern society. For example, a gentleman who watches the workmen trudging sullenly forth from a factory or their families swarming uneasily in the slums of a great city may experience a thrill of horror at the thought that, but for the firm, relentless hand of the law, a mere nothing would suffice to set these people angrily against him. Only the fear of policemen's clubs and prison-bars prevents them from plundering his house and treating its inmates with the utmost violence and disrespect. At the same time, the most thoughtful and least rebellious of these workmen may be filled with resentment and perplexity when he considers the gentleman's manner of passing an evening. Food, he knows, is wasted nightly,—likewise all manner of effort contributing to shows that excite envy but provide little further satisfaction to those who order them. Meanwhile he is, himself, perpetually in danger of wanting for the necessities of life and cannot be reasonably certain that his best efforts will avert catastrophe.

Fresh manifestations of the skepticism and supposed decadence of man make their appearance with each generation. At one time, they may seem comparatively rare; at another, they have suddenly become so glaring and frequent as to suggest all manner of remedies, violent or calculated. Meanwhile, the pinnacle of earthly power and universal knowledge to which man alone may climb is being reared by him boldly and forever skyward. Men must eventually cease to be born; their work, however, cannot be destroyed, and the most obscure will undoubtedly behold the finished edifice. Now and again a thought, an emotion, or a special creative faculty is lost along with a portion of our simple faith; at the same time, others are evolved that command instant attention. Superstitions are more easily lost than arts; new sciences spring into existence and rapidly become indispensable, leading to workable generalisations and hence to unforeseen negative agreements,—the material we build with for all time. And in the whole known world, nothing appears at once so inscrutable and so suggestive as the mind and heart of a man; undoubtedly, in other words, the progress of knowledge will be slowest in the most absorbing and promising department of research,—the one that makes us better acquainted with ourselves. Indeed, in this universe of differentiation approaching perfection,

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it seems hardly an idle conjecture that the total differentiation now external to man may be less significant than what is immediately implied in a single highly developed human being.

Now, the altruism of all living creatures — even as embodied in the instinct of the lowest animals — belongs obviously to change and not to that which is overcome by change. Human altruism, then, must be expected to have reached a height commensurate with the extraordinary differentiation that characterises human life and thought. This it appears indeed to have done. Man recurs less often to his simple faith, even as he has lost much of the muscular power and keenness of bodily sense belonging to the animals most nearly related to him: these possessions have been included in the price paid for mastery and a varied life. Accordingly, he becomes heir to countless miseries that are inseparable from a loss or impairment of the more elementary altruism still prevailing in the wild; he has, however, evolved new forms of altruism whose import is so extensive as, by comparison, to dwarf the simple and almost mechanical consideration shown by one animal for another or for the tribe.

Let us here consider the forms of altruism in respect of which man either is pre-eminent or stands alone. In so doing, we have always to bear in mind that the unparalleled differentiation of man is not

exclusively represented by the successive phases of his intellectual and emotional activity but is strikingly in evidence in the diversified character of the race, itself. Indeed,—supposing man to be the actual dynamic centre of the universe,—the difference, both in present importance and in immediate destiny, between the highest and the lowest types of man must be vastly greater than any differences between the most widely separated of extraneous species. And the comparatively slight structural variations in the several branches of the race merely emphasise the portentous supremacy of the highest human type. If we imagine the earth as peopled only with the lowest races of men and the existing species of other animals, we shall perceive that its future, as an abode of life, must be remarkably uneventful as compared with its history of the last few thousand years. Thus, we readily conceive the average wild animal of a given species as one closely resembling the vast majority of other animals of this species; but we cannot speak intelligibly of the average man except in a restricted sense, as, for example, of the average of a specific race, nation or class or of the people who happen to be under discussion. Even in these senses, the word generally proves misleading except when used in connection with the more immediate concerns of life. In the course of the foregoing pages, mention has been

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made of the majority of men: this indefinite portion of humanity was contrasted with the lower animals generally, in respect of the most elementary of animal activities, such as killing, feeding, reproduction, early training of offspring. But in respect of the forms of altruism to which man is indebted for his pre-eminence in the world, the majority of any company, however small, are always far from a positive agreement; and the recognition of an average opinion is merely a more or less convenient and excusable perversion of fact. Hence, any estimates of human altruism in which the highest achievements of individual men are denied a predominant place must be of little value either in a theoretical survey of existence or in any projects for the brightening of man's earthly outlook.

This conclusion, though obviously in consonance with the conception of permanence and change, should be further elucidated through the proposed discussion of certain specific forms of altruism, — which discussion should, at the same time, wind up our inquiry into man's traditional inferences concerning his own soul and its destiny. Let us consider, first, two qualities — fidelity and courage — that are shared by man and the lower animals, and afterwards the altruism of which man is the only recognised source.

Fidelity will here be understood as the loyal devotion to a purpose or to any creature other than mate, offspring and kin. Of this fidelity the dog furnishes a striking example. To be sure, he is one of the most highly bred of domestic animals and has learned so much of man as to be able, in some ways, to imitate him. Moreover, he is dependent on man; and often an individual dog regards himself as wholly dependent on an individual man. Nevertheless the devotion, often unrequited or even punished, of a dog to his master is one of the most impressive facts in the history of animals. Undoubtedly most civilised men are essentially incapable of a fidelity such as this. Yet the fidelity of all dogs has limits, and the fidelity of some men has none. Except in self-defence, a dog stops short of the supreme effort; but men and women often work themselves to the bone or suffer gratuitously and to the point of exhaustion for the sake of persons worthy and unworthy or of causes hopeful or trivial. The test of life and death is passed successfully by the dog; he will risk himself for his master or follow him to the grave; but he cannot face unfamiliar dangers and will endure avoidable pain only when the habit of obedience or the instinct of self-preservation demands it.

Evidently fidelity implies courage; and, in general, the courage of man and brute presents a con-

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trast similar to that of their fidelity. The wild creatures of the woods are taught in early youth to recognise their enemies; thenceforth the perils of one day are very similar to those of the next. The enemy is always assumed to be near at hand and is evaded or succumbed to in a manner strikingly mechanical. There are competent observers who believe that the joy of the pursued often exceeds that of the pursuer. At any rate, if a fight is out of the question, the quarry, when overtaken, submits gracefully to the inevitable and is probably entranced before the *coup de grâce* is delivered. Indeed, the show of ferocity with which certain animals attack others or defend their young may be primarily a muscular accompaniment of the combat and only secondarily a ruse, so free do the wild creatures generally appear from the abject terror that is often written on the human countenance when life—or only material welfare or social precedence—is at stake. But let the proudest animal be confronted, for the first time, with a blazing log, a quaking earth or a diminutive but calm-eyed man; the splendid self-possession for which we envy him vanishes like a dream and his behaviour becomes erratic, perverse, perhaps suicidal. Even the most intelligent and mobile of the wild animals lack the requisite courage for taking a pronounced initiative; hence they are unlikely to add much to their experi-

ence of the earth prior to their disappearance as species.

Doubtless the conservatism of the animals is no more fortuitous than the enterprise of man. But the point here under discussion is a more immediate one. Thus, we are aware that, while all animal species but the human have been modified largely in response to a changing environment, the higher races of men, but not the lower, have shown a stubborn determination that has won for them an effective control over a considerable field of earthly events. They have suffered the worst possible torments for opinion's sake and have refused to be finally balked by any of the perils known, unknown or imaginary that have lain conspicuously or supposedly in their path. Since the day when their intelligence was no menace to the rival animals of their domain, they have braved all these animals as well as devils, dragons, insects with a demonstrably poisonous bite, deadly and loathsome diseases, and all the terrors of the elements; they have penetrated to the farthest regions of the earth, succoured one another under the most outlandish and unfavourable circumstances, and acquired a valuable knowledge of the most minute things upon the earth and of many things far distant from the earth. Many of them still possess the bravery of the lion but fear to be misunderstood or shunned or exposed

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to ridicule; others are less afraid of public opinion than of a snake or a bee; a few have many kinds of courage. In sum, human courage, various though it be, is the only courage that has always led to fresh opportunities for conscious advancement: it has made possible the development of an altruism for which no semblance of an analogy is now discoverable.

Even as the highest achievements of individuals are those which have affected the greatest number of productive men, so the highest and characteristic altruism of the race is one that concerns itself with general principles but not with specific acts except in so far as they may be generalised. It is concerned, for example, with wife-beating; it is seldom concerned with the question whether a certain man did or did not yesterday beat his wife; it is always concerned to make husbands less ready to beat their wives. This altruism is associated with certain faculties that, for the purposes of this discussion, may be regarded as exclusively human; probably the most important of them are logic, emulative effort and impersonal curiosity.

Man's facility in syllogisms often enables him deliberately, or causes him unconsciously, to forego a careful scrutiny of their premises. Yet reasoning of a higher order than prevails among other animals pervades all his activities; and without this peculiar

faculty he would have been unable to develop formulas adequate for the intensely gregarious life he leads.

Emulation of an ideal has produced all manner of practical results, auspicious and calamitous; competition for the material prizes of life is a more elementary business whose scope, probably, is soon to be greatly contracted. Both these activities have been, directly or indirectly, productive of a striking diversification of human altruism, while the prominence of the competitive spirit has long been a theoretical obsession of certain minds and has repeatedly been represented as a fundamental and permanent characteristic of humanity. The ambition to possess and the ambition to excel will be considered in the final division of the present work. Meanwhile, a word concerning the most efficient of all definable factors in the peculiar altruism of man.

In the ordinary course of a man's life, impersonal curiosity is far less strikingly in evidence than the impulse to get the better of another man and carry off the woman or the booty. At certain junctures, too, it has a flabby look; at others, a ludicrous or a suspicious. It counts for little in the daily give-and-take; the hungry and the persecuted have no use for it. Moreover, curiosity cannot be entirely impersonal. Even when all thought of present gain and mastery is clearly out of the question, man's

curiosity points first to an individualised posterity. Yet, in proportion as it is dissociated from considerations of personal safety and worldly advantage, it must produce enduring results, because anything that is examined, as far as possible, in the light of its general implications must prove more suggestive than the same thing when examined for its bearing on a specific and unreproducible juncture in the life of a particular individual or community. And, in point of fact, one may easily satisfy oneself that the eagerness of man to turn all new experience immediately to account — like the apprehensive or predacious inquisitiveness of bear or lynx — is insufficient, of itself, profoundly to alter the life of the race. Something more is required to explain even the material supremacy of man, and this can only be the propensity to investigate things for their own sake. Indeed, but for man's liberal outlay in disinterested research, the inventors of practical devices for securing the mere physical safety of a race advancing in the perilous paths of civilisation would have had no groundwork of knowledge for their inventions. Hygiene would remain a matter of old wives' tales; current events would be known only through the medium of special messengers; there would be a hundred political systems to every one that actually exists today. Similarly, if man fails, in the future, to enlarge the scope of this disinter-

ested research, the demands of human differentiation cannot be met and degeneracy must become an acknowledged fact.

The products of impersonal curiosity are to be found in every department of life. Amongst them are the workman's satisfaction with a piece of work well done, — which is invaluable to society as establishing a standard that cannot be ignored by more desultory workmen, — the untiring investigation of all classes of physical phenomena by men capable of gaining a wider renown and bigger material reward in other fields, and the genuine interest evinced by men and women of nearly all classes in books, music and other works of art that have no direct bearing on their own lives. No doubt it is exceptional for anybody's curiosity to be wholly dissociated from a prospective advantage over other men. Altogether impossible, on the other hand, must be a purely competitive interest in winning a woman, excelling in an art, prospering in an industry, acquiring a material possession, or gaining prestige in any province of human affairs. Such an interest, bearing no relation to the intrinsic merits of the desired object or chosen vocation, is clearly an absurdity, — non-existent in any mind.

Likewise, the ulterior consequences of an exercise of impersonal curiosity are discoverable, sooner or later, in every department of life. They include a

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decrease in the numbers of the hungry, the persecuted, the greedy, the tyrannical; they serve, moreover, as an index of man's progress in the universal altruism whose goal is a perfect knowledge of reality. The future of human altruism, as a factor in earthly events, will presently be considered at some length. Meanwhile, however, the results of the above discussion should be formulated.

The survey here undertaken of the vileness of man, on the one hand, and of his moral eminence, on the other, should for one thing, supply an obvious commentary on the curious doctrine of the immutability of human nature. It should further disclose — what chiefly concerns us in this place — the source of man's traditional inferences respecting his own soul and its destiny. Man's advance in differentiation has entailed both a higher altruism, that is limited only by the material conditions of his existence, and skeptical misgivings that are forever inciting him to unhealthy, cowardly and iniquitous practices such as are rarely or never resorted to by the lower animals. For good and for evil, he knows himself to be enormously superior to any living creature of whose existence he is aware. Thus it is hardly surprising that this knowledge, when taken in connection with his essential faith in immortality, should suggest to him the notion of a hereafter in

which he may forthwith behold perfection or suffer in perpetuity.

At this point, however, his crowning achievement should begin to make itself felt. The achievement, to be sure, is not complete, — is perhaps in an elementary stage. We have seen, nevertheless, that the results of man's disinterested research have already pointed decisively to the immense crudity of his intellect and personality relatively to the least imaginable sum of universal processes. The curious may no longer doubt that the soul identified with any earthly man exists at a prodigious distance from perfection; that, in proportion as it is intimately associated with the man's career in life, it must, after death, enter upon a long novitiate as either the student or the pupil of perfection; or, indeed, that it cannot be, do or suffer anything in perpetuity.

With regard, then, to the hereafter, a completion of the crowning achievement of man means a diffusion of the spirit of curiosity in such strength and throughout such proportion of the race as shall ensure its becoming a dominant influence in human affairs. Barring a demonstrable degeneration, or early disappearance, of mankind, this is certain to happen sooner or later; it may already have happened, although still awaiting a conscious recognition. Once it is an accomplished and recognised fact, its implications must include the exhaustion of

much of the arrogance and faint-heartedness of man. Any but the most backward members of the race should then realise that the simple faith, or instinct, of the lower animals may never be regained by man but that a rational belief in immortality is ready to hand, — can hardly, indeed, be overlooked. And as this belief acquires greater weight in human deliberations, the consequences of a loss of simplicity must become proportionally fewer and less hurtful until a time when the degrading influence of scepticism and strained piety will possess but a historical importance as signalling a painful episode in the development of the race, — an interval comparable to a perilous crisis in the life of an individual man. Nobody will then presume, as heretofore, to depict the posthumous surroundings of a human soul; but everybody who helps to shape the career of humanity upon earth will have seized the necessities of an immortal life that bear upon this earthly destiny. Let us here formulate the belief in immortality to which all thoughtful people, regardless of antecedents, are clearly entitled.

The postulate stated below is an inference inevitably to be drawn from the results of our consideration of the universe of permanence and change. It would also seem, under any circumstances, the simplest and most suggestive assumption to be made by the men of today concerning man; in this place,

however, we shall save time and avoid useless repetition by discussing its implications, from the outset, in terms of permanence and change.

We may assume that the intellectual and emotional development of man is not without meaning in the universe; that the human faculty of logic, artistry, creative and responsive emotion, impersonal curiosity, is not a queer accident of physical evolution,— a brief episode in the life of a doomed planet; a mere flash never to be equalled or excelled in the vast acons of a cosmic dusk.

Here is an assumption, or negative inference, that should be generally and openly agreed to amongst men, especially as such agreement is easily discovered to be a condition precedent of all characteristically human acts,— even of those resulting from superficial doubts of its validity. By many, the long vista of its implications may have been contemplated in silence from a familiar window; these have perhaps been reproved for idle dreaming by people of weaker vision who prefer to draw the blinds and keep the house in order as best they may. But human inertia is forever turning to us its vulnerable sides; indeed, its cardinal necessity is that of yielding. Hence the following discussion of the unearthly destiny of man.

In the above postulate, the subject was given as the human faculty,— that which most obviously

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distinguishes man from all other products of nature observed by man. In accordance with the predicate, the following phases in the future existence of this faculty become inevitable.

When man, as a race, shall disappear and his old abode become unsuited to the maintenance of animal life, the human faculty will persist as an element, whether dominant or subordinate, in universal processes. And, though it long continue, as at present, to attack old problems without discovering the final solution and to evolve new ideals that always fall short of an absolute, its errors must become ever less obvious and more intimately suggestive of perfection. The only alternative — to wit, that knowledge and the subject of negation should eventually reach a plane of differentiation imperfect yet unsurpassable — would prove equivalent to a denial of our original assumption inasmuch as such knowledge and existence would forthwith exhaust all their possibilities. The human faculty would then perish prematurely and with no hope of resurrection, thus rendering unaccountable, nugatory, inadmissible the long-seeming, tireless quest of new experience that constitutes the total actual record of man.

Now, in this process of illusion supplying knowledge of reality, all the strands of anterior existence must be inextricably bound up; if a single one were lost, the human faculty must eventually dissolve in

mystification and absurdity. Each wave breaking upon the first island in the terrestrial ocean, each intuition, act, omission of each individual man, each vital tendency of each dying infant must continue as factors in the events of every age to come, and their importance in the triumph of change must be second to none. Thus, when knowledge of reality has reached a point where it verges upon perfection, behold our every self reconstituted and far more alive than before by reason of our more thorough participation in the general process of existence.

Perfect knowledge, or the triumph of change, demands, as we have seen, a dissolution; there is then what may be called space empty of matter and mind or, in other words, the triumph of permanence,—the utter absence of experience that is the condition precedent of differentiated illusions.

No discussion will here be undertaken of the intellectual and æsthetic aspects of human immortality,—of the certainty, for example, that one may walk with Cæsar, know Cæsar better than he was known to himself and proceed, still in his company, to more invigorating pursuits. In the progressive amalgamation of all human and other units, culminating in the triumph of change, is seen the absolute freedom of the individual (cf. page 12) — to everyone, all experience. The main purpose, however, of the present work is to indicate the more

immediate bearing of a rational view of immortality on the earthly conduct of men; let us proceed forthwith to the considerations that will best serve this end.

For any practical purpose of today, the ethical implications of our original postulate need hardly be held subject to the necessity that, once the knowledge of reality is complete, the work of the universe is finished, hence the work of the universe must begin. No doubt, there is both sorrow and gladness in the reflection that no single moment of an earthly existence, however blissful, however agonising, may be forever left behind. Herein, though, must lie but a small portion of the legacy of an earthly experience. When the triumph of change is imminent, pleasure and pain, whether as sensations or as incentives to action, have doubtless become so modified as to bear little resemblance to their material counterparts. But what shall be said of the intermediate phases between earth and perfection?

As any one of us yields up his life upon earth and emerges in a reconstituted state at the bidding of our successors in the human faculty, it must be by his earthly life that he will at first be judged and judging. Though he will be fully and exactly appraised only in the perfection of knowledge, it must be at a vast distance from perfection that he begins to be known better than today. Each thoughtless

word, each pain inflicted consciously upon a fellow-creature, must overtake its author and either cling to him or be visited on him again and again. It is true that time is but a symbol and that the future modifications in our sense of its passage may not be estimated. Doubtless, too, the pain and the remorse of the innocent and the guilty, as well as the pleasure and exaltation attending an earthly success, will decline in intensity as error after error is absorbed in the progressive knowledge of reality. On the other hand, the consequences of a foolish act must be faced in a far greater variety of relations after death than in the course of the most prolonged of earthly retributions. Moreover, though the pain suffered innocently avails in the elimination of error in that it serves to familiarise the victim with pain and thereby subtracts something from the sum of his future sufferings, the pain consciously inflicted in carelessness or despite must react sooner or later on its author, making him a laggard in his own eyes. When remorse ensues, it represents both the first effort to retrieve lost opportunities and the inability clearly to perceive that the careless or spiteful act was productive of no real detriment to the victim,—inability that must persist until the merging of human units is so far advanced as to demonstrate the equality of all individuals in their total experience of pleasure and pain. Does our earthly existence con-

tain anything more prophetic than its tremendous burden of remorse, — burden that would be meaningless, unthinkable, if death could be expected to set a limit to human personality?

Whether the hereafter contains, for each of us, a thousand deaths or none; what our sense of its duration will be; in what manner and how rapidly our relations to one another and to any hypothetical phenomena of matter will be modified; — these are questions upon which all speculation now feasible would probably shed no light. Clearly the differentiation belonging to the future is so extensive that no gauge of it may be found in errors already eliminated; thus, to each of us, after death, must remain a career built up of illusions so various as to render trivial, by comparison, the most important distinctions that are noticed in the terrestrial life of today.

It follows that, from an ethical standpoint, the only illuminating statements concerning the hereafter must relate to its earlier phases, since the conditions under which an unearthly career may be developed are now hidden from ourselves and presumably from all our dead, as well. There is some evidence, to be sure, tending to show that living persons may, under certain circumstances, communicate with the souls of the dead. In this intercourse, perhaps, is seen the first glimmer of a reconstitutive phase of the human faculty. Or it may be that

what seems like a communication from the dead is the belated outcrop of impressions produced telepathically by the living in the subconsciousness of the living. Or it is even possible either that our dead are in actual process of reconstitution by others than ourselves, or that a future reconstitution is, to some extent, susceptible of forecast by certain living persons. At all events, neither theoretical necessity nor evidence of appearances points to a complete and contemporaneous reconstitution of our dead; and, if such reconstitution be assumed as a possibility, it need not modify the main trend of the present discussion.

To resume, then, no one should fear that a lifetime of honest and unrequited labour may go forever unnoticed and prove unavailing; and no one upon his death-bed may entertain a rational hope that the errors of his past life will be forgotten. Out of a sow's ear we have never been able to make a silk purse; no more can we conceive our successors in the human faculty as having either the power or the wish to raise us in an instant to a state of beatitude or indifference. Each of our dead lives awhile in the memories and monuments that he has left with his survivors; eventually he is perhaps forgotten; at all events, it is not until the elements of his personality and record have been more or less thoroughly culled from the reactions to them pro-

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jected through the interval that he may consciously resume his human existence, whether upon a material or an immaterial plane. His earthly deeds, then, and all his secret thoughts, whether vicious or prudent, trivial or momentous, must first appear to him in his reconstituted state as they appeared and were remembered upon earth, but with this much added: that they are now being laid bare to his contemporaries who may appraise them more justly than before by reason of the new experience that is becoming the property of all mankind. Before his old associates can have reached an attitude of comparative indifference with regard to the earthly episode, he may expect to be scorned by those whom he has deceived, and ridiculed by those whom his ambition has trodden under foot, or requited by those who have shown him ingratitude, and supported and aided by those to whom he has offered the means of advancement. Also, the judgments of his earthly posterity will undoubtedly contain many surprises.

In sum, as he becomes better acquainted not only with his own generation but with all other generations of mankind, his own particular career upon earth must acquire and long retain a vital importance as the nucleus, or point of departure, for the new existence. For it is inevitable that any process by which he may be made familiar with unearthly

methods in the elimination of error and so helped to a loftier point of view will be much longer, in respect of the total differentiation involved, than any earthly curriculum. Moreover, the act through which he has been reconstituted may represent a competence, on the part of the agents, that is limited by the law of minimum change to a comprehension of that portion, possibly infinitesimal, of universal reactions which suffices for the reconstitution of a man's total self and life as conceived by the man, himself, and by the other men of his day.

The analogy between any one's life upon earth and the life he may logically expect hereafter, and the similar analogy between the total life of a human individual and the total life of the race are of too fundamental a character to be misleading. Little George's terror at the first wave that overtakes him on a beach may be as painful as any subsequent experience that life holds in store for him. He may always remember it. Yet after he has slept, he may find himself more venturesome. And when he is grown to manhood, he may fear only the waves that are undoubtedly dangerous. He may laugh at the thought of his childish fright even while realising how acutely painful it was. And he certainly could not be the man he is without this and all his other remembered and unremembered experience. His pleasures, however fleeting, his sins and thoughts

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of expiation have left each a mark upon him,—marks that are often visible to himself and to his friends. Of all George's experience the epitome is George.

But this experience cannot belong exclusively to himself. No matter how solitary or how selfish a life he may lead, altruism is always at work within him, seeking how he may purchase the experience of others,—of his friends, of chance wayfarers at a cross-road, of the dog that daily keeps him company. Interests but now widely removed from his walk of life become suddenly his own; he may weep, rejoice, revolt, tremble at the vicissitudes of a neighbour or of a community on the other side of the earth. And by so much as the scope of his knowledge, sentiment and effective action is extended over the affairs and the physical environment of his contemporaries, by so much is the essential need of his manhood satisfied. No matter what the tenor of his life may be, its sole concern, however feebly felt, is to bring him into closer touch with something that lies outside himself.

After his last sleep he will again find himself more venturesome; yet his total heritage, at the outset of the new career, cannot exceed his earthly experience. Also his essential need will be the same,—he must go on merging himself, as far as may be, with his environment. So long as any joy or agony, past or

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present, of any fellow-being remains hidden from him, he must remain unsatisfied and continue the struggle. These emotions will eventually become his own, even as the fright of George, the child, was ever present to the adult George upon earth and even as the hopes and fears of distant communities became effective determinants of his conduct. And in proportion as this assimilated experience increases in volume, each of its separate items will be invested with a truer significance and will accordingly decline in intensity and intrinsic importance. If, during his earthly lifetime, he came to regard the formula, *Reality equals the total negation of universal processes*, as the highest certainty attainable in his day, he will now seek to replace this formula with one embodying the advantage of his release from the bondage of earth,—one that shall dispose of the concrete more suggestively than by mere negation. Which endeavour, as well as innumerable similar endeavours preceding it upon earth, will prove that humanity, as a unit, can never rest content with self-knowledge or with anything less than absorption of its antecedents and total environment.

No further recital of the general necessities of a future life should be required to satisfy us that, according as a man is given to useful deeds upon earth, his situation will be congenial in those phases

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of the hereafter in which his earthly personality will figure prominently. Thus we are brought to the final theme of this work and crucial problem of humanity, — the problem whose existence is presupposed in any discussion of the foundation of knowledge or of the immortality of the soul. That is to say, we must inquire how an individual man of today may live and act for the best advantage of himself and hence for the best advantage of the race. Or, in other words, what are the highest and least questionable duties belonging to an earthly existence? Certain light and frequently recurring duties, to be sure, are easily recognisable; possessing immediate, or narrowly restricted, implications, they are performed in a manner almost mechanical. A thief has no objection to passing the salt to his prospective victim, even if civility is not essential to his plan; cowards and murderers save human lives when the effort costs them nothing. But life appears to us, in a broader view of it, as a complex business and its various dilemmas not even to be catalogued, far less resolved. How, then, are any of us consistently to avoid confounding a useful act with one that may cause needless tribulation? Or, when satisfied that a certain act is indeed a useful one, how shall we perform it in an effective manner if the misconceptions surrounding it are sure to bring us into disrepute? How, finally, are we to

resist the temptation of immediate, personal gain when the consequences of renunciation are vague? Does the mere fact of personal gain create a presumption of evil, or is it rather the partial manifestation of a widespread benefit?

In general, the ethical implications of man's position in a universe of permanence and change are sufficiently obvious.

On the one hand, an absolute standard of good or of evil is unattainable upon earth.

On the other hand, any standard is durable in proportion to its generality: that is to say, the more it excludes of the specific character of human acts, the longer it may serve as a practical guide; or, conversely, since the most general propositions contain the most of negation, all moral precepts are ephemeral according as they are specific.

This necessity has long been implicitly, though not always expressly, recognised by man, who shows his comprehension of the slight significance of a specific act by striving earnestly for general principles by which to govern his life. Many such principles have been evolved by him; and, for some time past, he has been trying to utilise the most general of all intelligible principles — the principle of equality — but without conspicuous success. On the one hand, he realises that this principle resides in his inmost nature; on the other hand, he per-

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ceives, and has already had bitter experience of, the inevitable imperfections in its application; therefore he often doubts its value as an ideal for human kind. Even as he insists, in his inertia, on the reality of the waves breaking on the shore, so he demands of an ethical or a political formula that it shall be complete and definite in its operation. And, perturbed as he is by the failure of all tried formulas to justify this expectation, he continues alternately to promote the development of equal rights in his society and to arrest this development in favour of less general formulas involving less of change.

No discussion will here be attempted of current doctrines of human equality. The present purpose is, first, to state briefly our common notion of the essence of practical morality; then (Page 100), to examine the principle of social equality in its theoretical aspect; and, finally (Part III), to indicate to what extent and in what manner the conception of equality, when supported by a rational view of immortality, may be made an active force in human affairs.

The knowledge that nobody has succeeded in defining good and evil does not prevent us from consulting the ethical standards of the day and so arriving at a fancied agreement as to the morality

of specific acts. Certain cases we judge almost without hesitation. If, for example, we discover that a man has been secretly stinting himself in order that others should have a measure of his abundance, we may, with one accord, proclaim his act exclusively a good one. Not only have we no absolute right to do this; we are undoubtedly in error. Even the immediate consequences of the man's generous frugality may shape badly for everybody concerned. The ulterior consequences may include a condonation of indolence, a justification of exclusiveness, an encouragement of superstitious views of the hereafter and of gloomy views of human nature; at all events, they must, to some extent, prove unfortunate because the man's conduct was disingenuous and indicated either a lack of enterprise or an excess of self-consciousness. Yet his intention was presumably, in the main, altruistic. And the error in our judgment is one that may be worked with; it is well suited to the present phase of civilised life. If we were to take the contrary view and decry all altruistic efforts containing harmful possibilities, there would result a chaotic state of human society in which it would be difficult to discern any ulterior benefit.

In more dubious cases, we are often baffled; we lose heart, too, like children and the wild creatures, and become traitors to our best convictions; yet all

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the necessities of our training of the young, our hereditary aptitude for a notion of justice, the bonds of personal affection, the faculty of logic itself, conspire to establish in us a belief, as tenacious as it is vague, that good and evil have a place — if not in reality — at least in some province of existence, to explore which would be to acquire vastly more knowledge than we now possess..

Accordingly each of us devises, for his own use, a little code of practical morality that is honoured in observance more or less as its author's hopes, fears, passions, health, years and a variety of other conditions may permit. And most of us find that our morality resembles more nearly that of our immediate neighbours and contemporaries than it does any that we may read of in the annals of a people residing on the other side of the earth or of one long since vanished from our own soil. But we all recognise that, wherever piety and reverence for ancestors are left out of account, the essential principle of morality in all lands and in all ages is the consideration shown by one person for another. This principle is expressed in acts of all possible shades, from the least possible consideration for the fewest possible persons all the way to an utter abnegation of self. Undoubtedly its highest expression — the one plainly marked for survival — is in the endeavour to consider all others equally with

oneself. Let us examine the intrinsic possibilities of this formula, entirely without regard to immortality.

We have here a formula that is regarded by some as an embodiment of good common sense, by others as of heroic or even Quixotic import, by still others as prudential and hopelessly uninspiring so long as men remain who are capable of a supreme sacrifice. Like all other ethical formulas, it contains no possibility of accurate translation into practice. Even as the most reluctant altruist is unable to avoid conferring benefits on others, and even as the fanatic for sacrifice is powerless either to discover the supreme sacrifice, itself, or justly to estimate the purpose for which it is to be offered, so the exponent of equality in altruism finds himself absurdly incapable of reaching all other men, of comprehending the needs of those whom he may reach, or of ignoring his personal predilections in the cases that he may actually comprehend. Nevertheless equality in altruism is entitled to a serious, immediate and not merely esoteric consideration because the application of this formula to the needs of humanity is no less feasible than that of any tried or conceivable formula while, in addition, it has the following important points in its favour.

Equality is the rule of the system of appearances which we broadly designate as nature and to which

we are admittedly subservient. In the inorganic world, every action appears to be followed by an equal reaction. Animals that have not been intelligently influenced by man exhibit, for the most part, a marked propensity to respect one another's rights, to share equitably the woods and the waters and to interfere with one another only under the rigid compulsion of necessity. Throughout nature there appears an overwhelming, if not universal, tendency toward fair exchange with no margin for by-products.

Again, the most enduring of our pleasurable emotions are forever demanding equality in human relations. Any one who has succoured many of his fellows dislikes leaving others in want; and, in proportion to his candour and intelligence, he must find it difficult to forget those whom lack of means or opportunity has forced him to pass by.

And finally, the decisive consideration in favour of equality in altruism is that no other formula, if hypothetically converted into practice, is capable of remaining indefinitely in operation. That is to say, all other formulas, if active for a sufficient period of time, will inevitably be merged in the formula of equality. These other formulas are readily classable under the two heads, (1) limited, or selective, altruism, and (2) altruism exceeding equality.

(1) Let us suppose the simple, though unrecorded, case of a race or nation of men undertaking to show equal consideration for one another and the least possible consideration for people of a different race residing within their borders and for communities lying beyond these borders. Pursuance of such a policy will prove, at best, an awkward and obnoxious task, inasmuch as it should be easier and more natural for many of these people to establish intimate relations with certain individuals of another race or nation than with their own countrymen. Suppose, nevertheless, that the attitude of exclusiveness is maintained with a tolerable measure of success. A great portion of the activities of this people will, then, be confined to interchanges amongst themselves because of the recognised limits of their altruism. Their language, learning, manners, art, industry — hence, their methods of supplying themselves with the necessities of life — will take such forms as may be consistent with the restrictions of a social isolation self-imposed; and, as time passes and the limit of new possibilities is approached, these forms will become increasingly rigid. Unless relief is sought amongst other peoples, a crisis will eventually be reached in which no opportunity will exist for doing anything leading to anything else except as it has been done before in every possible degree of unsucces. Meanwhile, new possibilities

of welfare, both material and intellectual, reveal themselves on every side. Something approaching equality of races must, then, be inaugurated within the domain; conquest or colonisation must be undertaken without. And the more limited the reciprocity established with the conquered peoples or with the new neighbours of the colonists, the sooner a new stalemate will be developed, similar to the old. In short, limited or selective altruism must be modified in the direction of equal altruism and must continue ever to be so modified in the careers of all races, classes, nations of any magnitude less than universal. For, by so much as the aim of the conquering nation, ruling class, or wealthy or powerful individual falls short of equality in all dealings with the conquered, the obscure or the needy, by so much will an important benefit be unavailable that is always to be had for a deliberate and intelligent effort.

Undoubtedly the gift, to any race or class whatsoever, of equality in the actual politics of mankind may be, and often proves, the reverse of beneficial to both donor and recipient, inasmuch as all known schemes of politics are but the various manifestations of a severely limited altruism. The intention of the donor may indeed be altruistic yet rooted in unfruitful traditions, even as the sincerest beliefs of a politician may spring from a soil of mendacity.

Furthermore, the most thoughtful and zealous altruism cannot provide for the elevation of any race or class who are unresponsive to the most scientific educational treatment of the time. Such tasks will perhaps be hopefully undertaken by a not distant generation of men; they will certainly be included among post-terrestrial vocations. But, for the present, the best altruism, far from leading the hopelessly, or even the presumably, incompetent into strange fields which they might devastate in their bewilderment, would, on the contrary, contrive such a segregation of them in various groups as might be, at once, most congenial to the individuals composing them and least likely to hinder the productive vocations of man. All others would be offered vocational opportunities of a character and importance relative to their capabilities.

We shall presently inquire (Part III), to what extent this altruism may become effective upon earth. Meanwhile it should be clear, from the above analysis of a simple instance of the spirit of the clan in active operation, that the modification of limited altruism in the direction of equal altruism must inevitably parallel all progress in the elimination of error,— that a recognised and progressive decrease in the efficiency of this process of modification would demonstrate the incipient degeneration of earthly man. Although no clan, nation or caste

in history has ever approached the ideal of *esprit de corps*, as defined in the case of our hypothetical people, all human communities have revealed, in various kinds and degrees, this essential conflict between internal altruism and collective incompetence. Each great nation of today is showing unmistakable signs of the inanition implicit in all national life, and the maximum of ingenuity in providing for its future needs may only postpone the demolition of the last bulwarks of its exclusiveness.

(2) As regards the second and only remaining ethical formula that falls beyond the limits of equality in altruism,—namely, altruism exceeding equality—it will be observed that any one attempting to carry this formula into practical effect must be giving his more than equal share of consideration either in order that others may give less than an equal share or else in the hope of his sacrifice becoming an example to some or to all other men.

According to the first alternative, he will be doing what he denies the right or the ability of other men to do. That is to say, he must be either a short-sighted and inefficient altruist,—what we generally call an egoist—or else a confirmed pessimist. Either he is endeavouring to lay up for himself a treasure in the hereafter in which others are not expected to share, or else his faith in altruism, as

an active force in the world, is nearly or quite extinct and his own conduct a paradox in his own eyes.

According to the second alternative, the man may be truly altruistic; he may even, on occasions, be the most efficient and practical of all altruists. Yet his altruism, in so far as it is indeed effective, must be operating in the direction of equality. His example, as it spreads, will become less needed and more difficult to follow; once it is the property of all mankind, the excess must have disappeared, since there is none to benefit by it.

Thus all human conduct, whether blindly impulsive or logically prescribed, is seen to be continuously in process of modification and always in the direction of an equal altruism. It is well known, however, that equality can never be established upon earth. If we apportion the land and all other property equally amongst men; if we sweep away all national and other social barriers with an impartial fidelity that shall prevent the attainment of any special prestige in public affairs by any man or coterie of men whatsoever; if we proceed to the extraordinary length of giving to all youths an identical training for life; we shall still be forced to recognise a disparity in men's noses; certain communities may be seen guiltily rejoicing in the sunshine while the neighbouring valley is wrapped in mist; one man will cut a dozen patterns while

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another is cutting six; of two watchers by a summer sea, one may be filled with the marvel of brightness and colour while his companion thinks only of the expected ship. Wherever, as in the actual abode of man, all life and thought are derived from a material system of appearances, the differentiation of individuals must be essential and the practical advantages and disadvantages of position must be obvious.

Evidently our two separate lines of research have led us to a conclusion suggestive in the highest degree. For, in the first place, starting from the postulate (page 84) that the peculiar faculties of man are not a meaningless accident of cosmic evolution, we find that the faith in immortality—which, as we have seen, underlies even the most short-sighted and materialistic of human considerations—is rationally grounded in the implications of this postulate. Then, ignoring both the postulate and its implications, and proceeding (page 94) to a survey of the total possibilities of principles applicable to human conduct, we find that all forms of altruism are irresistibly tending to merge in a form that is unattainable upon earth. Impossible to stem the tide of human affairs onrushing towards equality; impossible to imagine equality amongst men: ceaseless, the imperative purchases of another's

new experience; unthinkable, a liquidation of the account. Even a fatal degeneration of mind and body clouding the evening of mankind must be inseparable, throughout its course, from the struggle for a fuller reciprocity between man and nature, and between man and man. Even a complacent suicide of the race while in the plenitude of power must project differentiated units into the future.

In sum, the results of our independent lines of research are, in each case, the same and may be stated as follows. The supreme concern of mankind is an unearthly future, and the supreme significance of all earthly concerns of a given man lies in their relation to this unearthly future. In all men, the strength of a belief in immortality, whether expressed or implied, is the measure of their altruism,—measure of their effective regard for self-interest. Altruism, finally, is included in — or, in the broadest sense, equivalent to — change; it is definable both as the reduction of permanence and as the approach to equality, or the triumph of change.

Thus equality, though unattainable upon earth, is nevertheless a true and shining goal. It is, moreover, the only goal there is; and those who fancy they have not seen it are merely guilty of self-delusion,—are so obsessed by the poverty of men's altruism as to suspect that it is giving ground before

an enemy. Any, on the other hand, who have been successful in penetrating superstitious views of human nature and have discerned a similar competence in others may, indeed, still tremble to witness the act of a dastard yet may not derive from the experience a pessimism favourable to the rearing of further dastards. These it is who are improving the altruism of the day both in themselves and in others. They are avoiding and exposing, as far as possible, the lower and less ambitious phases of experience which bear a perilous resemblance to so much that has gone before and are therefore so prolific of disappointment and remorse; and they are embracing and promoting the higher and more enterprising phases that lead to fresh possibilities. Evidently this is no easy task. Doubtless it will assume a different character before man's course is run. At any time, however, it will be congenial in proportion to the amount of error that is palpably being left behind. And the larger, at any time, may loom the ignorance, or inertia, of man, the stronger must be the incentive to individual men to set forth, by word or by example, the ideals of a more efficient egoism.

We should now examine — in connection with the results reached in the above discussion of immortality — some of the errors, workable and unworkable, that are at the command of, or actually wielded

by ourselves of today. And throughout this undertaking we should always bear in mind that man and any differentiated successors of man must always maintain the bulk of their deliberations upon changing planes of suggestiveness or truth, none of these being absolute.

Thus the practical business of life cannot be transacted in accordance with negative formulas; farms, mines and factories, kitchens, nurseries and schools would rapidly fall into disuse if their superintendents were to dispense with the concepts of entity and finality. On the other hand, these institutions cannot be improved, nor their existence justified, except through continuous modifications of these concepts. Again, of the two inferences, *I am* and *I am not*, though the latter possesses the higher value as embodying a partial knowledge of reality, the former is indispensable to the activities of all differentiated beings. To be sure, *I am* is father to the more suggestive inference, *I am not*; but, like many other illusions, it is capable of an active and indefinite co-existence with the negation of which it is the subject. The world is yet too young for *I am* to be rescued, for long at a time, from its illusory isolation. On the rare occasions when a human self becomes partially merged with other illusions, whether of nature or of personality, it proves unripe for so much of new experience; either a successful


retreat to more familiar ground, or a loss of competence to participate in the normal existence of the time, or physical death, itself, must follow. But meanwhile, *I am not* is capable of an indefinite—and actually exerts a very considerable—pressure upon the parent inference. Not merely is it plainly stamped with the value of survival; it is forever prodding the indolence or tempering the harshness of the paternal whim. No need but to behold its helpless, tiny form in the slender cradle of truth, and a foolish impulse is checked or an act of simple bravery set afoot. If neglected, it is not the only sufferer. Give it air and proper sustenance, O *I am*, if you wish for calm and shelter in your declining years.

Similar is the case of all other inferences evincing a greater or lesser suggestiveness of the constituent process of this universe of permanence and change. Your logical admission that physical entities are unreal may seem but remotely connected with the conditions under which you obtain your evening meal. But if you come to recognise that these two factors in your earthly existence must be as intimately related, in respect of the supreme concern of this existence, as any two that you are aware of, and if you are able to lead a sufficient number of other men to the same conclusion, the effect of such elimination of error will certainly be profound and

extensive; it will not only improve the quality of your own and everybody else's evening meal but will penetrate the entire subject of political economy and all the brighter sciences that you may name. For the most part, it is very difficult to assign to our familiar inferences satisfactory and workable values; yet the redistribution of values that is easily feasible has already assumed such proportions that the performance of even a small portion of this obvious duty would be followed by important changes in the existing scheme of civilisation. Let us consider this obvious redistribution and its possible consequences.

PART III

**PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A RATIONAL
VIEW OF IMMORTALITY, AS REGARDS
WAR — MURDER — RAPE — EUGENICS
— ALCOHOLISM; HABITUAL USE OF
DRUGS — MARRIAGE AND FEMINISM
— MOTHER LOVE — ARTS AND SCI-
ENCES — PROPERTY — GOVERNMENT
— THE FIRST DUTY**



WAR

IN the strictest sense of the word, the *fittest* undoubtedly survive. Through the process known as natural selection, the animal species generally undergo progressive modifications enabling them to maintain themselves more or less comfortably in a changing environment. Roughly speaking, the characteristics best suited to each change of environment are perpetuated for an indefinite period in the posterity of individuals that have possessed these characteristics while the lines of less fortunate individuals are dying out. A numerous species of simple organisms with a narrow range of requirements may exist for a longer period than one less prolific and demanding more special conditions of life; accordingly, the disappearance of a species may often be explained by reference to its environment, animate or inanimate. Thus geological and climatic changes have been efficient agents of destruction and doubtless of generation as well. Again, a species, or variety within a species, may be crowded out by a higher species or variety. The last survivors of certain kinds of birds were provided with wings of an

extraordinary length; the bones of certain extinct mammals are of an enormous weight. These huge creatures represented the last efforts at adaptation on the part of their respective species; they were unable to maintain themselves and must relinquish their place to distant cousins that found the existing conditions more to their liking. It was the fittest that survived. Innumerable phases of development, apart from that of excessive size, have heralded the doom of other species. Generally, however, among the highest forms of life, animals of comparatively stable habits and restricted activities have been replaced by animals more complex and resourceful.

Now, of all the higher animals, man alone is almost completely shielded from the influences that have brought about, or are still threatening the extermination of other species. He is already nearly secure against any geological or climatic changes that may reasonably be expected to occur within the space of a thousand generations and has but to say the word that will make him entirely so. He has finally demonstrated his mastery over the simpler creatures of the wild; if it would avail him anyhow, he could probably kill off all the terrestrial and aërial animals of a size comparable to his own. Furthermore, he has extensively cultivated the fruits of the earth and has but to say the word that will

guarantee him indefinitely against want. It is true that men die in considerable numbers by shipwreck, lightning, earthquake and under the ravages of animalcules taking up an abode within their bodies. Yet these and all the other physical perils besetting individual men have never been sufficient, within historical times, to place the species, as a whole, in jeopardy; and in all probability, the day is far distant when the material deficiencies of an ageing earth will become a serious menace to one so fertile in expedients as man.

So far, then, as the present generation of men and any posterity nearly resembling us are concerned, it seems reasonably certain that man, as a race, has nothing but himself to fear. Men are the only known masters of the earth and, for the most part, they consider nature as their handmaiden. A few thousand men and women would suffice for the purposes of this dominion; yet the race numbers its hundreds of millions, most of whom have come to believe that they are acting, or ought to act, as if their welfare upon the hither side of the grave were their chief concern in life. Here, naturally, is the principal reason of our great numbers. No one can fancy himself living alone, yet each of us is brought up to regard every other as a possible enemy,—a rival in the pursuit of pleasure, influence, leisure. In the long run, one's immediate neighbours are less

dangerous than the inhabitants of distant parts. One understands them better; moreover, one cannot accomplish much single-handed, and one's neighbours are in the same case. Here, then, are obvious allies; one joins with them for the purposes of protection and common betterment. One cannot know the whole world; and, the less one knows of it, the more suspicious and personally antipathetic are people of a different colour, speech or conduct. These are certainly to be reckoned with; and if we are to have our share of the earth, our community must be strong in numbers as well as in brain and muscle. To this end, general rules must be adopted, — rules easily intelligible, even if erratic in operation. For example, the individual human life, however unpromising, shall be decreed sacred; above all, we must look to our women.

Thus the growth of each people, as promoted by its leaders in the interest of its immediate welfare, entails an increase in its intrinsic requirements while the margin of available sustenance existing between the limits of all peoples is, in consequence, diminished. In the clashes eventually ensuing, the weaker peoples succumb and are destroyed, repressed or absorbed by their conquerors. Here, again, the fittest survive and extend their control over the events of their several regions.

Meanwhile the fittest multiply rapidly; each of

their tribes improves, even more rapidly, its methods of destroying the members of other tribes, while the relinquishment by all tribes of their traditions of exclusiveness proceeds at a perceptibly slower pace. From the time when each great nation of the earth began counting its millions of civilised beings, no single nation or league of nations has ever come near exterminating another nation or league. It has sometimes happened that a nation was crippled beyond the possibility of immediate retaliation; but all the great nations of the present day are possessed of such power of resistance, such quickness of apprehension, such agility in combining against the most dreaded foe that any attempt to make one of them impotent for future aggression would probably end in failure. There prevails, nevertheless, a very considerable and even ominous activity in the destruction of individuals by martial means. And it is notorious that, in accordance with the most modern methods of prosecuting a war, the destruction of the capable, the disinterested and the courageous is comparatively great while the destruction of the incompetent, the sordid and the cowardly is proportionally small.

It may still be the fittest that survive. Yet the struggle for existence in which the human species is engaged has produced, for one thing, a kind of warfare in which strength, courage and intelligence are

of little use as a protection to their possessor while, on the other hand, they serve to place him repeatedly in positions of danger. Critical operations are not entrusted to those who have no heart for them; weaklings and intriguers, for the most part, remain in safety and, when the fighting is over, have a better chance than ever of becoming persons of influence in their communities. In other words, the supreme effort of civilised men to preserve both their lives and their traditional rights plunges them in a conflict which, at least in one respect, leaves them weakened for the general purposes of self-preservation and progress. And survival of the fittest of men may come to mean — as in the case of certain animal species now represented only by fossils — a survival of the individuals best suited to bring about the decay and disappearance of a race that is cumbering the earth. Doubtless man cumbering the earth must be understood as earthly man proving exhausted for the further purposes of universal change, since there is no reason to suppose that man has an obscure but ambitious rival in his own domain.

The above considerations can hardly fail to suggest a second condition in virtue of which man differs profoundly from the lower animals.

The first condition, already stated, is man's com-

parative immunity from dangers not of his own making.

The second is his sense of intelligent control and responsibility. This notion, essential as it is to the existence of a race of highly individualised beings, pervades all the activities of man and cannot be overlooked in any survey, however general, of human society. Any number of men, to be sure, may openly recognise that a law of minimum change governs all their motions, — that, of the two inferences, *I am* and *I am not*, the latter possesses the higher value. Yet, as long as the differentiation of the human faculty includes the differentiation of individuals, this faculty must be expressed in acts implying a regard for their consequences. And the greater the differentiation, as embodied in separate personalities, the more efficient the altruism that is associated with personality in general and consists in an endeavour to turn to practical account a rational acceptance of responsibility for the future.

The bearing of man's growing sense of control and responsibility upon the survival and present character of war is not difficult to define. Our primitive forbears exercised no such extensive control over the natural resources of the earth or their own immediate destiny as is familiar to the humblest of civilised peoples. They knew little of the world beyond the several valleys in which they lived, — were con-

scious of none but the simplest obligations to the family and the tribe. The varied material requirements, the emotional sensibility and refined skepticism of any one of us would have been incomprehensible to one of them: they still relied on a simple faith in immortality. Considering this little knowledge, this simple faith and few responsibilities, it was inevitable that pugnacity, even as amongst the lower animals, should form an essential part of the equipment for life. At innumerable familiar junc- tures, doubtless, a fight was bound to occur. More- over, the weapons being rude, it must nearly always have been the strongest or the shrewdest that pre- vailed, often against superior numbers.

But with the increasing differentiation of the race comes a radical change in the conditions governing its battles. The havoc worked by mines, bombs and shrapnel is mostly of a fortuitous character except that the enemy's effectives are generally within its range and are certain to retaliate in kind. Indeed, retaliation is the only possible answer to high explosives, since no satisfactory expedient has been dis- covered for counteracting their destructive force. And, in the main, their victims are, either demon- strably or potentially, the pick of humanity, being either the most capable adults or the youngest. For, in respect of the most efficient and intelligible of human altruism, it must be true that the youth-

of a race are its most valuable asset. The productiveness of men of 20 to 25 belongs almost exclusively to the future: upon the outbreak of war, these are the first to come under fire. For the most part, they are unversed in military theory and have had little or no experience in managing large bodies of men; their task, therefore, is that of executing the orders of men who are approaching, or have already passed, the limit of productivity.

There is no means of knowing how much has been lost to humanity through the performance of this task. At the lowest estimate, however, it should greatly exceed the gain represented by all the just wars that have been successfully prosecuted in modern times. What might have been is always included in the calculations of a race acknowledging responsibility for its acts. Thus, many of the fallen youths would, in all probability, have produced something that could be utilised for a considerable period of time while, on the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the triumph of a just cause, as effected by force of arms, has ever been productive of more than a momentary advantage to civilised society, especially as it has always helped to perpetuate the practice of resorting to force in the interest of all manner of causes, just and unjust.

Hence it appears that war is, to some extent, anomalous in the life of a race possessing a highly

developed consciousness of control and responsibility. That is to say, it represents a deliberate concentration of thought and labour upon a business that is certain, in at least one important particular, to impair the vital and progressive energy of the race. And the modern weapons that have so greatly overshadowed the competence of a strong right arm are beginning to invite comparison with the massive frame of the dinothere, — a last effort at survival leading, instead, to adversity and death.

Yet, in order to seize the full meaning of the anomaly of war, we should notice the trend of the principal virtues and vices that are admittedly fostered by war. Like all current religions and many traditional and obsolescent usages, war has still a bright side and an exceedingly glorious renown. But for the generous ardour with which so many have responded to the call of country, humanity would undoubtedly have been a much poorer thing than it actually is. And at the present moment, vicious, petty, selfish and idle persons of both sexes are being roused by the stimulus of a great war to a sense of responsibility and a capacity for self-sacrifice that they have failed to exhibit in the more personal crises of their careers. Life in camp or in trench promotes, at least for the moment, a high order of self-control and a candid and useful recognition of different values in human conduct. In

general, it is easier to divide the sheep from the goats in time of war than in time of peace,— which, by the way, should certainly indicate that the ordinary conditions of peace are in urgent need of overhauling, since the more thoroughgoing division of sheep from goat in time of war is largely as the goat would have it.

Thus, in any serious consideration of civilised warfare in its relation to human progress, there is no need to dwell on the horrors. It is well known that murder, rape, pillage and manifold acts of aimless cruelty occur with an extreme frequency that is perpetuated from war to war; also that the condonation of these offences by military authority is by no means exceptional. But if horror were its only legacy, war would no longer be a subject of discussion. A more significant aspect of war is found in its transient benefits that are preserved in memory and help to keep the martial spirit alive. Not all the sheep have been slaughtered; here and there, one has come off much better than any of the goats. Old soldiers are generally made much of, no matter in what cause they have fought or how badly they have since behaved; and, indeed, it must be difficult for an old soldier to behave properly amid the humdrum and make-believe of civilised society or to cast off the obsession of the intensest hours of his career

when he was fighting for his life or to overcome the enemies of his country.

Evidently war is possessed of some attribute that distinguishes it from all other human activities. Something more than the thought of national honour, or aggrandisement, or exclusiveness, is needed to explain the thrill of awe and elation that follows upon the first call to arms, the new-born resolution of the idle and the depraved, the rigid discipline and unequalled organisation of armies and navies, the unconcern expected of their heroes, the moral callousness so much in evidence among campaigners, the spectacular appearance of an artillery duel, the enchantment of a soldier's uniform. And, indeed, the source of war's peculiar fascination is not far to seek: of all human activities, war alone has invariably a background of death, — violent, unforeseen, fortuitous yet possibly avoidable and, above all, impenetrable death.

On the other hand, we have seen how war resembles all other human activities in that its bearing upon the future of the race has changed perceptibly within the space of a generation and profoundly since the dawn of history. A logical inference from legend, history and the scientific study of man and the higher animals is to the effect that war was once a frequent, inevitable and comparatively unemotional incident in the yearly routine and an impor-

tant factor in the advancement of a people of simple faith. And in the latest phase of skepticism, it has various aspects, most of which would be incomprehensible to a primitive man. For one thing, it is a gigantic show pleasing to megalomaniacs and lovers of the lurid; for another, it is a racial tonic — of brief and uncertain efficacy — when luxury and idleness have spread too far, or, on the other hand, a sedative when class or party rivalry has reached an acute stage; it is also an instrument of the most commonplace ambitions of civilised men, — these will presently be considered; — and it is always a potent influence for extermination of the soundest of the human stock. The relative benefits of a state of war make further wars possible; and the net result is not an enhancement of these benefits that are merely the lesser of two sets of obvious evils but a demonstrable decrease in the healthy and productive elements of the race. Hence it can hardly be doubted that war will cease to be waged long before the disappearance of the human species; and the question that is already and urgently demanding an answer is whether the race, through the influence of war and other impoverishing activities, will be rendered physically incapable of making war or whether it will continue to flourish for an indefinite period after the incentives to war have been removed.



In the course of the above discussion, only the intrinsic value of war has come under consideration. That is to say, a survey has been undertaken, first, of the principal aspects of war that are used for justifying it as an eternal vocation of man; then, of certain phases of warlike activity, the remembrance of which often helps to make war possible and, at the outset, even popular; and, finally, of the function of war that has now become the most important of all,—namely, the decimation of the young and the capable. Meanwhile, the prepossessions of nationality and the political and commercial influences directly responsible for the outbreak of specific wars have hardly been mentioned. Evidently, nations do not go to war because they have grown too luxurious or in order to discover which are the most enterprising and devoted of their citizens. On the contrary, they make war when national existence or material welfare is at stake or when an opportunity for aggrandisement is at hand; and in the avowed purpose of every war, an ethical ideal figures prominently. In these respects, the wars of today must bear some resemblance to those of our primitive forefathers who, however, could never have sought, by warlike means, the manifold profits for endless and unequal division that enter into our present calculations, even as they must have

had a far better chance of obtaining what they actually sought.

Now, of the immediate causes of war, let us first consider one that is a *sine qua non* of all martial operations, threatened or effective, yet has probably never been the single, or even the preponderating, cause of a declaration of war.

The number of different peoples regarding themselves as the salt of the earth is so great that no special ignominy can attach to any one of them in whom, for the moment, this collective arrogance stands out, conspicuous. Fluctuations in the intensity of patriotic ardour in a given people depend, to a great extent, upon the foreign policy of their leaders, recent successes or failures in trade, diplomacy or war, and the prevailing system of education. In general, however, patriots actual or potential compose the bulk of every people and — apart from the sordid ones who profess patriotism but without conviction — may be roughly divided into three classes: persons who, by temperament or in consequence of their upbringing, are incapable of understanding a foreigner and whose standard of political ethics is determined by what their country has done or is about to do; others who are not entirely satisfied that their compatriots are indeed superior to other men but believe that they may become so if sufficiently strenuous efforts are made to bring about

this desirable result; and, finally, those who view the commonwealth with a comparatively critical eye yet believe that they should give it their support for the simple reason that they belong to it. Each of these classes contains many an individual who is deeply attached to his birthplace and habitually regards it as inseparable from the league of heterogeneous, and mainly unfamiliar, political elements that he calls his country. The home, the family, a mere garden-plot may, and often does, have this appearance of absolute dependence and so furnish the single real incentive to an ardent and effective patriotism.

Now, it is well known that a limited altruism of exalted and very genuine character has been embodied in the patriotic acts of certain rare individuals, even as in martyrdom for religion's sake. And undoubtedly patriots such as these have contributed largely to the maintenance of an effective tradition of nationality in certain minds. Yet by far the most important factors in human clannishness are two general conditions of human existence that have already been indicated and should here be recurred to.

(1) The race is too numerous to permit of single families thriving unless leagued together for purposes of mutual aid. And whenever the resultant tribe or nation is great and successful, the multitude of its members who are not remarkable as individ-

uals may derive both material and social advantages from the prestige enjoyed by the league. Thus a person of mean appearance, when caught in suspicious practices, may grow several inches in his own estimation upon proclaiming himself an Englishman. Or, in a drawing-room, everybody may be quite unimpressed with the woman who has just entered; yet, once it has transpired that she is *française*, a whole world of mystery and elegance becomes associated with her insignificant person. And even the most gifted and independent of beings may, upon occasion, find his birthright of great value, especially if it is backed by the numbers, wealth and fighting power of a people whom other peoples are accustomed to treat with respect.

(2) On the other hand, the tribe is dependent on the individual in even greater degree than the individual on the tribe. Hence the leaders and the wise men see to it that a spirit of veneration for the tribe is implanted in the youthful mind; eventually this phase of education becomes practically automatic and self-perpetuating, subject to differences in the tempers of successive rulers or governments.

In sum, patriotic ideals are largely derived from the division into groups of a race whose individuals, for the most part, have little knowledge and many suspicions of their distant cousins and are not above taking an unfair advantage of them in order to save

trouble and thought. Accordingly these formulas of a limited, and therefore obsolescent, altruism have always been essential to the welfare of the tribe and but slightly less important to the individual. At the present time, the general constructive work performed in their name seems in process of demolition, — which process must lead either to decivilisation or to something more auspicious than the known products of civilisation; — equally suggestive is our knowledge that each of the most splendid single edifices owning a similar origin in the past has crumbled before a violent onslaught, leaving the former inmates accountable to an impoverished and persecuted posterity. Many nations have risen to a position of importance by means of a strenuous and watchful patriotism; and these nations have always declined, and sometimes disintegrated, because of a proud and complacent patriotism within or a more strenuous and watchful patriotism without. For centuries past, there has been no recognition of the pre-eminence of a single nation; and if such a recognition were imminent in the present century, it must rapidly lead to the overthrow or disruption of the nation so singled out.

Doubtless the cultured European of today may insist, and with reason, that he has more money in his pocket, more information in his head and more forbearance in his heart than the Bedouin who

would welcome an opportunity of first shooting, then robbing him. He may be thoroughly satisfied that he and his countrymen have produced much more that is of value to humanity; that his superior training enables him to support hardships and disappointments that would leave the man of the desert numbed and impotent; hence that it is right for the European to take up the dominion that falls naturally to the more efficient race and to prevent the Bedouin, forcibly if necessary, from interfering with his projects. Yet a comparison of the faces of Europeans with the faces of Bedouin can hardly fail to suggest that something important is known to the Bedouin that has escaped the Europeans and that this knowledge cannot become the property of Europe through the methods of repression and chastisement that are inseparable from the tribal system. A similar and more important lack of reciprocity prevails among the dominant peoples of the earth: it is well known, for example, that international jealousies incur little or no ridicule when they invade the most ancient seats of learning.

The tendency towards inanition implicit in all national life has already been noticed (page 101 *et seq.*) and will later be recurred to. Meanwhile we should consider the stimulus to patriotic and warlike emotion that is provided by questions involving the honour of nations. Here, doubtless, is

a subject on which it is difficult to write intelligibly since honour, as a national possession, is conceived variously, according to the exigencies of the specific business of the moment. In general, however, the honour of a nation, to the mass of its citizens, means both a quality and a condition.

First, it means the nation's propensity to deal fairly with other peoples. Historians have often said, probably with reason, that nations generally possess only the counterfeit of this kind of honour. At all events, the honour itself, if nations do sometimes possess it, is far less efficient in producing tangible results than is the counterfeit. Yet most citizens like to believe that their country is essentially honourable, even if occasionally compelled by foreign unscrupulousness to resort to subterfuge in return; hence they are not averse to impute cynicism to the historian.

Now, the counterfeit of this quality is often the means of establishing the condition that constitutes a nation's honour in the second sense: namely, the dignity of its position in the family of nations,—its readiness to punish any who treat the flag with disrespect or to uphold any special rights of its citizens that are of tolerably long standing. In the citizens' minds, a sense of this kind of national honour is largely involved not only with considerations of self-protection and material welfare but also with the

sense of power: in general, as we have seen, the individual whose ambitions are of a commonplace order enjoys belonging to a mighty and respected people. Let us examine this aspect of national life as it has appeared in modern times.

Probably most of the celebrated questions involving the honour of nations are either implied in, derived from, or closely analogous to the situations described in connection with the following hypothetical case.

By *C*, we may represent a decadent or semi-civilised people inhabiting a fruitful region of the earth; by *B*, a civilised people and power of the first class; by *A*, another civilised people and even more emphatically a power of the first class.

Force of circumstances and superior enterprise enable *B* to gain a footing in the territory of *C* and to develop its natural resources more effectively than it was possible for *C* to do. *B*'s occupation is unwelcome to *C* but may not be disputed and, eventually, is either overtly or tacitly recognised by the other powers possessing international influence,—which powers perceive an advantage to their own trade in *B*, rather than *C*, being in control. As between *B* and *C*, the increased yield of the soil is largely for the benefit of *B*, while *C* is placed in an inferior position and expected to abide by the laws and customs of a strange civilisation for which the people,

generally, have neither aptitude nor liking. Hence frequent clashes take place between the two races.

A hundred years later *A*, feeling an urgent need of expansion beyond its existing territorial limits and having already possessions adjacent to the land of *C*, falls foul of *B* over a question involving the border. There is an incident in which citizens or official representatives of *A* are the aggrieved party,—an incident comparatively trivial in itself but important in that it may afford the stronger power an opportunity of ousting the weaker from a rich domain.

If *A* now refuses such reparation as may be offered by *B* and demands, instead, *B*'s evacuation of a portion or the whole of the *C* country, it becomes obligatory, in accordance with the usage of nations, for all the politicians and diplomatists, official and unofficial, of both *A* and *B* resolutely to stifle such sense of humour as they may possess and carefully and minutely to demonstrate that the real sequence of events and vital issues of the moment are not as above described.

B is certain to be divided into groups holding mutually irreconcilable opinions of which, probably, the most important will be the two that follow. The party of discretion will intimate that *A* is a power not lightly to be defied and argue that the *C* territory is not worth a fight and that the *C* people have

always been a nuisance and a menace. On the other hand, the party of nationalism will contend that their country has sustained an affront and that no course other than a flat refusal to comply with *A*'s demands would preserve a vestige of its self-respect. The consideration that *B*'s rights in the land of *C* are derived from enterprise in theft may be ignored because the original affair took place a long time ago and has since received a general sanction and because the only possible losers by it belong to an inferior race. Hence the *B* patriots, if only they had a sufficient martial power behind them, could be reasonably certain of vindicating the honour and safeguarding the material interests of their country.

Meanwhile the position of the *A* patriots and professional politicians is, in some respects, equally difficult. Sensible as they are of a population outgrowing the present means of subsistence, they have, at the same time, to satisfy a small but important minority of qualmish citizens as to the legitimacy of the present project for expansion. In this necessity, they may utilise, to some extent, the ire of other citizens over the incident of the border. But they have also to consider the opinion of rival peoples who are only indirectly interested in the business yet may decide to interfere in unison. It should therefore be desirable to call attention to the defects of *B*'s administration in the land of *C*, the

repeated clashes of the two races, the insecurity of foreign lives and property. In sum, it may be shown that the general inability of *B* to manage the affairs of *C* is typified by the late outrage on the border and that it would be far better for everybody concerned that *A* should acquire the controlling influence. It may even be wise to offer special privileges in the country to citizens of one or more of the rival nations.

The situation described above reveals the principal elements that make up the honour of nations and should indicate that this honour is of a far less genuine character than the honour that is often manifest in relations between individuals. Doubtless certain peoples show greater foresight and self-control than others in counterfeiting the honour of individuals. Moreover the semblance of honour where honour is not belongs inevitably to civilisation as we know it. We cannot imagine the development and survival of nations in accordance with political principles mainly honourable and only slightly dishonourable, since the mere fact of the responsibility borne by a few men for the welfare of great communities that are not collaborators but rivals means that not honour but dishonour must be the chief reliance of the tribal system.

Evidently, then, — the tide of human affairs being irresistibly in the direction of equal altruism — the

tribal system is doomed to desuetude along with many another institution implying solidarity in separate and mutually hostile groups and demonstrating the moral and economic inferiority of these groups, as compared with the higher of their individual elements. Those who have encouraged outbursts of patriotic feeling over dubious points in international equity — such as the disputed control of the *C* territory in the above hypothetical case — will undoubtedly be held up to the ridicule of posterity. Similarly, the ancient lust of mastery that finds its most anomalous, cruel and obscene expression in the acts of civilised men and proves invariably degrading to any who possess it in a pre-eminent degree must become a subject for entirely different treatment from boyhood on. Instead of being carefully fostered as, for obvious reasons, it is today, it will be watched suspiciously and with concern and its outbreaks will never involve a whole race or community. Thus games and all other forms of rivalry bearing no direct relation to the more elementary of human concerns will be regarded not as a training for the struggle of life but as an outlet for the competitive impulse.

Now, racial and international disputes similar to those hypothetically considered above are always the ulterior cause of the greater and more sanguinary conflicts that reveal patriotism, no longer as an

object of suspicion or ridicule but, as a consuming flame fanned by necessity and feeding on gross and palpable provocation. The invader must be driven back and his outrages and depredations avenged; or, on the other hand, the aggressor must bend every energy to avert retribution and, if possible, to crush the foe he has learned to hate. In the thick of battle, men may even forget this hatred and fight, like the lower animals, in a mechanically fearless and remorseless manner. Thus, through acquiescence in a perversion of his normal tendencies, man may appear to rejoin the company of his forbears: during a battle, although rarely or perhaps never between battles, war may still appear as a normal state of man.

Roughly speaking, great wars break out in modern times with undiminished frequency, and it is not to be expected that a century will pass without a conflict that unsettles half the civilised peoples of the earth. Yet the most striking characteristic of modern wars, as we have already seen, is not their frequency but their peculiar destructiveness. Not only are promising youths among the victims of the first encounters, but incalculable time is lost and productive enterprises thwarted through impersonal curiosity becoming temporarily a drug in the market. With all the thought that is devoted, in warlike times, to the different branches of science and engin-

eering, wars have seldom led to inventions useful in time of peace: all energies are concentrated on the task of applying the results of earlier research to the specific and changing problems of warfare, one consequence of which is an increased complexity and destructiveness of future wars.

Europe, being the chief centre of modern wealth and civilisation is naturally the continent in which war has proved most devastating. Many leagues, or alliances, have been formed there for defensive purposes, — *i. e.*, for the preservation of peace — but these have endured only a short time and the constituent units are often to be seen fighting against their former allies. No more can a world-wide league of nations be expected to enforce peace for any considerable period because the conditions obtaining at the time of its formation cannot be anywhere near the same as after the lapse of a few generations. When the horrors and anomalies of war have, more or less, faded from memory and when certain members of the league have become markedly and, in their own opinion, undeservedly less prosperous than other members, chauvinistic elements are certain to appear in the governments of the less fortunate peoples. And whenever these elements are reinforced with courage and shrewdness, the league is certain to be dissolved unless its

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richer members are willing to part with a portion of the fruits of their toil in an utterly untribal manner.

The inferences to be drawn from the above discussion are perhaps sufficiently obvious; they may, however, be summarised as follows.

War will eventually be impossible; and one of the most promising indications that it will soon be impossible is found in the comparative frequency of recent attempts to justify it on theoretical grounds. That such justification should be thought desirable is, of itself, sufficient evidence of decline in the war-like spirit and of growth in the spirit of disinterested criticism. And the justification offered is certain to accelerate both processes, since it rests on the following contentions: a supposed analogy, in respect of the necessity of war, between civilised men, primitive men and the lower animals; the assumption that war now, as formerly, eliminates the feebler elements of the race; and the conjecture that this item in the ordinary routine of simpler creatures is indispensable to civilised man as a kind of exotic stimulant for checking his tendency to degenerate in the course of more characteristic pursuits, — all which contentions are easily proved unwarrantable and would probably never have been stated but for the two following considerations.

War has always been possible and is still being waged.

And the most formidable obstacle to any movement for making it impossible — hence the most powerful incentive to discover or invent for it a logical basis — is the necessity that the abolition of war means the abolition of so much more.

Any candid survey of the principles governing the life of nations discloses the conditions under which war must recur and the conditions under which it cannot recur.

War will be inevitable as long as the human race is composed of separate and independent tribes; it will be impossible when tribal divisions have been finally done away with.

And tribal divisions can never be done away with as long as the right of property and the factitious authority of one man over others are sustained in custom. If all nations were to amalgamate after electing an emperor or self-perpetuating administrative body who should be placed forever above considerations of wealth and position, it would be easy to forecast an early decline of the new régime. The central authority must have deputies in all parts of the world to enforce its decrees; and this enforcement, especially in respect of property, must often appear inequitable both to individuals and to entire communities. The deputies, themselves, could

hardly be indifferent wherever their own purses or positions should be in question. Eventually, real and ostensible grievances must lead to the formation of local alliances for the purpose of self-protection or of theft or in furtherance of the short-sighted ambitions of individuals. Indeed the difficulty, already formidable within a single nation, of preserving peace among the diverse elements of the population must be enormously increased in a world-empire constructed on the plan of any existing nation, because of the more heterogeneous character of these elements.

In sum, all thoughtful people should easily satisfy themselves that war is one of the most anomalous and unfruitful activities of civilised men and that there is not the least possibility of doing away with it as long as the right of property and any of the tried forms of government remain in vogue. The apostle of peace, then, would appear to have abundant work cut out for him, especially as thoughtful people are supposed to be rare. It is, however, well known that all civilised persons are compelled to think; and the most reluctant thinkers are, themselves, apt to grow exceedingly impatient with thoughtlessness in others and to insist on some thinking being done in the end. Now, all thought, while implying a loss of simplicity and of vital energy in its lowest forms, implies, at the same time,

progress or a gain in the vitality that belongs to the future. And since all thought has a common destiny, each new idea of a given kind brings this kind nearer to all other kinds; similarly, all ideas lead to further ideas and so become, either actively or potentially, a force in the moulding of posterity. Thus no limit is assignable to the number of supposedly thoughtless people who, when the time is ripe, may simultaneously discover an important truth.

It is with this necessity borne always in mind that the problem of war which, as we have seen, is also the problem of nationality and of property will be taken up in subsequent portions of the present work. Under the heads, Property, Government and The First Duty, the discussion will be brought to a conclusion.

MURDER

Every premeditated murder is different from every other premeditated murder; and the effort required for demonstrating the difference between two murders is far less than is ordinarily expended in establishing the fact of premeditation. But each numerous and civilised community of our day is fairly overwhelmed with the business of compelling its masses of reluctant units to conform to the requirements of a social system whose growth has lagged behind the demands it is supposed to meet. Rules are therefore in vogue for the punishment of every offence that we call a crime,—rules now ancient, now modern, but always of the kind that we call fixed and general. Thus, in most communities, the penalty for all premeditated murders is the same: ordinarily it is an added murder expressing, for one thing, the principle of admonition.

Now, the murders that we authorise and direct in our courts of law and on the field of battle undoubtedly possess, for the present, a higher altruistic value than murders done for individual gain or in personal despite. The considerations involved—

such as protection of human life; defence or acquisition of property; vengeance; jealousy — are similar to those involved in the commission of individual murders; but the execution of the sentence is more orderly. Moreover, the imperfections in collective egoism, being multitudinous, are more easily veiled and hence more tolerable; the error of overlooking or condoning murders by individuals would doubtless prove an excessively unworkable one.

One thing, however, may safely be said of every kind of murder: namely, that it is proof positive of weakness. Whether I am weak or strong, it is evident that the strong may be of the greatest use and benefit to me while living. Therefore I shall not kill one of them unless I am too weak to seize the profit that is my due. Neither shall I kill the weak if I am strong. They may indeed be of comparatively little use or benefit to me; yet, on the other hand, they may not kill me without demonstrating that I, too, was weak. If I am indeed strong, they will be no more of a menace or encumbrance to me than any obscure and harmless creatures of the wild. Only the weak, then, kill; and only the weak are killed.

Hence the proudest embodiment of collective egoism verges on absurdity in decreeing the murder of a murderer, since the strong, in killing the weak, must themselves become weak.

It also verges on absurdity when one of its individual supporters dies by the hand of a weakling. For, if the supposedly strong may be killed by the weak, they cannot, in respect of killing, have been truly strong.

The problem of the practical altruist, then, may be stated as that of making more difficult the killing both of the supposedly strong by the assuredly weak and of the assuredly weak by the supposedly strong. If such killing should become impossible, the strong must have acquired, in this respect, a perfect and unearthly strength and would soon be equalled by the relatively weak. Upon earth, however, a considerable advance may easily be made in the direction of this ideal. Let us inquire what is immediately possible.

To this end, all murders may be classed, as above, under one or other of the three heads: martial, admonitory, individual.

The only possible preventive of martial murder has already been noticed and will be reconsidered in subsequent pages of this work.

Admonitory murder is now almost exclusively a consequence of individual murder; and a practical safeguard against both these forms of murder can be reached only through the dissemination of a rational view of immortality. The method that would be adopted as a result of this dissemination

has already been indicated (pages 103-104) and may be further defined as follows.

In accordance with a rational view of immortality, mankind, as a whole or in any part, must always be absolved from responsibility for any individual souls whose development presumably requires a more efficient guidance than the best contemporaneous knowledge may supply.

Now, it is well known that great numbers of actual and potential murderers and other malefactors have failed to respond to any of the influences that have been tried for their betterment. These enemies of society are, by temperament or by force of cruel circumstances, incapable of a sustained hope of anything beyond a momentary gain. A gloomy or impish pessimism feeds upon the opportunities for self-assertion furnished by the accepted theory that each of its votaries is a normal citizen of the world up to the moment of his first unpunished offence; it is further stimulated by the enmity of the laws which are indeed terrible but may often be circumvented in a highly sensational and gratifying manner. Under the current régime of skepticism and formal religions, it is impossible to deal successfully with this class,—superstitious hopes and fears of the hereafter having entailed an unhealthy, and often tragical, affectionateness between kin as well as impracticable theories of personal

liberty and religious opportunity. My son, it is contended, shall not be declared an outcast when nothing can be proved against him or when he has paid the penalty of all his misdeeds; neither shall my neighbour who has committed no criminal act suffer disabilities because his propensities are understood to be evil; no more shall any erring one be abandoned to the powers of darkness.

But when the relatively strong shall acquire a rational view of immortality, they should be able, conscientiously and consistently, to take measures for safeguarding themselves against the aggressions of the weak,— aggressions that are, above all, unprofitable to the weak. And, with regard to murder, there is clearly but one means of attaining this end. Both the conspicuously and the presumably weak must be segregated in such manner as to be deprived, as far as possible, of opportunities both for killing those who are resolved not to forestall them in murder and for reproducing their kind within circles where homicide has been abjured. The weakest must, at first, consort with the weakest, the suspect with those who are similarly suspect, and provision must be made for matriculation of the more promising ones into non-homicidal society. Details of the method of ostracism need not be considered here; probably, in most cases, suspects would be determined in accordance with their parentage, their

records at school and the testimony of their neighbours.

Under a scheme of graduated segregation, the killing of the weak by the weak would be the less abhorrent to contemplate according as it should be the more likely to occur. But the weak, far from being encouraged to kill one another, would be deprived of the most powerful incentives to murder by reason of their separation from the strong. Within a short time, doubtless, individual murder would be no longer a daily occurrence, as at present, but an exceptional one; and the segregation of suspects would become an affair demanding little attention and attracting little notice.

In the inception of this plan, however, there would still be a liberal margin for error. The strong would probably suffer injustice in two forms; the weak, in two.

First, some of the strong would be adjudged weak. These, however, should be able to contrive a rehabilitation,— the earlier in proportion to their strength.

Secondly, the admittedly strong would still be at the mercy of weaklings who were adjudged strong. But trespassers in the domain of the strong should be more easily recognisable than today by reason of their comparative paucity. Their homicidal purposes might fail through lack of abettors or, if suc-

cessful, might result in a further subtraction from the dwindling company of misplaced weaklings. At the present time, unhappily, all men may be regarded as potential murderers. Even as the member of Parliament, though more consciously a promoter of murder than the hangman, may be a stronger all-round man, and even as the ruler of a war-worn people, though blood-guiltier than any corporal with dripping bayonet, may be noted for his suavity in private life, so an individual murderer may be the votary of a culture too genuine and too profound to be comprehended by his victim. But, given a rational view of immortality tolerably well disseminated, no such deformities of character and purpose would be possible. The law-maker giving his voice for capital punishment would be openly derided; the war-lord's only realm would be a region of unhealthy dreams; the devotee of any surviving culture could hardly ignore its relation to physical death. Instinct of immortality, as we have seen, is inseparable from instinct of self-preservation (page 49); and productive men, if they are to be used to the full measure of their capacity, should not be exposed to murder nor their energy wasted in unproductive deliberations concerning murder.

With regard to the weak, the inception of a rational scheme of segregation might likewise entail injustice in two forms as follows.

First, certain weaklings, capable of response to the best influences of the time, might suffer unwarranted disabilities. Here is but a variant of the injustice to the strong, considered in the first place above.

Other weaklings, adjudged strong, might suffer a further loss of strength through the opportunities afforded them of killing the strong.

Evidently, all these forms of injustice are in active operation today and with a vastly greater force than would be possible under any rational and effective system of segregation. And to every concrete instance of injustice supposable under segregation there must be innumerable instances peculiar to the system under which we now exist,— which system of pretended equal rights, with compensation by admonitory punishment, serves chiefly to maintain society in a state of ceaseless apprehension while condemning a host of fertile brains to the arid regions of the law.

To many, a self-ordained decimation of the race may appear desirable. If such an experience is indeed reserved for the future, the first decimation may conceivably be followed, at intervals, by others; or, on the other hand, it is possible that, under a more rational economic and social system, the race will again expand and surpass even its present

numerical strength. Much will depend on the rate of improvement in methods of production and distribution of both the necessaries and the desirable and stimulating accessories of a civilised life.

However this may be, no doubt can exist among people of some experience of the world that the human stock is urgently in need of pruning. One hears of physicians having the courage and humanity to strangle defective infants at birth. One hears of grown men and women solving an otherwise hopeless problem by the simple act of taking their own lives. Both proceedings are irregular,—not to be avowed in advance. And herein, again, is evidence of weakness,—not in the authors of the irregular deeds but in the system of organised confusion under which human beings are bred, reared and cast upon a skeptical world. Indeed, it is only natural that people who are putting from them a simple faith in immortality and failing to grasp the higher courage that is within reach should experience bewilderment and awe in the presence of a suicide,—repulsion at the thought of infanticide. Hence there is little difficulty—especially for certain purposes, mainly profane, of church and state—in persuading many of these people that both suicide and infanticide are acts of sacrilege.

Under the operation of a more rational social system, infanticide would, for a space, be a common

and openly recognised practice. Suicide, on the other hand, would be far commoner and would eventually become the natural death. It would be regarded as unfortunate only when committed by productive persons, temporarily unbalanced; hopelessly unproductive persons of all ages would be given every encouragement to take their own lives. Nobody would be either badgered, or negligently permitted to lapse, into a state of melancholy or despair from which self-slaughter might seem the only issue; on the other hand, nobody would be allowed to forget that a deliberate choice of death when earthly happiness is unavailable reinstates the suicide in productivity. In this act would consist the killing of the strong by the strong,— the only form of slaughter that may become the ideal of a race owning a highly developed sense of control and responsibility. The practical benefits to be derived from all productive enterprise would thus be enormously increased, a vast amount of useless sham and self-deception discredited and innumerable pitiful episodes arising from physical or mental decrepitude obviated.

The possible effects upon the race of an elimination of murderous stock from posterity will presently be considered under the head, Eugenics.

The question, under what circumstances the

establishment of a rational system of segregation of the weak would be feasible, will be considered in various places and finally under the head, The First Duty.

RAPE

Of all human acts, rape is perhaps the one most clearly indicating a crude social experience in the ancestral lineage of the agent. It is true that men who were otherwise of a tolerable sanity and culture have committed rape in moments of extreme aberration; it must, however, be denied that any but the most backward in general development may deliberately plan a rape.

One hears that rape has recently been officially encouraged for political reasons. This statement, if true, must place the instigators and the perpetrators of the abuse upon two different planes of altruism, both of which have rarely, if ever, been reached in historical times; hence their cases will not be considered here. Neither will climatic or other local or fleeting influences in the lives of individuals or of whole peoples be considered in this connection, the purpose of the present discussion being to establish the approximate status, in any civilised people, of the individual who, under ordinary circumstances, is capable of rape. No legal definition will be followed. The rape here under

discussion is an act of unmitigated violence. Whether or not facilitated by deceit, it is performed in a manner both implying the presumption of an unconditional aversion to submission on the part of the victim and eliminating the possibility of an intention to benefit her against her will. That rape of this kind is an affair of daily occurrence will hardly be doubted by the most ill-informed or denied by those who are least given to sentimental or over-delicate views of woman. This, moreover, is the rape to which the practical altruist may, with advantage, give his earliest consideration.

In accordance with the above definition, it seems highly probable that the relatively small number of men capable of rape are supplied from either of two larger classes whose limits may, for most practical purposes, be roughly assigned.

One of these classes is derived from an ancestry whose sexual experience, from force of circumstances, has been either comparatively small in the sum or meagre in its diversity. Economic disadvantages, for example, may have repeatedly resulted in the early loss of husband or wife through famine, disease or war, in the impossibility of second marriages or, above all, in long series of relatively distasteful unions of like with like. All else being equal, the individual scion of such a stock should possess an exceptional competence and appetite for the pro-

creative act. And once the practical restrictions upon its exercise are removed, he may approach and absorb the experience excluded from the constituents of the ancestral seed with a rapidity and impartiality that would be impossible for his more highly bred contemporaries.

Indeed, there is no department of life in which the reduction of inertia, or quest of new experience, is more strikingly and generally in evidence than in the business of reproduction. A more partial or less fundamental impulse or activity may be stifled at birth by hostile prepossessions whose relation to it seems more or less remote. You may fail, for example, to acquire a taste for honey even though the race from which you spring has had little of it: intense sweetness, in any form, may not suit your palate; the peculiar scent of honey may inspire you with aversion. Or again, your habits of life, your fund of human sympathy and your code of practical morality may all conspire to prevent you from badgering a captive enemy, though your forbears have been far from exhausting the possibilities of this form of amusement. If an exceptionally constituted person, you may even use alcohol and opium in moderation, though coming of a people whose means of obtaining these drugs were few. On the other hand, the exercise of any one of your physical or mental faculties may, up to a point, increase its apparent

efficiency. We are accustomed to give the name of *development* to this process which is rather a providing of opportunity for the exercise of a faculty already developed and which, if sufficiently prolonged, will assuredly lead to degeneration of the faculty.

At all events, your sexual status, however difficult to estimate, is one of the fundamental conditions of your existence; and its antecedents must be regarded, even for the most immediate of practical purposes, as being in active operation today. For, at maturity, you find yourself more or less governed by an impulse that is shared with all living creatures and may not be entirely ignored at any time up to the day of your death. The character and efficiency of this impulse in yourself is, in turn, governed by the acts of your innumerable forbears in which the same impulse has eventuated,—acts prepared by all manner of devices mercenary, heroic, pious, obscene, and ranging, in point of vitality, from the desperate or perfunctory self-assertion of the seasoned voluptuary to a consuming ardour only less intense than the rage of the famished, or from the concessions of an anæmic prudishness to the transports of an unreserved and lasting sympathy. In sum, your sexual competence and predilections represent the actual meeting-point of certain converging lines of sexual experience that are different from

those meeting in any other individual; and the sexual possibilities of the entire generation to which you belong are contained in the active legacy — highly important in so far as it may be estimated — of all the physical, emotional and intellectual propensities of its progenitors.

Hence it is seen that continence, under certain circumstances, may prove a valuable asset to the race while erotic sensualism, unless in an indirect and mainly obscure manner, cannot prove such an asset. And the issue of lines that, in relatively great degree, have been sexually starved are naturally regarded with admiration and envy, as well as with distrust and concern. Their numbers must be greater or less, according to the point of view from which they are considered, but no exaggerated estimate is necessary to satisfy us that they are indispensable for the purposes of posterity. No blame, then, can be imputed to a father who prefers his daughters' husbands to be of this class.

It is, however, inevitable that many individuals among them should embody an ancestral experience exceptional in more respects than that of sex alone. And some of these must have come into an inheritance that renders the eccentricity in respect of sex more of a detriment than a benefit both to themselves in particular and to the race in general. In one case, an excess of manual toil imposed upon the

fathers may produce an abnormally slothful propensity in the sons. In another, the intellectual activity of successive generations in certain lines may so far surpass that of the bulk of their contemporaries as to lead to a period of intellectual stagnation in these lines. Or, on the other hand, both the ancestral and the actual status of an entire people may have afforded such meagre opportunities for intellectual activity as to preclude a normal absorption of new experience by the latent faculties; great numbers of individuals owning this savage origin are permitted or rather, by force of circumstances, compelled to accept the freedom of civilised communities. In sum, any one or more of an enormous variety of incidents in the ancestral experience of the sex-hungry may serve to lodge their altruistic competence upon a perilously low level. Or, indeed, the obsession of sex alone may, in rare instances, be sufficient to choke such altruistic impulses as might otherwise be expected to bear fruit.

In accordance with the prevalent customs of civilisation, no special provision may be made for these helpless and dangerous persons. No effective measures are taken to prevent their exposure to suggestions of sex, no funds established, enabling them to marry at an early age; private purses, too, are tightly closed in furtherance of the theory that marriage should not be contemplated before matur-

ity is supposedly complete. Although marked amatory propensities are generally discovered in the childhood, and noised abroad during the adolescence, of their possessor, only the most slender precautions are taken against the manifold dangers so obviously besetting his path. Reformatories and prisons are supposed to do the work of correction, yet their future inmates are now given a wide choice of books and spectacles that are sharply provocative of prudent curiosity. And finally, owing to the equal rights in society ostensibly enjoyed by all persons unconvicted of crime, no woman is safe from violence on the part of men whose lack of control has long been notorious among their intimates. Probably it is well known, even to the most cynical, that a woman's power of resistance is no satisfactory gauge of her innocence; and it is certain that, under a system of pretended liberty and equality of all men, rape may be expected on any one of the innumerable occasions when opportunity is favourable and other forms of self-assertion are beyond the competence of the agent.

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The other class from which libertines are drawn lies at the opposite end of the scale of sexual experience. The reproductive faculty, either in the individual or in the ancestors, has been overtaxed but may still assert itself through sheer inertia coupled with abundance of opportunity. Even as economic

adversity is presumably the chief source of sexual starvation, so any lineage rejoicing in long years of affluence yet failing generally to turn altruistic opportunities to account may eventually be represented by men who are both able and willing to hire others to pander to their failing appetites. There are many who enter upon their sexual experience as members of the first of these classes and end it miserably as members of the second.

The horrors in the life of a trapped girl have been so vividly and frequently depicted elsewhere as to require no mention here. Probably nobody today enjoys being a bawd. One is such because no equally lucrative vocation presents itself as possible. That is to say, one's choice is, to a great extent, determined by the economic and social exigencies of one's position in civilised life, — which position may be compatible with the wish to be a bawd rather than a beggar or an inefficient worker in humdrum pursuits. It is for this reason that instances of divided responsibility for rape will not be here considered. For, if certain salient features of our present civilisation are modified in directions already indicated in these pages and further to be defined below, it will be unimaginable that any one should consent to pander to another's lust. Neither will false promises of marriage or other expedients for tricking half-willing girls be brought into a discus-



sion the main purpose of which is to establish the altruistic value of simple rape, as defined at the outset. Once this value is established, the various practices partaking, more or less, of the character of this rape may be appraised accordingly.

And the value of this peculiarly human act is readily derived from a statement of either its immediate or its ulterior consequences. The perpetrator of a rape, having yielded unconditionally to an impulse that he lacked the power or the wit to satisfy in a normal manner, has nothing to show for the deed but scorn of his victim and fear for himself. Not even a purse or a jewel — not the flimsiest illusion of justice done or vengeance wreaked — remains to cozen him of the sense of utter and stultifying degradation. He may indeed be by way of propagating the species, but only through the production of offspring that are almost certain to suffer disadvantages in any society. Also, the extreme depravity in human desires of mastery may be best suited by a ravishment that is preceded by frantic efforts at resistance. Meanwhile, however, the ravisher's sexual status has become distinctly less favourable than before; instead of facilitating the further satisfaction of his procreative needs, he has found the strongest incentives to shun the late object of his desire and has risked turning all women and their champions into a band of relentless per-

secutors. Thus rape must be regarded as proof positive of a weakness unexcelled among the vagaries of men. In one respect, the weakness of it surpasses that of any other debauchery leading through physical or mental degeneration to death, for it invariably injures more than one person and may rouse the sympathies of a multitude to a pitch of folly matching that of the original act. In another respect, its weakness surpasses that of cold-blooded murder, for it contains no semblance of a promise of ulterior gain, the perpetrator having sustained a defeat in the province of life in which victories are most easily and generally achieved. In still another respect, its weakness surpasses that of Onan's act which is of the same piece of imperfect egoism and essential futility yet may conceivably be barren of immediate and harmful consequences. And the fag-end of a career of libertinage generally emphasizes the character of the individual acts of which it is composed. Ageing debauchees, even if unscathed by venereal disease, cut a pitiful figure from the day when performance begins to lag behind desire or wits have finally gone to ruin.

Rape, in its relation to posterity, will presently be considered under the head, Eugenics. Whatever inferences may be possible in this connection, the above discussion of simple rape, as to its origin, actual character and immediate consequences should

perhaps be sufficient to suggest the following conclusions.

No doubt, one commits the extraordinary folly of rape — even as one may commit the generally, though not invariably, lesser follies of killing, getting drunk, telling a lie — because of an overpowering impulse to this end. Yet rape, of all human follies, indicates most decisively a disregard of consequences. Hence no penalty imposed on the score of a particular rape may be expected sensibly to diminish the number of subsequent rapes by persons hitherto guiltless, as long as the frequency of opportunities for rape remains undiminished. In sum, the absurdity, injustice and cruelty of condemning to long years of imprisonment the wretch who has been officially tricked into beating himself at the most elementary of all games are unparalleled save in the practice of permitting him, before the fact, to roam at will among the guileless and involve them in his defeat.

Here, again, the crudest idealism of man is actively in evidence. He still vaunts an equality of rights upon earth, a precious heritage of liberty and certain hollow theories of his law. In such names as these, human iniquity may grow to any size compatible with a continued existence of the race.

EUGENICS

The purpose of the following discussion is not to develop a standard in accordance with which the men of this day and social system may wisely choose wives, or the women, husbands. Under any system that may be hopefully contemplated as governing the social relations of our posterity, the inclinations of the persons concerned would probably supply a tolerably safe guide to marriage. The present purpose, although nearly related to the above-mentioned problem, is primarily the more general one of estimating the effect upon posterity rationally to be expected from restrictions upon the reproductive-ness of proved and potential murderers, libertines, brawlers, dullards and of all other people, the violence, recklessness or exceptional stupidity of whose conduct entails immediate consequences detrimental to the welfare, and obstructive of the progress, of the entire race.

To this end, the following questions should be asked. May these persons whose actual careers in life fill the public mind with abhorrent and unfruitful preoccupations, supply an indispensable factor

in the physical efficiency of mankind? If we make it difficult or impossible for the dunder-headed bully and the youth of markedly licentious proclivities to reproduce their kind, shall we thereby provide for an anæmic posterity lacking the will or the physique to carry its ambitious projects into effect? Is it perhaps dangerous, in this central maze of man's half-explored domain, to leave the paths prescribed by Nature; are we, indeed, walking in them now?

In order to arrive at any acceptable answers to these questions, it will first be necessary to consult the evidence relating to our distant ancestors. In accordance with this evidence and with the inferences naturally to be drawn from it, these ancestors, as compared with ourselves, must have been homogeneous in a remarkable degree. The men who lived in trees or, at best, exclusively in forests could have had no such variety of physical characteristics and mental preoccupations as are familiar to us of today; probably, even, it would be difficult to tell them apart, could we behold them in the flesh. For the purposes of the present discussion, they may be regarded as all but perfectly homogeneous.

Now, it is equally clear, from the implications of our initial postulate (page 84 *et seq.*), that mankind is now, and has always been, tending towards homogeneity. Thus our successors, or counterparts, in what has here been called the human faculty will

embody, when they reach the verge of equality in altruism, an all-but-homogeneity as different as possible from the all-but-homogeneity of our forbears. And between these two phases of altruism lies the whole range of human experience.

Hence it appears that the competence of the tree-dwellers, — *i. e.*, their fertility in experience, — was greater than our own. In them lay the germ of intermediate generations and our entire future as well. In them, perhaps, lay the germ of our successors who will consciously reconstruct the age of tree-dwelling with a completeness and exactitude impossible for ourselves.

As these simple and prolific people proceeded, in obedience to the universal law of altruism, to absorb the new experience within their reach, they became increasingly differentiated, the earliest differentiations arising from what may be called the accident of their several positions in the world. The amount of experience absorbed by any individual represented his decline in competence, and the amount absorbed by any set of progenitors represented a similar decline in their posterity. As the differentiation of individuals became more marked, widespread and complex, and as the race acquired a more extensive control over its environment, brothers might reveal opposite characteristics from birth onward; atavisms and other curious incidents of

evolution might supervene, demonstrating the meagreness of the available data for forecasting the results of human breeding but without affecting the ulterior necessity that a loss of competence, in respect of the sum of human experience, is a final and irreparable loss.

Thus the individual man embodying, relatively to his generation, a normal loss of competence has generally been the one best adapted to his environment, since the environment of any individual of a markedly predominant species must include, as an item of prime importance, the other individuals of the species. This normal individual always suffers the contingent disadvantage of an inability to respond readily to the influences that are constantly modifying the character of his generation. If he belongs to what is called a generation of reactionary tendencies, he may be far from suffering economic or political disadvantages yet must fail, only the more signally, to utilise the opportunities for conscious betterment that exist in every epoch.

On the other hand, the individual embodying a more than normal loss of competence—that is to say, one who has surpassed the bulk of his contemporaries in the absorption of experience—is ill adapted to his environment in proportion to the excess of such loss and possesses the contingent advantage of an ability to conform to the move-

ments of the day in the direction of equal altruism.

Finally, the individual embodying a less than normal loss of competence is correspondingly ill adapted to his actual environment and feebly responsive to the fundamental influences of the time. He it is whom, for practical purposes, we call not *competent* but *incompetent*, or *undeveloped*.

It follows that the savages of today, in the course of their earthly and unearthly existence, will advance more rapidly than peoples that have long been civilised; probably they represent a survival of the least progressive elements in the race. Meanwhile we may not recognise in them the equivalent of any of our ancestors since they, too, have been absorbing new experience; — that is to say, though starting from a lower plane of culture, they are still advancing toward the all-but-homogeneity that belongs to the future. On the other hand, if they learn to read and to operate a modern machine, we may not therefore regard them as potentially our equals in earthly culture. Our knowledge of the body and brain of the savage, in their bearing on his probable rate of progress upon earth; the observations that any one may make respecting his tastes, prepossessions, self-control, attentiveness, assiduity; the known results of his sporadic efforts to gather forthwith the fruits of civilisation; — these and similar data must serve to lodge him on a plane incal-

culably lower, in spite of any special knowledge he may have acquired, than many of our ancestors with whom we should be averse to establish intimate and enduring relations.

Let us further consider the comparative values of the culture both of different epochs and of different races belonging to the same epoch,— a point that may have an important, if not a decisive, bearing on all problems of eugenics. Culture will here be regarded as the phase of altruism which includes all formulated and debatable results of human experience and which, within the limits imposed by earthly conditions, may indefinitely approach equality at either an accelerated or a retarded rate of progress.

Many of us today are envious and deeply grateful by turns as we contemplate the monuments of the twentieth, or even the seventieth, generation anterior to our own. We love to dwell imaginatively in the past and are quite willing to admit, whether with pleasure or with regret, that the product of certain individuals and small communities of long ago has excelled our own in certain provinces of art and thought to which we are giving an earnest attention. These points of our inferiority, however, seem insignificant when compared with the wide range in culture represented by our civilised, barbarous and savage contemporaries. Human culture, indeed, is like a flood advancing in an uneven wave and with

many a seeming pause and recession when a deep natural fissure is to be filled up. And in no phase of earthly altruism may an appearance of equal progress be expected; the mere fact of differentiation — of permanence yielding to change — stipulates for an appearance of inequality in all experience lying between the two extremes of homogeneity.

On the other hand, our notable ancestors, or predecessors of another lineage, would marvel, on beholding our numbers and social organisation, that we should have any art whatever that was not mechanical or any thought beyond the concerns of a material well-being. Further acquaintance with us would turn their wonder to bewilderment. For they would be forced to recognise that the best spirits of their time would have far to go before they might grasp the significance of much that has happened since. Mathematical formulas, musical harmonies, details and generalisations of physical science that are familiar and useful to countless members of the present generation would probably lead to nothing further if entrusted exclusively to persons whose early schooling was of the thirteenth century. Again, the most brilliant period of Greek thought lacked records of any advance in knowledge comparable to that which has since been described, and its chief luminaries could learn much today of the



antecedents of their own race and language, of the character and position of the land on which they lived and of the various possibilities of the material elements in their daily use.

A prolonged sojourn in our midst would, however, reduce the most enterprising of our predecessors to a state of extreme depression. Our peculiar activities and the conditions of our social and economic life would repeatedly place them in situations as uncongenial as any that we should ourselves confront, if we could repay their visit. And the discomfiture in the two cases would proceed from a single source. The universal struggle towards an equal altruism—whether represented, in human affairs, by a higher or a lower standard of culture—is now at a more advanced stage than at any earlier period. That is to say, all elements of the race, even the lowest, have necessarily been modified through a continuous absorption of new experience. Thus the comparative values of the culture of any two epochs must depend both upon the interval separating the epochs and upon the ratios of the higher to the lower elements in the race. If this ratio is the same, the later epoch must possess the higher culture and represent the greater loss of competence relatively to the sum of experience. In the light of historical criticism, but not as a matter of logical necessity, the following generalisation sug-

gests itself as a tolerably safe one. Though the moral vileness of man is perhaps more strikingly in evidence and the demand for certain classes of inferior handiwork more common in modern than in ancient times, there are many reasons to deny that the highest types of manhood have declined in the course of the last seventy generations, while it would seem that the general altruism of civilised peoples, relatively to their total environment, had made a considerable advance.

At all events, the necessity of a continuous advance in culture by all surviving elements of the race is easily derived from the following hypothetical case.

If we assume that a certain savage tribe formerly possessed the art of writing and that the loss of the art, in this case, is not to be explained by an admixture of the blood of a lower race or by an elimination of the best blood within the tribe, we may not therefore pronounce the survivors of the tribe a more backward people than their literate forbears.

Each single experience of each individual, as we have seen (Part I), must differ from any experience of another individual and, whether remembered or not, must modify the character of both the individual, himself, and all his future offspring,— and, in its ulterior implications, the character of all his

contemporaries as well. Indeed, it is largely the mass of unremembered experience of both the individual and his ancestors that determines the difference between the civilised and the savage response to new experience,— response involving comparison, criticism, calculated action. And this difference always includes a vastly greater number and variety of altruistic elements than the difference between the mere perception by the savage and by the civilised of a given object or event.

The case of an entire people must be similar. Thus, though one savage tribe may, for the purposes of human culture, absorb more experience than another, no tribe of pure blood, even if condemned to isolation after a period of comparative freedom, can be supposed to have absorbed less experience at a later stage of its development than at an earlier. Even the death of all the adults before the training of the young should be complete would merely demonstrate the imperfect adaptation of the deceased generation to its environment and would thus provide an obvious, though possibly desperate, chance for the rising generation who could not be supposed to suffer through the loss of arts used to so little purpose by their fathers. We may go further and recognise that all progressive characteristics failing of transmission through the blood, as well as all useful arts failing to be handed down by example

or by word of mouth, indicate weakness in the progenitors and teachers rather than in the offspring and pupils. Similarly, the elimination from any people of the blood of its most useful members indicates weakness both in the sterile or exterminated individuals and in their survivors. Hence the resultant decline in culture must be only apparent.

Here, though, we are verging on the ulterior necessity of a continuous advance in universal altruism and of the equality of all earthly races relatively to the sum of experience. This necessity has already been considered at some length in the two first divisions of the present work. Doubtless it possesses the utmost importance as a background for all human projects; but, like the comparative values of the two inferences, *I am* and *I am not*, it cannot pervade the specific deliberations of a practical altruist owning a sense of responsibility.

For the purposes of eugenics, the following inference from the above discussion should be sufficient. The hypothetical degeneration of a single people or of all mankind can only proceed from an elimination of its higher elements. That is to say, a general decline in culture, if ever actually demonstrated, must be a process, not of decay but of extermination. This process might subsequently be checked and converted into an upward tendency through an elimination of the lower elements, or it might prove

directly responsible for the disappearance of the race. Thus, for an acceptable solution of all problems of an earthly future, reliance must clearly be placed upon the higher forms of altruism.

Now, it is well known that the mixture of two races of widely different kinds or degrees of culture lowers the standard of highest achievement of one or both of the races. The mixture of a higher with a lower race may prove beneficial to both if, as often happens, the higher race lacks certain qualities that may be supplied by the lower — if, in other words, the lower race is, in certain respects, the higher — and if the differences between the two are not too great. But all political and commercial enterprises involving an intimate association of the civilised with the savage have, up to the present, been barren of great or general benefits to mankind. Formal religions may, by this means, gain a number of dubious new votaries; individuals, or even large communities, may be made wealthy. A lasting or considerable gain to civilisation is invariably absent.

In both ancient and modern times, mixtures of savage with civilised races on a large scale have resulted almost exclusively from either trading or thieving expeditions followed by a more or less elastic system of slavery, at home or abroad; such mixtures, naturally, have been of a far less normal character than those in which only civilised races

were involved. That is to say, the mating of the civilised with the savage generally takes place under exceptional conditions in which tyranny, violence and sexual abnormality are apt to figure prominently. The fundamental altruistic value of the resultant half-caste is, of course, midway between those of the parental lines, but his practical status in society is generally anomalous,— and unhappily so,— since he is seldom fitted for either a savage or a civilised life. His personality may, and often does, furnish a striking illustration of the logical necessity that two sets of altruistic elements associated with widely different practices in the commonest affairs of life constitute an embarrassing heritage to the individual in whom they are united and may bring about his downfall at any one of the innumerable crises that are to be expected in the course of an ordinary career. Certain individuals of a later generation — especially those in whom the strain of higher culture is predominant — may prove themselves superior, in general efficiency, to some of their neighbours in whose veins there runs no savage blood. An exceptional mingling of the two elements may produce, here and there, an individual in whom the savage strain is reckoned as a positive, practical advantage. Yet by far the most important result of the mixture of a savage with a civilised race, both as viewed historically and as estimated by the

practical altruist for purposes of the future, is an enfeeblement of the higher race.

The social and economic position of full-blooded savages bred within the limits of a modern and civilised community is similarly unfortunate both for themselves and for the community. It is hardly surprising that they should wish to acquire property, influence and the showy accessories of civilisation and should almost invariably fail to acquire them, — that the new and shining baubles actually falling to their lot should often be broken over the heads of their neighbours, — and that the sympathy they inspire in their employers and protectors should fail to bring them to a sense of the manifold responsibilities of their new position although unfitting them for a normal resumption of the life of their fathers.

Undoubtedly any deliberate and rational effort to attack this problem of the association of savage with civilised, in the form in which it has been bequeathed to the present generation, demands that the following considerations be kept always in mind.

We have already noticed (Part II) the futility of civilised man assuming a direct responsibility for the savage or semi-savage soul that holds out no promise of response to the most stimulating influences of the time. Innumerable such souls exist, both within and without the confines of civilisation,

and the only obligation toward them that is certainly imposed on us is an indirect one: namely, that of paving the way for a posterity that may acquire a better understanding of their needs. We must, however, accept a direct responsibility for the body of the savage and for such of his human susceptibilities as we may comprehend; at the same time, a much weightier responsibility is for the welfare and efficiency of a civilised posterity. Theoretically, these two responsibilities should demand identical measures of reform. In actual practice, any conceivable measures must be variously unjust and liable, from the first, to scientific correction; they need, however, exhibit no such excess of injustice and defiance of scientific method as pervade the established procedure of today. For a beginning, the two following principles would, perhaps, serve as a guide.

No savage shall be forced, encouraged or permitted to leave his familiar haunts and take up an abode in a civilised community for any commercial, religious or educational purpose or for any other purpose whatsoever. Savages, when interfered with at all, shall be introduced into communities only less savage than their own.

No savage or semi-savage who has already been domiciled in a civilised community long enough to have acquired some of the habits of civilised life

shall be returned to the domain of his fathers where his experience of civilisation would probably place him at a disadvantage. On the other hand, he shall not only be relieved of the embarrassment of a pretended equality with the civilised but shall, in great measure, be debarred from intercourse with those who find him incapable of establishing a tolerable community of interest and conduct with themselves. Unless an exceptional person, he shall be segregated, along with others of like calibre, in such surroundings as may enable him, first, to find his own level and, then, to improve it according to his capacity.

Now, all considerations applicable to the savage dwelling in a civilised community must apply, with more or less force, to any one who belongs to a civilised race yet behaves, more or less, like a savage. Many acts that are normal and comprehensible in a savage community must be anomalous, even from the agent's point of view, when performed within the precincts of civilisation. Hence any one who, in consequence of a meagre ancestral experience, bears unmistakable signs of menace to the welfare and progress of a civilised community should not enjoy the freedom of this community up to the moment of his commission of an offensive act. The character of every child should be vouched for by neighbours and his record at school should be adjudged satisfactory before he is offered the highest

opportunities of the day. And everyone who, in adolescence or at any later period of life, gives reasonable cause for belief that his conduct may, under ordinary circumstances, become intolerably violent or licentious should be restricted, as to his movements, during hours of leisure and should be under surveillance during the hours when he is practising his vocation.

A graduated segregation of the unfit would, in some respects, resemble the so-called merit system that is the ideal, more or less nearly approached, in the operation of many industrial and administrative enterprises. Moreover, it would provide a natural outlet for the irresistible undercurrents in human affairs that have always triumphed, in the end, over theories of liberty and equality upon earth and determined a subordination, more or less logical and effective, of the unfit to the fit. It would, however, be entirely unlike any existing scheme of subordination in that, under its operation, the unfit could not be impoverished or, in any way, exploited for the satisfaction of short-sighted ambitions.

The bearing of a rational plan of segregation of both the generally and the specifically unfit upon the central problems in eugenics is a point of the highest importance and one that should receive careful study. There are, at present, no satisfactory

data respecting the offspring of licentious and turbulent members of civilised communities; but, with segregation, such data would be rapidly accumulated. Wherever, under our existing system of organised clannishness and racial rivalry, the future industrial and fighting strength of a nation is one of the principal ends in view, any restrictions upon the reproductiveness of potential murderers and libertines may appear unwise. Nevertheless, it is improbable that the specific weaknesses manifested in such acts as murder and rape should increase the general efficiency of the next ensuing generations or that an ulterior immunity from licentious and homicidal proclivities should not be attained through the acquisition of higher forms of experience as well as through an unbridled indulgence of these proclivities to the point of exhaustion. The former process, to be sure, might be the less rapid of the two, but it would certainly involve no such sinister possibilities of general detriment to the race.

At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that both the savage and the backward member of a civilised race are possessed of a greater competence, relatively to the sum of human experience, than the most cultured of their contemporaries. Like our tree-dwelling ancestors, they have before them a richer and more varied future. Thus each of our dullest or most truculent neighbours is eventually to

attain an eminence in the human faculty from which our highest achievements of today will appear as invested with the rudimentary value belonging to all earthly concerns; and, to attain this eminence, he must advance more rapidly than his superiors in culture. We can today give him little or no help on the road; almost as reasonably might we be expected to control the development of the beasts of the forest, the birds of the air or the sands of the sea, all of which will figure with equal prominence in the triumph of change. But we should, at least, be able to show a decent consideration for his exceptional needs, impulses and deficiencies and to prevent him from prolonging the train of misfortune in which he is involved equally with the victims of his stupidity. Indeed, if we would indefinitely reduce the number of his future depredations, we have but to expose to the light of common sense a certain revengeful article in most popular codes that represents the sinner as unworthily triumphant and his innocent victims as the only sufferers. One consequence of such exposure would undoubtedly be the adoption of a plan of segregation without implications of fear, hatred or contempt of the segregated or of suspicion or rancour in their own minds.

The specifically unfit and, to some extent, the generally unfit might then be utilised for the highest purposes of mankind. Under a rational plan of

segregation, data for eugenics would rapidly become available, leading probably to conclusions that lie beyond the range of present speculation. The unruly and the licentious, far from being condemned to celibacy, would be encouraged and aided to marry although their choice would be subject to restrictions varying in accordance with the results obtained from earlier unions. Wives should easily be found if no ignominy were associated with the state of segregation and no hardship more serious than the absence of many traditional opportunities for violence and deceit and for striving after the unattainable.

In the beginning, the unfit would generally mate with the similarly unfit; and, in the course of such breeding, probably, a great number of lines would become extinct. In many other lines, however, inbreeding amongst the unfit should lead to the exhaustion of specific weaknesses. And, within a short time, a partial mixture of the fit with the unfit would undoubtedly appear desirable, or even imperative.

It is true that the conditions precedent to a rational division of society into classes exhibiting different degrees of productivity are the same as would imply the impossibility of further wars, commercial rivalries and certain other traditional practices that have recently been brought severely under

suspicion. Hence a somewhat different type of man might be expected, under these conditions, to be in demand. It is, however, to be remembered that the state of society following upon a removal of some of its most conspicuous blemishes would be far from the paradise of anybody's fancy. Rather would it be an introductory phase of the first serious and united attack upon the really difficult problems of existence: little time, probably, would be wasted in mutual felicitations. The abolition of war and of commercial rivalries, for example, is a comparatively easy and obvious task which, to be performed, requires but a diligent dissemination of knowledge already available. But to wrest from the earth, the air and the heavens their fullest benefit; to shelter the little flame of nobility in the soul of mankind and fan it to a generous and self-sustaining blaze; to avert the sordid decadence of a posterity that has been cherished in every bosom, these long millenniums past; — here are tasks requiring nerve, courage, pertinacity. Which qualities do not exist independently. Their highest possible expression upon earth may have nothing to do with the tribulations of war, of vice or of poverty, but it can never, upon earth, be separable from muscles, digestions and red blood. And in these prime requisites of an earthly existence, innumerable persons who must be classed with either the generally or the specifically unfit are

richer than the majority of self-controlled and productive men.

This abundance of animal vitality amongst the unfit could not be ignored in the operation of any rational plan of eugenics nor fail to be utilised wherever possible. In other words, unfitness is merely a convenient term for indicating a congenital inability to profit by the normal opportunities of the time; it further implies certain important deficiencies in the best knowledge of the time, which is powerless to modify such unfitness through the use of tried methods. Under a scientific system of eugenics, made possible by segregation, either the connotation of the word, *unfit*, would be completely altered, or a number of other words would take its place,—words expressive of the specific points of superiority of the unfit over the fit.

It remains, finally, to be asked if the establishment of such a system may be regarded as a perilous experiment because of an implied departure from the paths prescribed by Nature.

In the present discussion, we are concerned with the immediate, or practical, aspects of human altruism; that is to say, there is no present need to refer to the ulterior necessity that all manners of breeding are in accordance with fundamentally natural processes. We are here endeavouring to dis-

cover the means by which man may consciously work out a higher destiny for a cherished and exacting posterity, — a destiny higher than some other destiny that seems equally possible. This is the chief business of man; and all his acts and utterances betray his belief that it is a legitimate business and one that will win him a reward in some phase of a future life. Likewise, all actions and reactions in the world of inanimate things appear to him to involve a strain and an effort similar to those which he, himself, feels impelled to sustain or to put forth.

From the plane of practical altruism, then, it is easy to recognise two different standards of naturalness in human breeding. One standard is the ideal: an unerring instinct is granted an unlimited freedom of choice. The other standard is of a relative or retrospective character: civilised custom is compared with our inferences concerning the breeding of our simpler forbears or with our observations of contemporaneous animal life. And anybody can see that the breeding of civilised people at the present time is in sharp contrast with either of these standards. The mating of civilised with savage, healthy with diseased, old with young, rich with poor, powerful with obscure, promiscuous male with desperate female, is as far removed from an ideal of freedom, whether monogamous or not, as it is from any mating, observed or inferable, of the simpler crea-

tures of the earth. Fortunate individuals, here and there, mate naturally in spite of the difficulties besetting freedom of choice; unnatural unions might be frequent under a scientific, but necessarily imperfect, system of eugenics. It should, however, be clear that a rational guidance of human breeding must bring us nearer to a standard of naturalness than customs that permit so many sordid and fruitless preoccupations to take a paradoxical precedence of both the individual wish and the welfare of posterity.

It should also be clear, which of the two standards of naturalness would be approached by a reasonable and progressive application of such principles of eugenics as we now possess and should later develop. For we may neither retrace our steps into the past nor descend the scale of earthly experience. We may not provide for ourselves the homogeneous environment of our distant forbears and, as regards the lower animals that share with us our actual domain, we draw from our observations of them many an interesting and useful analogy which, however, may seldom be directly applied to the peculiar conditions of our existence. We may compare our domestic arrangements unfavourably with those of the rat or the partridge; any emulation of these creatures on our part must evidently be subject to liberal deductions.

Perfect freedom of choice, then, must be the unsustainable ideal that a rational and progressive scheme of eugenics may indefinitely approach, — a freedom such as could have little meaning in the lives of the lower animals or of our primitive ancestors because of their greater homogeneity and lesser experience. Even the initial restrictions upon human breeding necessitated by the wide differences in culture between the various races of mankind and between different lines of the same race would, at once, make for greater freedom within the prescribed limits. It is true that like must then mate with like wherever of an extreme unfitness and that the lines established by such unions would probably, if sufficiently prolonged, be largely productive of sterile individuals. But wherever relative unfitness should come within the scope of the broadest educational methods of the time, the mating of the unlike would be encouraged and assisted by every available means.

The conclusions to be drawn from this discussion may be stated as follows. In detail, they are vague because of the meagre opportunities hitherto afforded for systematically recording the transmission of human characteristics. Their general tenor, however, is unmistakable. A rational scheme of eugenics is one that will control human breeding to such an extent and in such a manner as may ensure

an accumulation of scientific data for the benefit of posterity, prevent the mating of the unlike wherever the difference in culture is sufficiently great to threaten either anomalous offspring or an enfeeblement of the race and, finally, promote the mating of unlike members of the classes recognised as normal or supernormal or as amenable to the best educational influences of the time.

This plan, once inaugurated, should prove easily workable. Under its operation, human nature would be suffered to separate into certain obvious and mutually hostile elements that have hitherto been held together by the contradictory notion that, although various, they continue, for all practical purposes of the future, one and unchangeable. In every department of life, responsibility would be lifted from the shoulders of those who now make it a point of honour to assume responsibility although well aware of, and notorious for, their inadequate strength; and a great portion of the burden would be taken up by those who have hitherto explained their indifference by the theory that to be any kind of human being is to be mostly a savage. Once inaugurated, indeed, this obvious plan would ensure to all classes of society a more congenial situation than before.

But how to inaugurate it? Practical altruists

should take notice and be duly sensible of the exceeding difficulty of the first step.

For it is undeniable that the tradition of a general and indefinite liberty of the individual is one of the central fictions of civilisation. Doubtless this has become a highly unsafe reliance; it is, however, pervaded with the glamour of antiquity and the prestige of important achievements, for it was probably established, in one form or another, long ages before the first history was written and has repeatedly proved the means of delivering a people from unbearable tyranny. We have seen how powerfully and variously it operates against a profitable freedom of action in modern communities; nevertheless, it is still celebrated in song and fervid rhetoric. Though it is forever being invalidated by the inexorable conditions of an earthly existence, the certainty that man's striving for freedom and equality is an expression of both his inmost nature and his ulterior destiny provides an excuse for disregarding the practical necessities of his position. The impossibility upon earth of anything approaching equal rights of men is today more obvious than ever before; today, more generally than ever, men are persuaded that, by choosing their own leaders, they may safeguard their interests and enforce their will. Since teachers and leaders, for the most part, show the same dogged devotion to this too simple

inference as do their pupils and supporters, it is hardly surprising that liberty, or — what comes to the same thing — equality, is most cherished by those who are farthest from possessing it.

In time of stress, the so-called freemen are generally able to organise and materially to affect the course of events although, in the complexity of the conflict, they must invariably secure a great deal more or a great deal less or something quite other than what they bargained for. Such an uprising would undoubtedly be precipitated by any determined but premature attempt to carry into effect a scientific plan of eugenics. While the manifold devices of civilisation for obscuring a rational faith in immortality remain in effective operation on every side, it is not to be believed that persons accustomed to the kind of freedom that permits them to have their fling or strive after all manner of unattainable objects will forgo this privilege without a murmur. Spokesmen of the relatively unfit would probably address the advocates of rational eugenics in some such terms as follow.

“ We understand that you purpose labelling as *unfit* a certain very considerable number of us who must thenceforth keep to the ways set apart by you for our use. Not only may we not marry your daughters but we may not even behold the light of your countenance lest we should tread on your toes

or let you have the feel of a healthy fist when you were giving yourself too many airs. You say you will see to it that we have everything we need, the same as yourselves. Thanks for your kind offer of patronage, but we are not likely to accept it, having always been accustomed to earn our bread and beer without anybody's help and being prepared, at the present moment, to show you which is the fitter party of the two, if you make us really angry with your high-falutin theories. Why, pray, should you be pleased to call us unfit? You may, as you say, be more cultured than we are, but would you care to deny that the toil of our hands has enabled you to become so? And what have we done that we should not be tolerated in your favourite resorts? Haven't we often heard you say that no man is worth his salt who hasn't made a fool of himself at least once? But now you propose that a man shall be declared an outcast for having a harmless bit of fun. And you expect good people and true—and a sight more decent, perhaps, than the likes of you—to consent to be shut up in a kind of zoölogical garden where they may be scientifically bred by their keepers. Excuse me, gentlemen, but you are anarchists; and, more than that, you are traitors, for you mean to trample under foot the law that has been entrusted to you for the benefit of all."

Here—upon the supposition that the existing

scheme of civilised life provides a tolerably acceptable and possibly enduring environment for man — is a sensible and unanswerable protest against the most scientific principles of eugenics. The conditions — their value and chance of ever being realised — under which such a protest would cease to be sensible, or even possible, form the chief subject-matter of this book.

ALCOHOLISM; HABITUAL USE OF DRUGS

Elimination of error, as operative in the habitual use of intoxicating drugs, is, to a great extent, included in the process known as natural selection. That is to say, amongst the users of any drug, the fittest, or those who survive and reproduce their kind, prefer other vocations to a fatal or highly injurious addiction to the drug. The reasons of this choice need not concern us here; they will be traced by our successors in the human faculty to an enormous variety of characteristics, physical and mental, of the persons in question and an equal variety of factors in their environment. At all events, if their descendants continue to resemble them in the use of this drug, a lineage will eventually be established for whom the drug will either contain no perilous seduction or inspire a positive aversion.

Amongst any of their contemporaries in whose lineage a tradition of total abstention has generally prevailed, the individuals in whom this tradition is maintained at an effective strength have likewise no reason to fear the drug for themselves. But each of their descendants who exhausts the immediate pos-

sibilities of one or more of the preferred vocations and finds himself, in consequence, a prey to disappointment, ennui or hysteria must thereby impair the force of the abstemious tradition in his own case. That is to say, the attractions of any untried vocation that is readily available must, in his eyes, be proportionally enhanced. And the drug that was shunned by his fathers will be dangerous to himself in a degree proportionate to the persistence with which it has been shunned. To be sure, an ancestral experience similar to what would have been constituted by a more frequent use of this drug may have established in him a partial immunity. Or, indeed, he may use and not abuse the drug under conditions unfavourable to moderation if he is one of the rare and versatile persons who may draw largely on the higher forms of experience without sensibly diminishing the available store. In other words, although the total possibilities of drug-using will become the common property of all human lines in their projection into an unearthly future, the earthly records of any two lines of drug-users cannot, in any respect, be interchangeable.

In this connection, however, the relations among different forms of ancestral experience need receive no further consideration. And the exceptionally gifted people of the earth are the hope, rather than the concern, both of society in general and of each

gifted one, himself. The purpose of the present discussion is, first, to estimate the practical significance of the distribution, among various communities, of the users and abusers of certain drugs notorious for the perilous seduction that, under certain circumstances, they hold out to the generality of men; and, secondly, the aim is to indicate the direction in which the actual social status of these innumerable persons may be modified with advantage both to the present generation and to posterity.

In accordance with the evolutionary necessity stated above, moderation in the use of alcohol or of any other stimulating or narcotic drug should be expected in regions where the drug in question has long been easily obtainable. Certain deductions are, however, to be made from this general proposition.

All branches of the human race have been more or less persistently engaged in the business of migration: it is exceptional for a people to remain, in considerable numbers, upon the same soil for as many as fifty generations,—a space that might often prove inadequate for the exhaustion of intemperate habits.

Moreover, any civilised race continuing for as long a period as this under uniform climatic and geological conditions always receives a liberal infusion of new blood through conquests, commercial

interchanges and the migrations of other peoples. This infusion must modify the character of the race in its relation to the use of drugs as well as in all other respects.

Again, different manners of preparing or of using a drug should be noticed in any consideration of an intemperate addiction to the drug. For example, equal quantities of alcohol obtained, on the one hand, by distillation and, on the other, by fermentation produce different effects upon the human body, even when proportionally diluted. And alcohol by distillation is a comparatively recent product whilst alcohol by fermentation was doubtless used by prehistoric man. Hence a people that has attained a tolerable immunity from the deleterious effects of fermented liquors may occupy a more backward position in respect of distilled liquors.

In sum, — and especially with regard to the impossibility of persistent inbreeding in any civilised race, — it is not to be expected that anything approaching a total exhaustion of intemperate habits in the use of any intoxicant should be demonstrable in any region of the earth. On the other hand, — especially in view of the retarded pace of recent migrations and amalgamations of races, — it is indeed to be expected that a marked tendency toward such exhaustion should now be demonstrable

in the regions where the intoxicants are most easily obtained.

And, in point of fact, the present distribution of the devotees, in moderation and in excess, of the two most important drugs that lend themselves to habitual use indicates decisively that the fundamental process of elimination has already produced measurable results.

If tobacco, tea and coffee be left out of consideration because of their comparative unimportance as intoxicants, by far the most widely used of all the seductive drugs are alcohol and opium.

In no race or nation is a condition nearly approaching complete immunity from the baleful effects of either of these drugs to be observed. But the relative immunity varies greatly in different peoples.

It is in the regions of southern and central Europe that alcohol by fermentation is most easily obtained in an acceptable form. In southern Europe, where the vine has been cultivated for a longer period than in any other region of the earth, the immoderate use of wine is rare and the number of wine-drinkers great. In central Europe, where the vine has been cultivated less easily and for a shorter period, wine is abused more commonly than in southern Europe, and less commonly, in proportion to the number of wine-drinkers, than in northern Europe or in other

continents where wine has been produced only recently or not at all. In southern Europe, distilled spirits are not consumed in any considerable quantity; it would seem highly probable that, relatively to the number of consumers, they were not abused as commonly as in central Europe where they are certainly less commonly abused than in northern Europe or in either the southern or the northern portion of North America.

Similarly opium, which has been easily obtainable in southern Asia for a longer period than in eastern Asia, is less commonly abused in the former region.

In view of the above considerations, let us inquire what changes in the present social status of drug-users are possible and desirable. This status varies considerably in different communities; and a recent movement in the direction of prohibition, which is intended ultimately to prove a levelling process, has, thus far, only accentuated the variation. No doubt, a thorough and impartial re-arrangement of the status of drug-users upon any level whatsoever is impossible; nevertheless any rational progress toward this end must be in the direction of equal altruism. Let us consider the case of the drinker.

Up to the present, it has always been impossible to take alcohol away from a bibulous community. Prohibition of the traffic in alcohol may indeed make

it more difficult for the young to learn to drink. It may also create a demand for other drugs that are more easily distributed in secrecy. It may affect the life of the community in a variety of ways; but an undercurrent of alcoholism is always present and may, at an auspicious moment, rise to the surface and seriously disturb the peace of a people unprepared to cope with alcoholic excess.

The difficulties besetting any movement for the suppression of drink are so well known to all but the most ill-informed and incurious as to require only a brief mention here. They are derived not only from the desire to drink but from a sense of the various real and fancied rights of man, such as the right to use, or to make and sell, a commodity that is used by a vast majority of persons without detriment to their neighbours. Hence, the policy of suppression is here a far less promising one than in the case of any of the obviously unproductive activities that have been considered in earlier pages of this work. For, although it has been impossible in the past to prevent men from killing, fighting or breeding in obedience to an ungovernable impulse of the moment, there are no theoretical obstacles in the way of such prevention, even in the immediate future. But the theoretical objections to the suppression of drink are probably more formidable, at least for the present, than the practical objections.

If, for example, two nations are on the verge of war, other nations whose interests are not directly involved in the quarrel generally endeavour, at least in theory, to prevent the war. Or if two individuals have come to blows, bystanders generally endeavour to separate them. If, however, a man is about to drink, it is far less usual to oppose his intention than to follow the example.

Moreover, there are people who believe that alcohol is a positive benefit to humanity and that the total abstainers, at least of certain races, seldom rise to a high level of efficiency. A much larger class of persons believe that alcohol, under certain circumstances, might be a positive benefit to humanity although it now is not. Wine-lovers are conscious of peculiar intellectual and emotional values in both the stimulus and the reaction following upon the use of their favourite beverages and consider that the price paid for this advantage — to wit, the demonstrably impaired efficiency of ordinary mental processes and bodily functions — is none too high. And philosophers are prone to apprehend serious consequences from the decrease in sociability that is noticeable whenever generous liquors are placed under a ban.

All things considered, the possibility of anything approaching an absolute and world-wide prohibition

✓ of the use of alcoholic beverages would seem entirely negligible.

Nevertheless, a system of partial prohibition is conspicuously in operation in every region of the earth, the motive force being the moral prepossessions of drinkers and abstainers alike. Generally speaking, the encouragement to drink that a man receives from his friends ceases at the point at which signs of habitual intemperance begin to appear. Thenceforth all manner of expedients, even to threats, promises, ruses, bribes, are in order for defeating his supposed intention to ruin himself, body and soul. He finds himself an object of suspicion, tinged with shame, and must make the most of today's opportunity for indulging his notorious appetite lest tomorrow bring forth no liquor. All the elements in his character that make for moderation are opposed by a powerful psychological counter-agent in the form of his neighbours' undissembled conviction of the malignant nature of his infirmity. He becomes, on the one hand, a charge upon the public conscience, which will permit neither his elimination from the race by the painless and tolerably scientific method of alcoholism persevered in nor his re-instatement in efficiency through an exhilarating effort of his own will and intelligence. But, on the other hand, his personal liberty and right to pursue any chosen vocation may not

be called in question; he may, therefore, perpetrate any act of violence that his fuddled or over-excited brain may dictate, so long as his earlier misdeeds have been duly expiated. Likewise, his son grows up, an object of distrust unaccompanied by rational precautions.

Under the circumstances here briefly outlined, it is hardly surprising that the moral prohibition of alcoholic excess should achieve so slight a measure of practical success. Wherever its failure is conspicuous and the temper of the community is consistent with more drastic methods, legal prohibition, or restriction, of the sale of alcohol is generally resorted to. We have seen how slender is the chance of such prohibition remaining effective for any considerable period of time; hence we need not dwell on the unsightly aspects of the communities in which it is ostensibly in force,— the degraded condition of the bibulous, the unmerited humiliation of the temperate, the growth of exotic forms of dissipation, the prevalence of fraud and magisterial chicanery. All these and many other indications of the futility of prohibitory laws are invariably present wherever such laws prevail. They need not, however, be emphasized for any practical purposes of reform, since by far the unluckiest incident of prohibition would be its successful enforcement. To restrict or prevent the use of alcohol is inevitably to impose

alcoholic disabilities upon posterity,—upon the countless generations that are ignored in so many devices of civilisation yet remain inexorably the chief concern of us all.

The substantial difference between the immoderate use of alcohol and the vices that have been discussed earlier in the present work is a point that should always be kept in mind.

Pugnacity, for example, is likewise in the blood of the race,—the survival, in a comparatively cruel and cowardly form, of a quality that was once systematically developed as a necessary part of the equipment for the daily routine. Its manifestations, however, have become so extensively involved in extraneous fictions of civilisation, such as codes of honour, rights of property, national pride and sentimental clannishness, that to remove these various obstacles to human progress would be to reduce to a negligible minimum the number of occasions when a fight could be expected.

Alcoholism is also, and to a great extent, dependent on extraneous influences in civilised society. It is promoted, as we have seen, by the exhaustion of other activities. Nevertheless it is, at present, chiefly important as a condition independent of all the barriers or stepping stones to human progress. Both its moderate and its extreme manifestations are either averted or facilitated by opposite moods

and circumstances, as by adversity and prosperity, despair and exultation, failure and success, illness and health. In sum, since alcoholic beverages are now easily produced in all the inhabited regions of the earth and are in great demand in all circles within certain races rating themselves among the most enlightened, it seems hardly conceivable that alcoholism shall not continue as an important factor in human affairs at least for centuries to come.

As regards the use of opium, the same general conclusions may be drawn, though with modifications in detail owing to the different effect of the drug upon the human system and the different temper of the races most addicted to it.

The first task, then, of the practical altruist in connection with the habitual use of drugs — and, for the immediate future, the only task — is to bring into discredit the popular notion of prohibition, moral or legal, as a cure or preventive of intemperance. Whether it is desirable forthwith to place exotic drugs freely at the disposal of any race whatsoever may be considered highly doubtful. Opium, for example, — to judge by the accounts of those who have used it, — must possess a more than purely medicinal virtue. Yet, under the present conditions of civilised life, to place opium within easy reach of everyone belonging to a western race might be to

incur the danger of an otherwise avoidable degeneration in this race. Under the conditions, however, that the practical altruist must endeavour to bring about in all departments of life, the ready accessibility of all intoxicating drugs would be stipulated for in all communities of the earth. For, in order to eliminate the most anomalous type of man and to preserve and improve the most promising type, it is undoubtedly important that no adult of either sex should be suffered either to regard as forbidden any practice entailing no certain detriment to others or to reckon upon the restraining hand of society in case his addiction to the practice should prove detrimental to himself.

Here, again, it is to be remembered that popular notions, such as the notion of prohibition, are not easily assailed. As a race, we are often as stubborn in our support of a tradition as we were whimsical in setting it up. Our mothers, too, preside anxiously over many of our councils; and mother love has taken on a new and peculiar character in the human species. Indeed, mother love is a force seriously to be reckoned with in all rational projects concerning the immoderate use of drugs or any of the other vices that have already been considered in these pages. For it is impossible to say that women are showing a finer sense of the best interests of the

race than the least stubborn and whimsical of their sons.

The difficulties are many; but the objective is clearly visible; hence there should be the less faltering. Once prohibition is brought into general disrepute, the drunkard will no longer be given a cuff with the one hand, a crutch for his infirmity with the other. So far as alcohol is concerned, he will be left, if an adult, entirely to his own devices. If these enable him to recover his efficiency, he should prove, more than ever, a useful member of the community. If they fail, his inherent unfitness for the uses of the time is the sooner demonstrated and he becomes forthwith a charge upon a more competent posterity. In either case, his sufferings, physical and moral, and those of his intimates as well, are greatly mitigated and curtailed. And in the latter case, he is prevented, by virtue of segregation, from compelling others to share his degradation, while the loss to the community of such productive power as he may have possessed should be more than compensated by the suppression of his wasteful activities.

MARRIAGE AND FEMINISM

One of the special privileges and intellectual diversions of man is that of generalising about the other sex. So one hears from various sources that no woman is really won unless she has been contended for, spoiled, beaten, amused, inspired with pity, exalted above other women. A notable philosopher declares that, if women were to speak the truth, no morality would be possible upon earth; another, equally famous, holds that a woman may be deeply moved only by the perception of true nobility in the character of a man. By many it is said that logic counts for little in a woman's deliberations; others maintain that this circumstance has no practical importance since the consequences of woman's lack of method are, in the long run, compensated by her superior quickness of intuition.

All things considered, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the female sex is as highly differentiated as the male and that each of the above-cited estimates may hold good of individual women, or even of certain classes of women, while none of them may apply to women in the mass. On the

other hand, the three general statements that follow must have an important bearing on all problems of sex.

First, the woman bears the child,—a function that plainly grows more arduous with the present trend of civilised custom.

Secondly, and perhaps consequently, the initiative in generation, as well as in nearly all other human activities, belongs not to the woman but to the man, the feminine prerogative being that of consent or refusal.

Finally, the number of females born to each generation is approximately the same as the number of males; and the ratio of the physically and mentally sound to the total number of females is probably about the same as among the males.

Now, the human male cannot be called either a promiscuous or a monogamous animal since, in respect of sexual conduct, mankind is differentiated in a degree unapproached by any other species. If men were generally polygamous, they would not devise multifarious rules, religious, moral and economic for limiting the choice of a mate; if they were generally monogamous, whole peoples would not become committed to polygamy and great numbers of individuals ostensibly subscribing to monogamous rules would not be willing to risk health and both

social and economic advantages by transgressing these rules.

Undoubtedly a considerable proportion of the most valuable fathers of posterity are monogamous, not merely from a sense of duty but also by temperament or inclination. Moreover,— in communities ostensibly monogamous — if masses of women were not always to be found in a virtually defenceless position, the promiscuity of sexual relations would be indefinitely lessened: customs governing the distribution of property and sustaining the liberty and equality of men operate unfavourably for obscure, needy or timid girls who would prefer to lead an honest and healthy life. And finally, the equality in the birth-rate of males and females may seem to indicate that monogamy is the rule of nature. We have seen, however (page 190 *et seq.*), how far all practicable methods of human breeding are removed from any comprehensible standards of naturalness other than an ideal unattainable upon earth.

In sum, any serious attempt to forecast the meaning of marriage to our posterity must be contingent upon our adoption of a practical plan of eugenics. The significant elements in marriage — temperamental, psychological, physiological — would then be allowed to appear more clearly and promptly and less offensively than under any tried system. For a beginning, monogamy would doubtless be the rule

for peoples who had hitherto ostensibly subscribed to monogamy and perhaps, also, for peoples who had practised polygamy without remarkable success; eventually, perhaps, an exceptional man would take more than one wife without prejudice to the general rule of monogamy.

Similarly, — under a practical system of eugenics, — the movement known as feminism must be subject to a general and overt recognition that equal rights among human beings have always been far from realisation and that the irresistible tendency towards equality can only be fulfilled in an immaterial future. At present, the notion of equal rights is inextricably bound up with traditions of personal leadership and exclusive ownership of property. When these traditions are no longer active in human affairs, every woman must perceive the folly of any proposal consistently to offer her the same opportunities or subject her to the same restrictions as are enjoyed or suffered by her brothers or sisters. Probably no reason exists why exceptional spinsters and childless wives should not attain the maximum of efficiency in pursuits that have hitherto been largely or wholly monopolised by men. On the other hand, women who devote the best years of their lives primarily to the production and upbringing of a family cannot be expected to take an active part in the advancement of knowledge or management of

affairs. The highest and most obvious prerogative of mothers, apart from the concerns of motherhood, must be one, not of initiative but of advice and correction. How successfully this function is often performed can be attested by innumerable men who have confided in their wives and found woman's judgment better than man's in matters only indirectly connected with the household. Indeed, it is not improbable that woman's supposedly keener faculty of intuition is due to her comparative isolation from the multifarious, and often trivial or delusive, concerns that complicate the most popular vocations of civilised man.

MOTHER LOVE

Undoubtedly woman has often a quicker and a surer vision than man in the provinces of life that man alone is supposed to have thoroughly explored. It may be that the possibilities of a whole people or generation are sometimes divined by women, men being at fault. Generally, however, woman's vision is quickest and surest wherever personal interests are clearly and immediately involved. And it is certain that the space of an individual life upon earth assumes a higher importance in woman's reckoning than in man's.

To be sure, there are still women who send their sons to war with avidity and a show of light-heartedness. Their inmost feelings may differ considerably from those of the Spartan mother; yet the glamour of war and the interests of the clan or nation appeal strongly to most women in any crisis that is beyond the ordinary. On the other hand, women are generally more perturbed than men at seeing their sons adopt an unremunerative vocation, become the victims of commercial greed or political jealousy, sacrifice themselves in the interest of scientific research or renounce any material rewards whatsoever.

The sick and the wounded are nursed by women with a maternal instinct that often proves more helpful than the physician's technical skill.

Many a soldier, knowing himself mortally hurt, calls aloud to the mother who died in his childhood.

And in the whole range of human experience, there is no relationship more beautiful and inspiring than exists between a wise mother and an understanding son. Many of us have known such a mother; and many of us have confessed that we failed in understanding. Yet, unhappily, as we grow into manhood and gain experience of the world, we cannot fail to perceive that our wise mothers are by no means typical of the race. Neglect of offspring is a charge that is commonly, and with good reason, brought against a multitude of mothers in every civilised community. And probably this offence is a less serious one — at all events, it demands, for the present, less emphasis — than the admission of weakness and the readiness for indulgence that are displayed by so many women before their rebellious or erring children. There is one juncture in life — perhaps only one — at which a person may implicitly trust his sense of decisive and all-round superiority over another: this is when an ordinary adult comes into conflict with an ordinary child. Nearly all children expect a cheerful and unhesitating assumption of authority on the

part of their governors; and any vexed or disappointed mother who resorts to complaints, tears or cajolery either in order to save herself an effort or in the vain hope of retaining her child's affection merely defeats her own end at the same time that, by destroying the child's confidence in her, she deprives it of a much-needed support.

It is undoubtedly hard to admit that a relationship both potentially and actually fraught with the very highest benefits to mankind should also be responsible for incalculable damage done in the most critical period of human development. Yet the extreme frequency of mothers exhibiting an indolence, pusillanimity and lack of foresight that are almost unknown among the simpler creatures of the wild leaves us powerless to deny that mother love has taken on a new and perhaps inauspicious character in the human species.

Mankind has lost the primitive ancestral faith; hence it is no wonder that women, unlike most of the simpler mothers, are generally ready and eager — except when under the spell of an extraordinary crisis — to sacrifice the interests of their community to the supposedly imperative needs of their offspring. In this procedure they are, for the most part, actively seconded by their men; indeed, mother love is but one embodiment of an altruism shared by all human beings. Friendship, love of kin, transitory

comradeship, intellectual affinity, sexual love are, in the sum, productive of all the practical effects of mother love. Even babes new-born may suffer nohow when separated from the best of mothers; in which respect, the sucklings of no other species are as fortunate.

Yet the child of man, at any stage of his development, may be exposed, on the one hand, to neglect or cruel treatment and, on the other, to a paralysing indulgence of his whims or to the operation of fruitless devices for neutralising his congenital defects. Needy or dissolute parents often starve their children, curse them, compel them to resort to degrading practices, yet may not kill them outright. More prosperous people feel that their depraved or defective offspring should always be given another chance. Human reason is forever attacking the morbid affectionateness and sense of sin that human differentiation has entailed; but individuals are still far from ready to forego a superstitious, and undertake a rational, expiation of their misdeeds. Life is short; we're a long time dead; to every person, then, the best possible opportunity upon earth,—thus, roughly, runs the dogma of popular morality.

There can be no doubt that this is an ephemeral phase of human conduct. A simple faith in immortality has given place to mystical religions and a shallow skepticism; these, in turn, must yield to the

rational view of immortality derivable from the assumption that existence is not totally devoid of significance. The succession of mothers shielding their sons from death, disgrace and disappointment at any cost to posterity cannot, then, be indefinitely prolonged. And conspiracies of humane and gentle souls to obscure the harmful propensities of weak brothers until calamity visits their neighbours will cease to be formed when the production of productive men and women — of people capable of the joy of living — is recognised as the chief educational concern of the race.

ARTS AND SCIENCES

It is by no means surprising that the people who have produced something new and valuable in the world are often embarrassed when honours are conferred upon them. Human culture is probably advancing. In certain directions it is undoubtedly advancing so that, even today, the farther a man surpasses his contemporaries in any province of art or thought, the more clearly he may realise both his own impotence and the vastness of the territory still unexplored, — hence the more dubious and uncomfortable his attitude toward tributes implying a perdurable quality in his work.

On the other hand, the man of the moment, whether charlatan or honest believer in himself, — the one who unites familiar elements of thought or art in an attractive or readily workable whole, — may receive such tributes with a feeling of relative composure. This one, fixedly contemplating the immediate end in view, finds in a popular recognition of his achievement the natural consequence and final reward of his labours. And according as he values highly the reward, he becomes liable to

either or both of two errors that are certain eventually to impair his individual happiness: namely, a liberal exaggeration of the value of his achievement and a belief that he may rest on his laurels or let future performance borrow from the old prestige.

Now, in all human activities, there is a certain juncture at which every tolerably sane person is not only entirely free from discomfort and unhappiness but experiences an active elation and sense of advancement: this juncture is the moment of production. The mother harking to her new-born, the farmer reaping his fully ripened grain, the builder laying the last stone of church or dwelling, the golfer who has put every ounce of body and wrist into his drive, the chemist finding a long-sought element, the teacher finding himself understood, the poet finding music for unspeakable mysteries, the critic exposing a meretricious art or an outworn canon of thought or conduct, — all these, and only such as these, are for a moment insensible of sordid care and distracting rivalry. Here, indeed, is found the central meaning of human existence, which is an unreserved consideration for posterity.

Golden moments, these of conscious production, — familiar to us all yet of a rarity that must often be disheartening even in the most fruitful of individual careers. It would seem, then, that to multiply

them were the chief concern of educational and all other social institutions: that no man should be taken from his work to hear it praised or see it rewarded in any manner likely to cloud his perception of its provisional and therefore stimulating character. Such, indeed, must become the practice of our successors owning no material bondage.

Each earthly man, however, is condemned to long and frequent intervals of indolence or of desultory and unfruitful activity. Moreover, under our existing system, honours and tributes are by no means purely a hindrance to the recipient; they supply, at the same time, a valuable aid to new experience. Constituting, as they do, a passport to fresh relationships and the society of the cultured, they resemble money; and, indeed, they are generally accompanied with money.

In sum, it is easily to be seen that the competition of artists and scientists for prizes of both a material and a sentimental character belongs to our present plan of civilisation and, though mainly deceptive in its results, supplies a powerful incentive to many minds, leading some into regions of pure happiness that might otherwise remain unvisited by any of their generation. It is, however, equally clear that, even if our general plan of civilisation be taken for granted, the implication of finality with which prizes, honours and posthumous monuments are

usually invested is unnecessarily overdone, checking the growth of much healthy curiosity and breeding trivial ambitions in many hearts. A more rational system will permit the real pioneers in art and thought to be taken at their own estimate, — which is unlikely to be a fanciful or excessive one, — even as it will expose conventional and shallow productions to a clearer light of criticism.

PROPERTY

Generally, in proportion as a man has a thing to himself, his enjoyment of it is slight. To the castaway on an uninhabited island it is an empty, and often a bitter, reflection that he is undisputed possessor of all he surveys. And the more fruitful his island, the more ironical his ownership, except that he may the more easily sustain life till some lucky chance delivers him into a land where sharing is possible. In the busiest centres of civilisation, the same aversion to exclusive possession is everywhere in evidence. One does not buy a boat in order to sail it by oneself or fine dresses with a view to the looking-glass. Art treasures are not hidden from all but the owner's eyes. And only the maddest of misers may ignore the ultimate and altruistic distribution of his wealth; indeed, we are all aware that, within a few score years at most, we must be separated from everything material that is ours.

At the same time, we all recognise that the impulse to acquire property is one of the strongest and most frequent determinants of human conduct. To risk life for a jewel is a common occurrence. Many have fancied that, in winning a fortune, they

placed their souls in jeopardy. And nearly everyone engaged in the pursuit of wealth regards this vocation as by no means an unnatural or irrational one since, if practised with success, it may, and generally does, mean healthier living, a position of greater influence in the community, a wider and more cultured circle of acquaintances, a better education for one's children and improved opportunities for helping one's fellow-men in a great variety of ways. Money earned, inherited or won at play may even be the means of inducing a kind of self-respect in those who are on the verge of moral ruin.

This paradox of an ardent desire for wealth accompanying a perception of the futility of exclusive ownership becomes intelligible upon consideration of certain conditions of our existence as a race.

Of all animals, man is the most complex and versatile, — the most eager and successful in the quest of new experience. Hence he is likewise the most gregarious, if gregariousness be held to include association by means of written language. Thus it is not uncommon for men to gain an intimate knowledge of, and maintain extensive dealings with, people of another race whom they have never beheld, while the association of the lower animals is, for the most part, confined to the limits of the herd. Even the humblest of men is likely, at any time, to set about enlarging the scope of his activity, while each of the

most enterprising individuals of the race feels an imperative and ceaseless need to purchase the experience of others, paying for it with his own. The owner of a boat provides new experience for those whom he asks to sail with him and finds a recompense in both the careless enjoyment of one guest and the critical attitude of another. A new dress may serve a similar purpose. The woman who appears in it may take pleasure in the admiration and envy it excites even as she may derive a future benefit from the indifference of women better dressed than herself. In the case of immaterial possessions, such as talents and ideas, the necessity of altruism is even more obvious. In short, the first benefit of any possession, material or spiritual, is reaped when this possession is shared with one who has not had it, the mere act of sharing entailing a gain to the possessor. Thus human society, more strikingly than any other known product of the universe, demonstrates the universal progress toward equality in altruism.

On the other hand, the certainty that human society is still a long way off any plausible appearance of equality is evidenced, for one thing, in the imperfect egoism of the human proprietor. For we have seen that his pleasure in sharing is derived not alone from the admiration, love and gratitude of others; it may also proceed from their

envy and malice. Permanence, be it remembered, has but the one function of yielding to change; which means that the yielding must be the most stubborn possible, — the least bit at a time. And this may mean, in respect of the specific human concern here under discussion, that the traditional devices of men for distributing the fruits of the earth and of their own creative genius must be productive of an extreme misery and discontent and must appear almost incredibly crude and self-condemnatory before they can be abandoned in favour of more rational methods. Let us briefly consider their origin.

Man, when first acquiring an extensive control over earthly events and taking his position in the world as the foremost exponent of altruism, perceived that his control was nevertheless very imperfect; his altruistic impulses must therefore be checked in every direction. Individual men must seize and retain grounds for hunting and fishing and, later on, for agriculture; else they must starve or fail to secure a mate. Here, as always, altruism is limited by — or, rather, equals — the general competence of the species, relatively to its environment; in the careers of primitive men, it may hardly extend beyond the family or, at most, the clan.

But with the increasing differentiation of the species, its altruism must needs become proportion-

ally complex. Many of the most consciously altruistic achievements of individuals bring about conditions of life that compel other individuals, or even the mass of mankind, to repress altruistic impulses more rigorously than before. Of such achievements, the most important, perhaps, are those which have enabled the race to multiply at a rapidly increasing rate and have imposed upon it an obligation to support its unproductive members. In consequence, the struggle for a bare livelihood is, at times, no less severe than before while the struggle for something more than this—for the easier and more varied existence that is enjoyed by one's shrewdest or most favoured neighbours—becomes immensely keener. This competition fails not to produce every shade of pride, arrogance, envy, malice. Although no sane person wishes to make enemies of all the world,—which would amount to a renunciation of all the fruits of success,—most men exult when they have outstripped a rival in the pursuit of riches, inasmuch as they have thereby defeated one who might otherwise have purchased the new experience desired ardently by themselves. Which new experience, in its ultimate realisation, means invariably a sharing of possessions without ill-will on either side.

It is readily to be seen that the evolutionary process here described is merely one aspect of the

development of man's notions of immortality. Consciously altruistic acts cannot be supposed to represent a loss in altruism, merely because they incidentally supply fresh occasions for envy, hatred, strife and other obstructions to the pursuit of happiness. For it is inevitable that the sum of universal processes should continuously approach equality or the triumph of change. And if man is the actual dynamic centre of the universe, or even one of a number of similar centres, it follows that both his differentiation and his altruism must continuously improve up to the point where he is overshadowed by some other product of change. In other words, differentiation and altruism in man must be one and the same thing, no matter how many partial or temporary obstructions to altruism may appear to grow out of the increasing differentiation of the race.

The practical question, then, for us of today — that is to say, the question for any who believe they have attained a tolerably rational view of immortality — takes this form: In what departments of life do we find obstructions to altruism that plainly invite assault? All desirable changes in human affairs are brought about through an effort — generally a painful effort — of individuals. In what direction, then, is an immediate effort most likely to bear fruit? Wherever the breach is sufficiently wide and the hostility sufficiently intense between

the best altruism of the day and the hindering consequences of an earlier altruism, no limit is assignable to the extent of destructive operations representing the minimum of change. Hence the question that is forever obtruding itself upon all thoughtful and enterprising people: Where is the crisis most acute; which of our familiar customs are most conspicuously defenceless against the ravishing hand of time?

Certain changes, presumably imminent, in various departments of human activity have been discussed in earlier pages of the present work. And in all these activities, considerations of property are so extensively involved that the solution of this central and increasingly predominant problem will perhaps precede, or even include, a solution of the others. Let us consider the question of property as it appears at the present time.

It is no longer usual, under any circumstances, to regard human beings as chattels. To be sure, many philosophers perceive an analogy between the rights of a man in his wife, of a woman in her husband or of either in their children and the rights of human beings generally in their domestic animals or inanimate possessions. These philosophers contend, probably with reason, that any considerable modifications of current methods of distributing the necessary and desirable products of the earth must be

followed by changes in the status of marriage and parenthood. It is also true that the life of the family, under present conditions, betrays the universal yearning toward a broader altruism. The most enlivening topics in the home circle are occurrences outside the home. Ordinarily a man becomes indifferent to his wife and children — provided they are free from infirmity — in proportion as they see little of the world and are not desired in unfamiliar circles. And conversely, any one who, within certain limits, shares intimately in the life of people not his own is especially welcome at home.

Nevertheless it seems highly improbable that we are within any measurable distance of sexual promiscuity, in however scientific and regularised a form, or of a common upbringing of children. Many of our prepossessions in respect of sex and of the reciprocal duties and affections of parent and child rank, perhaps, among the crudest articles of our heritage; a future generation will easily recognise and explain their obstructive character. They remain, however, exceedingly potent in the minds of many of the most productive people of the present day. It seems, therefore, unlikely that the customs now governing marriage and the rearing of children are soon to be radically modified.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the problem of impersonal possessions is exposed to an imme-

diate—or, rather, is undergoing an actual—and very determined attack. In this movement, all shades of wisdom and folly are plainly in evidence. And the subtractions, both of a theoretical and a practical character, that have already been made from the traditional right of the individual to accumulate property and bequeath it to his offspring are undoubtedly slight in comparison with those which are reserved for a not distant future.

It is unnecessary here to bring forward evidence of the existence of an extraordinary condition of social unrest, for it is well known, even to the least diligent students of history, that a serious friction between the various members of the social body has developed in every civilised community of the earth and is producing tangible consequences entirely without parallel in human records. Many different questions are involved,—as, for example, those of sex, race, class, religion,—but all these questions are so thoroughly permeated with the paramount considerations of property as to contain little that is independently and immediately momentous. For, indeed, all conditions in life are contingent upon various factors in the composition of the individuals concerned but are nearly always contingent upon the amount of property possessed or desired by these individuals.

Now, many who, either seriously or ostensibly,

hold the acquisition of property to be an incontestable right of the individual like to look forward to a reaction ensuing upon temporary successes of the movement called socialistic. And it is entirely possible that an apparent reversion to customs already discredited will be noted by certain historians of the future. Often events, when superficially considered, appear to move backward. Moreover, as we have already seen (pages 176-179), an alternate elimination of the higher and the lower elements of the race, although incapable of reproducing a past juncture in history,—because all elements, even the lowest, are continuously absorbing new experience,—may nevertheless result in an alternate predominance of reactionary and progressive tendencies and so give colour to the theory that the course of human affairs is as the path of a pendulum.

What is, however, manifestly impossible is that the human race, unless doomed to an earlier disappearance from earthly records than we now have reason to expect, will fail to abandon the makeshift of private ownership of earthly products. This certainty is readily inferable from considerations already noted above and here to be re-stated and amplified as follows.

We practise charity toward the physically and mentally infirm to the point of vouchsafing a prolonged and wretched existence to vast numbers of

hopelessly unproductive people. We shall be unable indefinitely to reconcile this practice with the theory that the strong, the shrewd and the industrious should enjoy exclusive possession of the fruits of their labour.

The right of property implies the privilege of disposing, to some extent, of the possessions legally recognised as one's own; that is to say, they may be bequeathed to one's children or to other individuals. Hence it is inevitable that much property should come into the possession of the infirm and that many of the strong and shrewd should have comparatively little. These latter unfortunates must, then, endeavour to correct the injustice of their lot, employing such methods as may successively become available. At present, the usual method, especially in democratic communities, is the unpromising one of taxing the rich generally for the general benefit of the poor,—a policy which, if persisted in, must undoubtedly lose its original adherents and lead to fresh opportunities for strife and fraud.

But the paramount — or, rather, the all-inclusive — reason for the eventual elimination of property rights is the certainty, increasingly notorious, that the advantages of possession are mainly delusive. Those who acquire wealth find it invariably, in all essential respects, the opposite of what they had

expected. Worse yet, they are generally afraid to acknowledge the deception because, once they have earned, won or inherited wealth, they perceive how much more wretched they would be if they were to lose it while others remained wealthy.

Naturally, however, the mask worn by the rich is thin and easily penetrated. Any one who has got the house and the land he has long desired proceeds forthwith to betray his dissatisfaction with them in so far as they are exclusively his own. Even his family, his familiar friends and the new acquaintances they bring within his gate prove inadequate as partners in the new possession: he can never be free from vexation that his choice of guests is so severely limited. Civilised society is forever becoming newly classified; and one of the most important of its present distinctions rests upon the shifting basis of wealth and may not be ignored by the owner of either a new house or a historic domain. For there are great groups of civilised people, none of whose members could he consent to receive on a familiar footing. Dullards, libertines, drunkards, certain kinds of thieves and all manner of incompetent egoists he may admit, but none whose breeding emphatically separates them from circles boasting of wealth or of wealthy connections. At the same time, there are other and smaller groups whom he would gladly welcome; these, however,

may be reluctant to pay him a visit if their familiarity with the accessories of wealth is of longer standing than his own.

Similarly, any one who has desired leisure may find that riches bring added responsibilities instead. Or if the leisure is insisted on, it invariably proves a burden unless consecrated to an altruistic distribution of the wealth already acquired or to some form of endeavour with which wealth has little or nothing to do.

Again, the power that inheres exclusively in riches undivided must be of a similarly delusive character inasmuch as it never rests on the good will and free consent of those over whom it is exercised. This point will be considered in another place.

In sum, — if the most maniacal forms of avarice are left out of account, — it is clear that the pursuit of wealth implies a hope of satisfaction to be derived from the influence, position, leisure or impersonal possessions which, once secured by this means, may be retained with diminished, or without any further, effort. How idle this hope is, must appear from any candid consideration of the vital elements involved. Wealth may indeed procure advantages that are not available to the poor, — advantages, to be sure, that would be far more easily secured in a world lacking mediums of circulation. That is to say, wealth may open avenues of altruistic development that many

are eager to follow. But as long as a man's riches remain undivided and his efforts for betterment lose force and continuity, he cannot be otherwise than miserable. For he is learning too late that happiness comes not to any one, old or young, who waits passively for it to descend upon him,—in other words, that there is no joy in the world but that of production.

Everybody has experienced this joy of making or doing something that is admirable, beautiful or needed. So the struggle for wealth shows that the meaning of wealth, in its relation to production, is hidden from the eager competitors. By these, generally, it is held that to accumulate wealth is to stimulate production. But the production they speak of is clearly one that serves only to intensify all the embarrassments of a gregarious life. It provides a perfunctory employment for vast numbers of people whose incentive to live (apart from a morbid fear of death which they share with one another but not with lower animals) is various and (including this fear of death) largely dubious, to the end that further specimens of a commonplace and markedly ephemeral handiwork should appear and, by force of example, create a demand for inferior products and that, in consequence, the earth should be taxed to support those who have no stomach for their labours. Whenever there is enough of this

kind of production, its promoters must fall to fighting with one another or with their supposed beneficiaries and destroying the property they have helped to create,— a remedy that often appears to drive men distracted yet provides the most enduring benefits possible under so crude a plan of economics.

Organised waste were certainly a better name for the system under which we endeavour to cope with the problems of supply and demand; under it, we are, for the most part, performing the opposite of the intelligent destruction that is the essence of all productive altruism. And who the true producers are will become much clearer, once we have taken the obvious step of repudiation. At present, many are recognisable among artists, artisans, farmers, engineers, scientists, teachers, mothers, housekeepers. In some degree, the unskilled workman still partakes of the quality of productivity although, if populations are diminished and the scope and efficiency of machines increased, he should soon disappear. An idle youth roaming thoughtfully by the sea may be by way of producing that which will stimulate generations unborn; a man in his prime, meekly filling his days with bustle at the bidding of others may prove pitifully an obstructionist. A difficult business is that of dividing, however roughly, the presumable producers from the presumable obstructionists; undoubtedly, this will be

one of the chief concerns of our posterity. But, even at the present time, it is sufficiently obvious that a net loss to true production must result from the accumulation by an individual of property conferring on him no benefits that may not be secured in other ways while it imposes a burden that may not be escaped; the loss, moreover, is the greater in that the process of accumulation cannot fail to stimulate similar activities.

Thus it is unnecessary to dwell on the fraud and deceit that are practised illegally in connection with rights of property in order to perceive that any race of beings capable of evolving our present economic system must eventually abandon it. For it is clearly upon deception, especially self-deception — the diminishing reluctance of men to look facts in the face — that our legally recognised rights of property have always rested. The really important questions for the economists of today are these two.

What plan of distribution of earthly products and human handiwork may be evolved through a conscious effort of our own for replacing the present system of exchange and accumulation?

How well are we now prepared to undertake the abandonment of an economic system that has been maintained in apparent integrity since the dawn of history?

Doubtless the first question is the more easily

answered of the two. Eventually human productivity will be recompensed somewhat as follows. Any one satisfactorily performing a useful or promising piece of work will receive, in payment, a voucher entitling him to a proportionate part of the produce of others. This voucher will bear his name and have a limited time to run. Thus it will possess no value for another and will not be saved by the owner against a period of non-production. The production and upbringing of healthy children and the teaching of adolescents will be recompensed in the same manner as other useful occupations; and no limit will be assigned, in respect of age or infirmity, beyond which an individual may be declared unproductive, except the limit of desperate helplessness, imbecility, insanity, or incurable bodily wretchedness. Cooking, washing, mining, road-making or any other comparatively mechanical or arduous task will form nobody's exclusive, or even predominant, occupation in life, especially as all these routine activities will be facilitated by the use of machinery to an extent impracticable today because of the competition of workmen and the necessity that every commodity be produced at a cost bearing a close relation to the market price. The production of machinery having a novel function is enjoyable and stimulating work; and when the standard of living is no longer determined in accordance with a stand-

ard of wealth, such machinery should indefinitely lessen the drudgery of life.

At all events, the providing of everybody with the bare necessities of life will be equal and automatic. In other respects, — and in addition to the segregation of the conspicuously unfit, — the race will still be divided into classes which, however, will be based upon progressive standards of efficiency in altruism. Many will still dine on bread, beef and beer to whom caviar and champagne are denied. Many will inhabit commonplace dwellings while others are surrounded with treasures enabling them to add to the world's store of admirable handiwork and stimulating ideas. Certain individuals will be granted special facilities for a varied intercourse with others of their generation, although not in the interest of the particular class to which they belong.

At the same time, the production of champagne and caviar, of comfortable dwellings with an admirable furniture, of enlarged opportunities for social intercourse and of improved formulas for developing these and all other departments of a civilised existence must be enormously increased through the release of an abundance of talent from the provinces of finance, of the law and of certain other dreary vocations now claiming many of the best spirits of each generation. For it can hardly be doubted that the statistical and legal machinery

for shaping and regulating a movement in the direction of true production will be extremely simple as compared with the machinery of our present system. Moreover, such machinery as may at first be indispensable will become increasingly simplified in obedience to a growing realisation that, with regard to enjoyment of the earth's abundance and of the fruits of man's ingenuity and artistic genius, everybody who is capable of getting something out of life is given a far better chance than before. Other problems will rise up in our path, — problems excessively painful that are already discernible on our horizon. One important error, however, will have been eliminated, and the prodigious sum of our unhappiness is thenceforward less.

The second question for economists — Are we now prepared for the abandonment of a system that has been maintained in apparent integrity since the earliest of human records? — hardly permits of so unequivocal an answer. It is, however, to be observed that the continuous integrity of our tradition of property rights is indeed only apparent, this tradition having already undergone very important modifications. The evolution of government by representation, with the attendant legal restrictions upon individual greed; the abolition of slavery; the taxation of income and inheritance; the growing importance of organised charity; — these and cer-

tain other developments of both ancient and modern times prove that the many have been unwilling to abandon to a superior few the supposed privilege of accumulating wealth under the protection of time-honoured custom. Moreover, the genuine acceptance by many wealthy proprietors of the principles involved in accomplished modifications of the right of property contains an implied admission that the strong and the shrewd may not reasonably continue in exclusive possession of the fruits of their labour after their efforts at production have ceased. And, finally, it is only necessary to perceive, with sufficient clearness, the inevitable future elimination of proprietary rights in order to regard them as having been established, as it were, yesterday.

Little, perhaps, has been achieved in the direction of abrogation, as compared with what still remains to be done. And if you wish to realise our present state of readiness or unreadiness for the final step, you have but to spend a single day in impartial observation of certain ordinary and characteristic phenomena of the time. The utterances in your morning newspaper, conversations in any market place, addresses delivered at any public gathering where social or political topics are under discussion, behaviour of the guests at any dinner table must satisfy you that no such step is generally and imminently under consideration. For you can hardly

fail to perceive that all manner of men are eagerly striving to surpass one another in adding to their excess above the average wealth of their contemporaries or else resorting to every kind of artifice for preserving the fortune they have got, while the various brokers in this considerable business are so obsessed by the complexity of our economic machinery as to venture the direst predictions of anarchy and chaos, supposing any vital portion of it were tampered with.

So the end of this day of facile research should find you ready to admit that mankind is unripe for emancipation from the delusion of ownership, unless, indeed, you have yourself been active, and productively so,—unless, say, you have persuaded men of feeling, intelligence and varied experience to devote the morrow to an equally unreserved and facile scrutiny of their own position in respect of the property and attendant privileges that they have won, lost, coveted, relinquished or actually possess. The women they have married, the children begotten, their gardens, libraries and laboratories, their friends and all their congenial pursuits,—has the best in any one of these a money value? Or the next best? Or any portion of the genuine merit that in them lies? Is it possible for your gentlemen to gloat upon the treasures they have bought and not become a prey to disgust and fear? Indeed,

they are no longer children nor savages; hence they cannot insist upon possession without paying an outrageous penalty.

Undoubtedly, if you have persuaded a few thoughtful and enterprising persons to put these questions searchingly to themselves and to one another, you need no longer admit the unfitness of man to emerge from his proprietary delusion. On the contrary, you may regard an early abandonment by both individuals and communities of all permanent rights of property whatsoever as a step involving the minimum of change.

A favourite theory of the day is one representing the progressive degeneration of man until, for sole representatives of the species, there remains a simian rabble, insane and desperate.

May not this forecast contain at once less and more than the truth? Suppose some of our most impoverishing activities to be brought presently into discredit, — activities (cf. "Eugenics" above) involving the extermination of much that is vital in the human stock. There can be little doubt that our posterity would then regard these last few thousand years of human history as a period of callow perversity and the present generation of men as embodying the crest of human madness. And our conception of property would certainly appear as

the central delusion ; our hard-headed ones, shrewdly securing themselves in economic strongholds, would look the maddest of us all. The lust of possession that has governed us and a long line of our historical forbears would be likened to many a single episode in the lives of individual men. As thus: a youth verging upon manhood and feeling an imperative need to love fixes his choice on the first woman that attracts his notice. She proves a false mistress, yet he performs acts of almost incredible folly for her sake, for indeed, says he, he cannot live without her. When, however, somebody shows her to him in her true colours, he may renounce her without difficulty and, with her, the manifold vagaries of which she was the cause.

Similarly, our simpler forbears feeling the imperative need of new experience, — of enlarging their knowledge of the world and the good things it contained, — adopted the most obvious means of satisfying this need. It was no longer sufficient to seize and protect the thing necessary for daily sustenance or for the rearing of future offspring. Such was still the life of less enterprising creatures ; men, however, could no longer rest content with such a hand-to-mouth existence. They accordingly devised a system of barter which was later facilitated and extended through the medium of a convenient standard of value. Thus the more efficient members of

a tribe might secure leisure for the prosecution of novel and attractive ventures; they might travel in strange countries without fear of want; and these ventures might redound to the advantage of their less able cousins. In short, Time was become less of a master and more of a servant to man.

We can imagine the first one who said "You fellows have more buffalo-skins than you need; chuck me a couple of your hides and you can take one of these hard-baked pots of mine" being listened to in amazement at the dazzling originality of the idea. And we may admit that a system of exchange through the medium of a permanent standard of value was at one time, perhaps, the best possible economic expedient for advancing the interests of man.

Since then, however, the growing numbers and skepticism of the race and the greater differentiation of its activities have caused a complete reversal of the significance of its economics while the economics, themselves, have undergone but little change. In our day,—not in that of our remote fathers,—either the facilitation of idleness or the incentive to dishonesty that is inherent in our system of earning and saving constitutes a sufficient and inexorable indictment of the system. Yet these evils are of lesser moment than the desire of legitimate accumulation that has taken so strong a hold of the mind

of man as to be deemed worthy of handing down, by precept and by example, from father to son and from teacher to pupil, — the ardent striving to get and retain that which confers no benefit save in being relinquished. Here is insanity indeed.

May we not reasonably hope that it will pass, — that, in our total record, it will appear as a kind of spring-madness incompatible with the maturity of our year? *Mine to use forthwith* contains as logical a meaning to ourselves as to any of our forefathers or to the lower animals of our day or to any conceivable future denizens of the earth. But *Mine to hold forever or for the rest of my natural life or any indefinite portion of it, — Mine to bequeath to such persons or to dispose of for such objects as may seem to me worthy, —* is a desideratum so replete with contradictions and with notorious and distressing embarrassments as doubtless to be incapable of surviving any further general advance in knowledge. Implying, as it does, the ephemeral character of human personality in general, the isolation of each human personality in particular, the possibility of providing a higher destiny for one's own immediate line of descendants than may be enjoyed by other lines, the probability that philanthropic enterprises may be forwarded only by appealing to the individual desire of gain, — implying, as it does, all these and a host of similar absurdities that have already

been noted, this ambition, economically speaking, cannot fail eventually to be regarded as the worst possible guide for human conduct.

The present critical stage of social unrest and mutual enmity of classes and nations should render more obvious than ever the duty of people of education and influence to undertake the self-examination that is the necessary forerunner of all reform. If it is seriously undertaken, the results, in so far as above defined, are certain. At the same time, there is a higher duty, — in our day, the highest, — the performance of which must be even more decisive in bringing the age of accumulation to an end. This duty has already been indicated and will presently be recurred to.

GOVERNMENT

✓ It is manifestly unsuitable that one man should have a semblance of authority over another. The influence exerted by any one's words and deeds over other men may indeed prove salutary in an indefinite degree. But any individual man or coterie of men who, by virtue of the efficient altruism of their own or their ancestors' most productive years, continue to control the destinies, though neither the will nor the opinion, of others are undoubtedly in an unfortunate position from which no benefit may be derived except relatively, as from the least of two or more obvious, and hence avoidable, evils. Even though such a governor comprehend the needs of the governed better than they do, themselves, this comprehension will eventually prove fruitless unless he succeeds in bringing them or their posterity to his view, — in which case, he is indeed a producer and well qualified to shape the careers of others.

The position of authority over those who submit unwillingly is, however, the position occupied sooner or later by the governors and legislators of all tried political systems, whether they be hereditary auto-

crats or representatives of the people chosen by a majority of their votes. For it is obvious that every majority implies a body of persons overruled; and, in this world of permanence yielding to change, it is both a logical necessity and, in practice, repeatedly demonstrated that the chosen one of a majority cannot long remain effectively in sympathy with his constituents.

Now, all problems of government have to do with the everyday relations of one person with another; hence, if these relations could be finally and satisfactorily regularised, there would be no need of government. It is, however, unimaginable that any earthly relations, whether human or impersonal, should be finally regularised in a manner perceptible to the human mind. Accordingly there is every reason to believe that the highest and most fruitful civilisation attainable upon earth will be subject to incessantly changing laws of man's own devising.

If, nevertheless, certain obvious changes are made in certain important classes of human relations,—especially, if national barriers and permanent rights of property are eliminated and class distinctions placed, as far as possible, upon a basis of productivity,—it is not only probable, but almost inevitable that politics, as a career, will be struck off the list of human vocations. Under the present conditions of civilised life, politicians are clearly

indispensable. The very necessity that their most ambitious projects should be effectively thwarted and that their most honest endeavours should further all manner of intrigue and chicane belongs to the general system of deception under which we have our social and economic being and only serves to emphasize the politician's principal rôle, which is both to preserve the present system and to prevent either its despotic or its anarchical elements from acquiring an intolerable predominance. Hence no politician may be expected to promulgate the rational principles of reform necessary for the subversion of this system without, at the same time, renouncing his vocation.

The future evolution of government may be as readily discerned from another point of view. In time of strife and the maximum of unwise destruction, governments have always tended to become centralised. A few clear heads and firm hands, or even a single strong personality, may prove the safest reliance when utter chaos seems imminent. Conversely, during a period of social calm and true production, authority becomes widely disseminated and the individuality of leaders less in evidence. Thus it can hardly be doubted that, when the most glaring opportunities for fraud and self-deception have been eliminated from civilised life, human personality will be released from the unproductive busi-



ness of political leadership and will therefore figure more prominently in the solution of really vital and difficult problems as well as in the creation of pleasure-giving formulas for life and art.

Eventually mankind, if continuing as a dynamic centre of the universe, will be governed, not by individuals but by a code that will have been subscribed to by every individual showing a tolerable competence for any productive vocation. This code will provide for a progressive alteration of its articles in consequence of the development of new conditions of life and at the instance of persons who, under the provisions of the code, are classified as competent to judge of the specific articles in question. Deliberate distortion of the code in furtherance of the short-sighted aims of individuals will, for the most part, be easily corrected, there being no pecuniary medium of circulation to facilitate corruption. And any one who has helped to modify the code will be suffered forthwith to return to his normal pursuits without further preoccupations of government.

When these changes in our social system may be expected to occur, none may say. All that is needed in order to bring them about is, first, the will to cast off certain delusions that are fast becoming intolerable and, furthermore, accurate statistics concerning everybody's condition in life, to the end that no adult be subjected to material privations to which

he is unused while the youth of the world are being reared in accordance with the new system. Probably the space of a single generation should be sufficient to eliminate the politics and economics now in vogue, provided the people of knowledge and sensibility among us are neither blind to their first duty nor fearful and silent.

THE FIRST DUTY

“But we don’t *want* you. We aren’t going to play with any little boys like you today.” So four-year-old is left disconsolate on the veranda while his elders are off, skipping over the granite ledges and streaking them, as they run, with sticks of charred wood from an old bonfire. Presently Father appears and must deplore the disfigurement of his fine rocks. “Oh, never mind it, Father,” cries the youngest, tugging at him with a restraining hand; “they had to do it, Father; there wasn’t anything else for them to do.”

Such is the altruism of childhood, — suggestive, perhaps, of the infancy of the race but also of universal processes. The ulterior benefit of present chastisement is a sealed book; hence the paternal eminence, towering above sordid cares, should be propitiated in favour of the weaker parties and to the end of a resumption and indefinite sharing of the pleasant experience of play.

No doubt, the childish mind is liberally misunderstood by the greater part of those who are charged with its training. And probably the notorious

cruelty and selfishness of children represent but a single set among many sharply and rapidly contrasted moods,— the set that is most conspicuous to a race of adults possessed of an acute sense of sin and ever on the watch for a reflection of their own vices. Yet if youthful iniquity be accepted at its highest estimated value, such acceptance merely emphasizes an important certainty that is patent to us all: namely, that the grown-up world is fairly oppressed with the altruistic impulses that it struggles valiantly to make effective.

Apart from the highest and exclusively human forms of altruism, we can hardly fail to perceive, in the consideration shown directly by one person for another, a full and sufficient promise of equality. Each of us, at maturity, finds that others are dependent on him in such a variety of ways as would be incomprehensible not only to the simple denizens of the forest from whom we sprang but even to the founders of any civilisation anterior to our own. And these relations of mutual dependence progressively overlap in a manner that can have but the one and obvious meaning when projected into an immaterial future. Between a mechanical observance of the rule of the road and the obligation unfailingly to give aid to people in misfortune lies a long and growing list of responsibilities that no sane and civilised person may entirely ignore; today,

more often than ever before, men are confronted with new and difficult problems of life demanding of them a reasoned and ungrudging concern for the welfare of others. Enthusiasts for self-sacrifice, to be sure, are less in evidence than at certain other periods in history. Indeed, the principal reason of the comparative rarity of martyrs in our day is probably that the consequences of martyrdom are insignificant as compared with the altruism developed in the course of organised educational and charitable effort.

No sooner has a community become the victim of earthquake, flood, or the perverse and predatory violence of persons too anomalously in authority, than help is forthcoming from all other communities from whom help should reasonably be expected. And though some who hasten to the rescue expect a substantial reward for their services, the great bulk of the assistance is rendered by those who gratuitously accept privation for the benefit of people known to be worse off than themselves and by those who cannot resist the force of this example. No sooner has a deadly disease threatened to spread from house to house and from city to city than it is combated by an army of willing teachers of hygiene and prevention, often with great danger and small thanks to themselves.

Meanwhile, the unselfishness of individuals in

their private concerns is as conspicuously in evidence on every side. The woman who courts disdain and degradation in condoning her husband's misdeeds; the man who devotes the best years of his life to the business of providing a suitable environment for his children; the priest whose only private life is that of his flock and whose first thought is for their welfare and right living,—these are not so much exceptions as they are types familiar to us all.

Finally, and more effective than any consideration shown by one individual directly for another, is the peculiar altruism of the race,—the impersonal curiosity, or capability for taking an interest in things for their own sake, that enables man to devise general rules of conduct consistent with his position upon earth. In sum, any impartial scrutiny of earthly events cannot fail to disclose human altruism as a dominant and irresistible force.

In spite of which, this world of ours may, and at the present moment does, exhibit each several aspect of Hell excepting its eternity. In each large community are incarnations — seeming devils in the uniform of civilisation — who feed upon human miseries in the frenzied hope of satisfaction somehow to be derived from their self-imposed isolation. Lesser imps may not consort with these. Their preference for a division of the spoils may enable them indef-

initely to retain a tolerable sanity; or finally, when occasion is ripe, they may contrive their own ostracism through a single decisive act. Gradations of the infernal in human conduct are innumerable; that is to say, human existence, in its social aspect, is summarised in a kaleidoscopic war of human competence with lesser human competence,— a conflict production of many a weird and heartrending spectacle. Thus we behold successful manufacturers among the genuine amateurs of arts that would never have enjoyed their patronage but for the exacting and niggardly treatment received by the workmen in their shops. Wealth acquired through a remorseless crushing of rival accumulators has been distributed in a well-considered and unobtrusive manner for the general benefit of humanity. Many a one has lost a fortune through sheer kindness of heart and gained another by evading the most necessary and comprehensible of human laws. Many another who would have shrunk with horror from any of the above practices has tricked, ruined and deserted every unwary woman crossing his path at the appropriate moment. And there are sober-minded but acutely sensitive citizens who have gone so far as to show their erring sons and daughters the door.

In each case, the inequitable character of the act is patent to its author; in each case, realisation of

the experience desired or of immunity from the dreaded hardship or disgrace may be deferred from day to day, or even from year to year, but not indefinitely because, indeed, of the shortness of life. For the same reason, men have murdered their benefactors in the interest of a cause held sacred, just as causes have been betrayed by women in the interest of individuals from whom they could expect no reward. And in the everyday concerns of uneventful lives, the same moral lopsidedness is abundantly in evidence, indicating both the immensely diverse elements in human nature and their common instability upon a single point.

Meanwhile the perplexity of great communities is still more painful. As we have already seen, no people dare adopt a more effective expedient for the prevention of disorder within their limits than that of admonitory violence or privation after the fact. In the names of justice and self-preservation, warring nations must resort to every odious ruse for exterminating one another's most productive citizens. In order that the so-called freemen be prevented from sacrificing their supposed heritage of liberty, their chosen legislators must vote for the semblance but not the substance of the freemen's demands.

The inference to be drawn from these and similar considerations has already been indicated and may

here be re-stated as follows. Conspicuous deformities of moral purpose, as exhibited by individuals and either shared or sanctioned by the communities to which they belong, must denote a kind of ignorance unusual in the pursuit of a particular science or practice of an art. Unquestionably they mean that man is constantly overlooking something important that lies beneath his very nose. If it were something obscure, abstruse or unattainable, the lack of which caused him so often to recognise yet choose the guilty course, the actual and prodigious force of altruism, ranging from an utter abnegation of self to a conscious and rational effort toward equitable dealing, were not to be looked for in his world. Hence this important possession must already be the property of the most efficient altruists of the earth, and in a degree proportionate to the value of their achievements in the direction of equality. And equality, as we have seen, is unrealised and unimaginable upon earth. The efficient altruist, then, works earnestly and with confidence in the interest of an unearthly existence.

Now, in certain people, a sense of calm and admission of responsibility in respect of the hereafter are largely intuitive. These resemble the lower animals in their simple faith; their numbers are ever diminishing because the increasing differentiation of the race makes it increasingly difficult to accept any

promise or obligation without reason or authority. Others acquire their trust in the hereafter on the authority of current religious formulas that are rapidly falling into disuse, — likewise in accordance with the logical requirements of a growing differentiation. There remains only reason; and reason, as we have seen, unqualifiedly stipulates for a hereafter containing, for each individual, all experience and providing, in its earliest phases, a congenial environment for those who have dealt equitably with their fellow-men upon earth.

Clearly, then, the first duty of the present age, and perhaps of all subsequent ages of an earthly existence, is that of disseminating a rational view of immortality and maintaining it as an active force in human affairs. If this is done with candour and persistence, the maze of queer and distressing contradictions in which most men and all communities now have their being must dissolve.

The class upon whom this duty falls is, to a great extent, an obvious one and need only be mentioned here as comprising nearly all men and women of energy, trained mind and wide experience. Yet within this class is found a much smaller one whose efficiency in the business of establishing a rational faith may be incalculable. To this smaller class it would seem unnecessary to address a special appeal inasmuch as most of its members should be willing

and eager to take up the proposed task, provided only that its importance has been satisfactorily demonstrated. It may nevertheless be well to define roughly their position in the existing scheme of civilisation in the hope of a suitable consideration being shown for their future activities.

It can hardly be doubted that a great proportion of the élite of the earth count for little in the religious, political and social life of their communities. Every now and then one comes upon a man of sensibility, keen intelligence and varied experience living, for the most part, in obscurity. Such persons may be highly enterprising in the pursuit of learning, practice of arts, playing of games, or in travel and desultory observation, yet contribute little or nothing to the altruistic capital of their generation. A universal clash of nations may call many of them forth from their seclusion, although they are unlikely to show great aptitude for the peculiar destructiveness of war. Often the weakness inherent in their isolation eventuates in a resort to pessimism or to vice. And, in general, their condition is urgently demanding an amelioration for which our existing civilisation may not provide. Between them and the bulk of the classes from whom they spring there runs a ceaseless dialogue, now tacit, now expressed, as between a mother and her sons; from this controversy, the following specific

interchanges may be culled and presented as an epilogue, or series of corollaries, to the main thesis of the present work. Mother Society interrogates.

How do you justify your abstention from so many of the activities customary to your generation? Not only are you dependent on these activities for your very livelihood, but your favourite pursuits, however esoteric and abstruse, could possess for you no lure but for the training, physical and mental, that you owe to civilisation as you have found it. Have you a right to complain of the crudity of institutions that are upheld by persons as discriminating as yourselves?

Our mother is well aware that human inertia is not easily overcome; hence she need hardly fear serious assaults upon any institution that is not plainly marked, Anachronism, in accordance with the best available knowledge. And one that is thus clearly inadequate cannot receive the support of discriminating persons who are not so unhappily placed in life as to preclude a normal exercise of their faculties. Surely you are not asking us to forget that the activities customary to any generation are certain eventually to be dispensed with through a conscious effort of this or of another generation. We cannot, then, be expected to take part in any of these activities whose futility, except as a lesser among several sets of obvious and unnecessary evils,

is easily demonstrated. Though we be imperfectly prepared for adversity or death, either were preferable, at the present stage of human progress, to any attitude toward the central devices of civilisation other than one of passivity or of recalcitrance.

Nevertheless, may not your aloofness be explicable in great part upon the supposition that you are comparatively without passions? If so, can you account yourselves fortunate in this immunity or possessed of a higher order of productivity than one who perceives clearly the concrete object of his desire and pursues it ardently and by every honourable means?

We are indeed unfortunate in being unable consistently to pursue the objects of our desire which is perhaps as keen as any other's although loath to be gulled with a too trumpery satisfaction. Indeed, our mother has laid down rules that preclude the ardent and essentially honourable pursuit of any object whatsoever. She is, herself, so conscious of their defects as to find it repeatedly desirable to devise new ones for counteracting the deceptive operation of the old. Beyond certain limits, however, fear and skepticism hold and bind her. Thus she must discourage violence and authorise it, repress greed and foster thrift, stipulate for freedom of speech and discountenance freedom of thought, her usual and imminently misleading guide being the analogy of specific cases. Accordingly, when

she admonishes us either as to the desirability of healthy passions or the necessity to curb them, she finds herself on a quicksand of elusive values and without other refuge than phrases susceptible of various construction. For, the longer she observes the conduct of her most characteristic sons,— and herein lies matter of great promise,— the more clearly she perceives that the immediate consequences of any ambition are trivial as compared with the ulterior consequences that are less often formulated and, furthermore, that a suitable regard for these ulterior consequences must entail the abandonment of many of the central portions of her social edifice.

Meanwhile, however, are not my proud and patronising sons somewhat deficient in sensibility? For example, your children, through the detachment of their fathers, will suffer the loss of opportunities to which they may feel they were entitled.

The fortunes of our children are unquestionably dubious. Yet, in this respect, they are hardly singular,— less so, perhaps, in this age of actual and imminent revolutions than ever before. Moreover, our children possess the enduring advantage of being reared, as little as possible, in an atmosphere of self-deception.

Is your apathy, then, proof against the most urgent demands of the time? When a mighty people

were prevailed upon to throw all recognised principles of honour and forbearance to the winds and to endeavour, through an unbridled exercise of martial power, to extend their leadership and an unwelcome civilisation throughout the earth, could you alone remain unmoved? Had you no feeling of concern or responsibility as you beheld the most astonishing and destructive conflagration in history?

Of concern, much; of responsibility, still more; but how is astonishment possible? International treaties, by their very existence as bulwarks of exclusiveness, invite destroying hands; there is no limit to the perversity of any people when the appropriate leaders have got them into the appropriate difficulties; and no race or community of men is justified in expecting wisdom on the part of those whom they either suffer or delegate to occupy positions of anomalous authority over them. Indeed, it would appear that the most implacable enemies of the late aggressors had undertaken little or no consideration either of their own temper or of the possible future exigencies of their countrymen. No doubt, the unrestricted sinking of merchant ships and bombing of unfortified towns are dishonourable stratagems because in violation of recognised rules of warfare,—outrageous, because contrary to accepted notions of chivalry and forbearance. Yet any who cry out against them in the names of

humanity and patriotism are undoubtedly guilty of two serious errors. First, they are assuming, quite unwarrantably, that their own countrymen would, under no circumstances, be capable of similar acts; secondly,— and this is of far greater importance,— they have overlooked the direr agonies and perils of existence. In any candid survey of life, it is impossible to perceive a greater evil in the slaughter of non-combatants of either sex or any age than in the slaughter of the youth of the world in battle, especially as the former practice helps to preserve the horrors of war in memory while, in accordance with the latter practice, the survivors often derive from war an apparent profit. Hence no specific war can reveal atrocities comparable, in their practical import, to the ante-bellum dereliction that permitted a resort to war. . . . In the case now so urgently under everybody's consideration, the leaders of the aggressive nation were formerly respected by a great portion of the outside world that was far better aware of their true position in the world than were their own people who had, in great part, been kept systematically in ignorance on this point. Nevertheless, for ourselves, we could not escape the unhappy obligation to oppose this people for the sole reason that they were indeed the aggressors and showed no disposition to cease fighting upon any terms worthy of mention. The duty was an obvious

one. Individuals were suffering untold and avoidable miseries and the race was making incalculable sacrifices from its store of forward impetus. But to pretend that our duty, as we saw it, was a glorious, or anything but a painful and irksome, one were to lend a disingenuous support to influences which, if unchecked, could not fail to lead to further miseries and losses of the same character.

In your loneliness and general impotence, are you never tempted to return to the religions of your contemporaries?

Our mother is aware that we have often discussed, with constructive intent, this all-important question of faith; at present, there is nothing for us to add except by way of sympathy with the contemporaries whom we are invited to emulate. Thus, we of the western world are far from wishing that church-bells should no longer ring of a Sunday morning. We have no doubt whatever that the spell of Good Friday is stronger upon us than upon the mass of those who piously tell their beads. When we reflect upon the Passion and its meaning to countless ardent souls, — the balm it shed upon generations that were fertile beyond any earlier dreams of men, — we experience an exaltation such as may rarely be aspired to by the harried pastor of a modern flock. No more can we repress a feeling of extreme resentment as we listen to the words of scoffers or behold

the sacrilege of vandals. Plainly, however, these emotions must be associated almost exclusively with the past. Christ, as a memory, is doubtless the most precious single possession of our world. But Christ, as an active and beneficent force in human affairs, is yielding to the necessities of a higher altruism than any that may be specifically connected with Christ. The yielding is reluctant and, like all other elimination of error, accompanied by odious phenomena, either trivial or calamitous. Thus, the mysticism that is now taught in Christ's name does indeed — like all religious systems known or conceivable upon earth — provide a kind of basis for equitable dealing among men. On the other hand, both scientific knowledge and the shallowest of worldly considerations are connected with the central mysticism and so held subject to the supernatural. That is to say, both personal transgressions and errors in systematic research are represented as susceptible of rectification through a more or less fortuitous intercession of that which is absurdly regarded as having an independent existence. The consequences of this desperate effort to reconcile ancient superstition with modern logic are distinguishable as factors, more or less efficient, in every manifestation of indolence, injustice and cruelty that is familiar to our modern world. Meanwhile stories are read to children from a pentateuch

whose chief heroes and their scribes, coming of a semi-civilised and comparatively vicious people, followed the custom and prerogative of similar peoples in freely over-estimating the importance of their own affairs. Undoubtedly they made strenuous and laudable efforts to provide a suitable religious faith for their posterity; which efforts, however, failed signally to cast a special glory over the secular aspect of their lives, — as must appear upon any tolerably unbiased perusal of their narratives. Indeed, there is hardly a more pitiful aspect of the many-sided madness that accompanies our rapid differentiation than the fancied discovery by otherwise cultured people of a poetic quality and deep suggestiveness in these exaggerated and banal episodes. Evidently the actual status of all formal but unchristian rites and doctrines is similar. In the total present heritage of the race, there are no institutions so deserving of reverence as its ancient religions; each one of these represents innumerable deliberate and conscientious efforts to satisfy the most urgent of human requirements. Surely a loftier purpose cannot animate the mind of man. And it is for the same purpose that the results of this earlier endeavour are now being discredited by all but the indolent, the incurious and the victims of an early training that was over-zealous. For we have reached a point in our progressive differentiation at which we may

entertain no sane and serious hope of seizing an eternal truth, or even a remarkably high order of truth, when we enter a place of worship. Hence a feeble compliance with the ancient and now anomalous demand for positive notions of divinity, eternity, creation, and for concrete images of the hereafter can only prolong the age of skepticism and general strife upon which behold us fairly launched.

My rebellious children are perhaps aware that, if they emphasize too strongly the futility of vocations to which their brothers have devoted a lifetime of effort and if, in addition, they assail their customary worship, these brothers may be moved to turn on them and hold them up as instruments of a devil. As regards your constructive propaganda, what possible hope of success can attend any far-sighted or logical plan for improving the condition of our hundreds of millions who, both by breeding and by upbringing, are incapable of understanding any such enterprise? Does not the religious, social and economic existence of this vast majority of mankind run almost exclusively in narrow channels from which any general innovation must have a suspicious look?

Nevertheless, it is the seemingly impossible that often happens abruptly and always happens eventually if based upon honest intentions and the best available knowledge. For ourselves, we need not

consider the possibility of persecution at the instance of those who would prefer to ridicule us if they were in a position to do so. Any injury that they may inflict will be trivial in comparison with that which they are now inflicting upon themselves and us through their reluctance to look facts in the face and heed the soundest counsels of their own hearts. Doubtless, too, our hundreds of millions are possessed of a prodigious inertia. Yet they are repeatedly mobilised for the purpose of voting upon unimportant questions or of prosecuting unprofitable quarrels. In Europe, many of these millions are now suffering privation or physical pain to a degree that cannot fail to suggest to them the tremendous advantages of enterprise over mere drift. Indeed, the chief obstacles in the path of human progress are now set up, not by the humble and the ignorant but by those who dare not regard themselves otherwise than as the exalted and fortunate ones of the earth. For there can be no question that, if the people who are capable of understanding a logical, comprehensive and uncompromising scheme of reform will but take the trouble to unite for the purpose of carrying it into effect, their inferiors will rapidly come to believe in them and support them with decisive majorities.

When you emerge from your seclusion, what will be your first step?

It is fervently hoped that an answer to the last question has been supplied in the pages of this book. As you take your little son by the hand, can you successfully pretend to him that you are confident, or in any other state than one of grave apprehension, respecting his career and happiness in life? Is there anything in his present position and worldly prospects that may effectively, or even in reasonable degree, protect him from insensate aggression or unmerited neglect? Is he being unreservedly instructed in the true basis and origin of his position in society? Are the influences surrounding him such as may help him, as far as possible, to recognise an unworthy course in life and also to avoid it? Is it conceivable that he should die happily after a life of ease or of political or commercial strife or of factitious authority over other men? Can such a life, then, be a happy one in the living? Have the last clear reminiscences of an earthly career but a fleeting significance?

Undoubtedly these simple questions are asked with increasing frequency; which proves that the unenterprising element in man — his susceptibility to delusion wherever his dear ones or his most vital interests are at stake — is losing force as a controlling factor in events. And to ensure that the highest exercise of his peculiar faculties upon earth shall forthwith be followed by a farewell to his old abode, man has but to say the word.

SUMMARY

The following summary, though probably of little use to those who have not previously read this book, may serve as a guide to any who, having read, wish to refer to dubious or imperfectly remembered pages. It will be observed that certain paragraphs, often entire pages, are taken from the text of Parts I and II. This is both because of the importance of the premises and basic syllogisms from which one argues and because the paucity of words in current use for stating fundamental considerations leaves practically no margin for paraphrase.

In time of stress, it is inevitable that all thoughtful persons should seek to discover the ulterior causes of our discontent, the real elements of our peril. Study of history has led us to distrust superficial appearances; we hesitate to call this man the arch-enemy of mankind or that principle of human conduct eternal. We suspect — nay, we have abundant reason to believe — that the stream of earthly affairs is far deeper than it looks; — that, before it empties into the ocean of a common destiny, much will have been brought to the surface that is now hidden from

the most curious eye. If, then, our present embarrassments are exceedingly painful, ought we not to use proportionate care in assigning to them an origin? Can we, indeed, pretend to find the origin of anything, — origin that shall be intelligible and significant even if intermediate, falling far short of the ultimate, — before we have satisfied ourselves as to the competence of the knowledge to which we appeal? Must we not first of all ask, What can a man say he *knows* beyond a shadow of doubt; what can he be certain that he does *not know*? Let us begin the inquiry with materials that are ready to hand, trying to use them, as far as possible, as if they had never before been touched.

For the practical purposes of life, we assume that yonder granite ledge projecting from the hillside is the same for the geologist, the quarryman, the mountain-climber. Yet, for the practical purposes of life, the entire significance of this ledge lies in the consequences of its perception. Now these consequences, as embodied in the thoughts, acts and emotions of a geologist, are certain to differ essentially from the consequences to a quarryman or to a climber. And a similar difference must exist in the case of any two individuals, as, for example, two quarrymen. The mere difference in their sense-organs or in their positions in space implies a difference in their perceptions and hence in the inferences and muscular

acts consequent upon these perceptions. And inasmuch as all our knowledge of things is based upon impressions received by our senses, we must conclude that a thing cannot be one and the same when regarded from different points of view. Likewise an event or an idea (pages 3-14).

Yet we may all agree that a granite ledge is harder than a chalk cliff; that is to say, chalk is not as hard as granite. Thus human agreements, the possibility of which is implied in all human deliberations, are always seen, upon examination, to possess a negative, or relative, character. Innumerable established agreements of this sort are clearly unassailable and cannot be conceived as possessing a merely contingent validity; hence they stipulate unqualifiedly for reality as a condition of the universe in which we live (pages 14-16).

In the course of our endeavour to find this ultimate condition of our universe and the relation borne to it by human personality and by the definite appearances that constitute our environment, we may soon satisfy ourselves (pages 16-20) of a complete interpenetration existing among physical phenomena and between them and all conscious subjects. That is to say, if our universe bears any relation to reality, the duality or multiplicity of its elements must be illusory; the presentation to a conscious subject of an external object must be an impossi-

bility and the reciprocal action of concrete phenomena, a similar impossibility, — both presentation and reciprocal action possessing an unknown value in respect of reality.

Yet the images that we form of all phenomena — their beginning, isolation, ending — constitute a direct negation of the conclusions respecting their interpenetration and continuity from which, in the light of physical science, we are unable to escape; moreover, it is solely by virtue of this negation that the images may exist, possess a meaning, be described. And the same contradiction that exists between our perception of a material object or natural process and our scientific inferences concerning it is readily discernible between our perfunctory and our carefully tested inferences. Our mathematical formulas, invariably unconformable to the scientific necessity of interpenetration and continuity, are not only closely related to the conditions under which we may become aware of phenomena but are largely instrumental, as well, in leading us to the highest certainties attainable in physical research (pages 20-22).

This paradox of indispensable knowledge refuting indispensable knowledge is resolved through an elimination of its unthinkable elements. As thus (pages 22-33):

We cannot suppose that human perceptions and

inferences alike bear no relation to reality. Such an exclusion of reality from any connection with our existence would merely necessitate the resort to an equivalent conception in order to explain our familiar and unassailable negative agreements as to fact. Moreover, these agreements are, themselves, inferences; and the material for these and for all other inferences is supplied by our perceptions. Both our inferences and our perceptions must, then, be somehow related to reality.

Hence we cannot suppose that reality is actually found in our perceptions, which assign limits in space and time to material objects and natural processes, when our least vulnerable inferences, which must also bear some relation to reality other than the mere negation of it, stipulate for the absence of these limits.

No more can we suppose, on the other hand, that reality is found in inferences that are negated by our perceptions or by other inferences.

There remains, then, but one possible solution: both perceptions and inferences must be illusions, though possessed of different values in respect of reality. In this difference lies their highest value, shared equally, and easily recognisable in all phases of human experience as the liability and essential need of each perception to be supplanted by another

perception and the similar liability and need of all inferences.

In sum, since our negative agreements stipulate for reality as a condition of the universe in which we live, and since the scientific elimination of discontinuity in phenomena means that dual or multiple elements in a given occurrence are impossible and that the absence from any occurrence in any epoch of any of the factors in earlier occurrences is also impossible, and, finally, since our perceptions and inferences join in a reciprocal demonstration of their invariably illusory character, it is evident that the reality conditioning our universe must equal the sum of its impossibilities or the total negation of its constituent processes.

Thus the data of science represent the elimination of error, not the establishment of fact. And the aspect of any illusion, as eliminated by us today in a negative agreement, represents but a portion of the impossibility inherent in this illusion; in other words, it represents the existing phase of our knowledge of reality. The relation of each illusion to a total, or perfect, knowledge of reality must differ from that of every other illusion, since the reproduction of any illusion would amount to a reproduction of the universe implied in it. For convenience of terms, then, the practical value of any illusion may be called its suggestiveness of perfection.

And obviously we must assign a higher value in suggestiveness to the inferential illusion than to the perceptive; for the latter supplies the material through which it is, itself, brought under suspicion while inferential illusions, though always bent on destroying one another, never lead us to place a higher trust in the simple perception.

Unless a superman flourishes elsewhere, *nature* or *the universe* or *existence*, at its highest value, must now consist in the sum of our perceptions and inferences; at a lower value, in those of the bee; at a still lower, in the yearning of the oak for its sun, on the one hand, and for its water, on the other; at a still lower, in the physical and chemical reactions of inorganic matter; at a still lower, in the emptiness of space.

But reality, or the sum of impossibilities, cannot resemble the sum of our impressions or any mathematical sum whatsoever. For it must include the universal relations, prospective and retrospective, of every illusion. That is to say, since reality is the total negation of phenomena and noumena alike, it must be independent of time and space and cannot endure any more than it can come into being or to an end.

All illusions, on the other hand, imply both permanence and change. First, a definite impression in our consciousness, or reaction in a material object,

is indispensable to any conception of existence; and secondly, this impression or reaction must forthwith be supplanted by another. Any notion that we gain of form, colour, sound, taste must be single; yet it may not exist except in contrast with other sensations. We are aware of the blue of the sky only by passing from this sensation to that of the green of the trees or the grey of the rock. And even a varied scene may not long be contemplated without fading from view.

Similar is the necessity of any positive inference drawn from a comparison of sensations already contrasted. To possess a meaning, it must be definitely formulated in the mind. Yet if stated repeatedly, it loses this meaning. If carefully examined, it declines in importance. If discussed with a neighbour, it takes on a new aspect. If read in an old book, it provokes fresh criticism. If projected into the future, it collapses in absurdity. Other inferences evidently are at work, undermining the original one and, at the same time, paving the way for a third set. All terms being illusory, only negative inferences are perdurable.

In sum, every illusion must be both individual and universal and must not only begin and end but also be derived and eternal.

Hence reality alone is possible or knowable; having neither permanence nor mutability, it is the suf-

ficient negation of both. Moreover, it is already partially known in the errors that have been eliminated, even as it is unknown in present perceptions and accepted positive inferences and in perceptions and inferences as yet impracticable.

Thus the universe, or nature, or existence, is the total subject of negation. Unlike the total negation, or reality, it contains nothing that may be destroyed save by a thing undestroyed; each error eliminated leaves its place well filled, even doubt and ignorance being positive. The attributes and functions of the universe are summarised in permanence and change: first permanence, then change; or first homogeneity, then differentiation. Permanence giving place to change — either in a simple perception, in a scheme of knowledge, or in the relations of material bodies — establishes what we call direction. Everything, as we say, moves forward, even retrospection being a forward process.

Knowledge of reality is ever present, impugning these terms and conclusions; but the subject of negation must yield with the utmost reluctance; else reality would be incomplete. And when the last error is eliminated, — the last shred of permanence snatched up by the ravishing hand of change, — reality is known by the total subject of its negation; and since reality may not be destroyed, triumphant change, the equivalent of all differentiation and

knowledge, must yield unconditionally to permanence. For if change were to retrace its steps,—if errors were to survive their destroyers, the smoke produce the fire, blossoms grow into buds,—existence must be, not a subject of negation, but a negation, itself.

Thus definite conceptions of events cannot endure; they are useful only in connection with the rudimentary illusions of a material existence. On the other hand, a practical or workable conception of the unreality of events cannot be attained by us whose mental processes are always conditioned by material appearances. We cannot treat systematically of universal impossibilities; we may only recognise them as a necessity. This recognition is, itself, conditioned by material appearances yet constitutes a palpable success in the struggle for emancipation from the rule of matter. It may not be turned immediately to account in the practical affairs of life; it may, however, and probably will, so illuminate the whole subject of men's relations with one another and with their material environment as profoundly to affect everybody's daily routine; and finally, it points unmistakably to human participation in an unearthly existence that includes material preoccupations only in retrospect and is not dependent, for its further development, on our present conceptions of the concrete.

Not that our immaterial counterparts will think of negation as we do upon earth; probably they will not think of it at all except in a historical sense. The specific negative agreements that represent our partial knowledge of reality will remain unassailable, but the form in which we state them will be seen to belong peculiarly to our position in the universe. That a trowel, for example, is not so good an implement for driving a nail as a hammer is, will never be contested; the essence of this proposition will, however, appear quite different to our immaterial successors from what it now appears to us, because its terms, — the tools, themselves, and their usefulness in driving nails, — will contain for them far less of permanence. In other words, no matter how faultless a specific negative agreement may be, it must always embody a partial, or imperfect, knowledge of reality, — a lesser knowledge than may forthwith be aspired to. And it is not to be supposed that incorporeal beings can harbour anything approaching the definite illusions that now compel us to have recourse to the formula, Reality equals the total negation of universal processes. This formula has no pretension to durability; it is merely the best formula now available for eliminating some of our most useless prepossessions and some of the social evils that are inseparable from them (pages 22-33).

It is now possible to indicate (pages 33-39) the manner in which the existing system of appearances — the actual physical environment of man — may have been derived from the triumph of permanence, — *i. e.*, from the perfect homogeneity or utter absence of experience that must follow upon a total knowledge of reality. Entity, position, time, — even what we call tri-dimensional space, — become intelligible in accordance with the necessities of a universe of permanence and change. A law of minimum change is early recognisable, without which there could not be a total universe to be negatived.

Likewise it is seen (pages 39-44) that man's present importance in this universe may be indefinitely great or small; that his disappearance, as a race, may occur within a short time or may be deferred till he has exhausted the possibilities of a material existence. In either case, by far the most significant aspect of his present position is disclosed through consideration of the following necessity. In the universe of permanence and change, the highest possible development of an existence that is strictly subject to material conditions must be of an immense crudity as compared with developments that are independent of these conditions yet include them both in retrospect and as a determining factor. This means not only that human personality must survive and undergo progressive modifications after

material death but also that human conduct upon earth must be profoundly influenced by the attainment of any unassailable and suggestive conceptions of the necessity and the nature of our immortality.

We should proceed, then (Part II), to inquire to what extent a belief in immortality actually obtains among men, what specific considerations, now intelligible, may tend to confirm this belief and enlarge its scope, and (Part III) what solutions of vexatious social problems of the present time would follow upon a wide dissemination of these rational views.

We may easily satisfy ourselves (pages 47-51) of the impossibility of sustaining in action an avowed disbelief in the hereafter, — may recognise that, in man and in all other living creatures, an instinct of immortality goes hand in hand with the fear of death and the instinct of self-preservation. In the life of man, — especially of civilised man, so intensely preoccupied with manifold activities, — this paradox is productive of tribulations that are unknown to the lower animals. His inertia is strongly in evidence in the fear of death which, nevertheless, represents a reduction of the universal permanence since, without the instinct of self-preservation, no creatures could continue to exist and reproduce their kind. The inertia, or permanence, here involved is readily separable from the altruism, or change, upon consideration of a general principle that governs the

lives of the vast majority of men and of the lower animals, — a principle expressible as follows: we are here; hence we purpose to remain, creating, producing. When we believe, rightly or wrongly, that our productive power upon earth is not exhausted, we fear death and seek to preserve ourselves. When we have lost all hope in life but have retained an active hope in death, or when our death seems the most productive act of which we are capable, we do not fear death; we embrace it.

Reasoned doubts of the hereafter and the consequent growth of pessimism are seen, upon examination (pages 52-59), to proceed largely from the logical criticism of specific religious doctrines. Man cannot do without religion; as he advances in the devious paths of civilisation, it is imperative that his faith in immortality be made use of for rendering his course less perilous. And the most active and materially progressive peoples have demanded the kind of hereafter that is more or less concretely referable to an earthly existence. There being little that is of obvious importance to them outside Earth, they assume that the spheres of human personality are Earth and one or, more often, two or three other places. Since human altruism provides for rewards and punishments upon Earth, man is accordingly represented as passing from Earth directly, or

through but few intermediate phases, to his perfect and eternal punishment or reward.

The knell of such beliefs has been sounded by those who have studiously inquired into the manifold implications of Earth. In terms of permanence and change, the results of this research may be briefly stated as follows (pages 59-63). Our earth is undoubtedly a very special kind of abode and we, ourselves, a very special kind of creature, not easily separable from our domain. If we conceive a soul possessed of a single attribute amongst others that is incompatible with the observed result of long generations of this particular material existence, we are conceiving that which nobody of today could recognise as the soul of a man. Now matter, as we have seen, must be a product of immaterial processes; and permanence figures in it so conspicuously as to necessitate an elimination of the material illusion at an indefinite distance, doubtless very great, from the perfection of existence or triumph of change. Yet matter is the basis of all human calculations,—even of those involved in the disintegration of the material illusion. It would be impossible to divorce a man from his material pre-occupations except through a modification of his entire physical and mental constitution, in comparison with which the gulf between men and the lower animals must be slight. And if the divorce should

eventually be complete, the man in question,—in so far as he should retain his individuality,—must be a long way from perfection, on the one hand, and from the concerns of his earthly career, on the other.

These conditions, then, cannot be absent from the hereafter. The soul of a man cannot be separated from material considerations without losing its earthly identity. And death cannot be an introduction to eternity; it must, however, be one of many stepping-stones to perfection.

At this point, we should find it useful to inquire further (pages 63–81), how men should have entertained so exalted a notion of their own souls as to fancy that they might emerge from their dead bodies and, either forthwith or after a blank interval, participate in the perfection of existence.

As a race, man possesses but a single obvious standard by which to judge himself,—viz., the lower animals. Now, we have seen how an increasing differentiation both in the race itself and in its peculiar activities has entailed a loss of much of the simple, unquestioning faith in immortality that is implied in both the instinctive acts and the systematic parental training of many animals. Hence, in the affairs of life and death, the lower animals often exhibit a better judgment and truer sympathy than do the vast majority of men. In men's killing, for example,—in their use of the reproductive fac-



ulty, in their prolongation of spent or fruitless lives, — is seen an erratic and ineffectual egoism for which no parallel can be found amongst the humbler denizens of the wild.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that man has consciously evolved new forms of altruism whose import is so extensive as, by comparison, to dwarf the simple and almost mechanical consideration shown by one animal for another or for the tribe. Each member of the race shares, to some extent, in its peculiar altruism; yet, if we bear in mind that the unparalleled differentiation of man is not confined to the successive phases of his intellectual and emotional activity but is strikingly in evidence in the diversified character of the race, itself, we shall perceive that any estimates of human altruism in which the highest achievements of individuals are denied a predominant place must be of little value either in a theoretical survey of existence or in any projects for the brightening of man's earthly outlook. Now, in the qualities that man shares with the lower creatures, — as, for example, the fidelity of domestic, and courage of wild animals, — it is evident that human achievement has surpassed all known achievements of the brutes. But the highest altruism of the race is one that concerns itself with general principles, not with specific acts except in so far as they may be generalised, — one that

affects the greatest possible number of productive men. This altruism is associated with certain faculties that, for present purposes, may be regarded as exclusively human; prominent among them are the faculties of logic and emulative effort; most important of all is man's impersonal curiosity,—his propensity to investigate things for their own sake. But for our forefathers' liberal outlay in this disinterested research, nothing approaching our varied yet intensely gregarious life of today would ever have been possible.

In sum, man's advance in differentiation has entailed both a higher altruism, that is limited only by the material conditions of his existence, and sceptical misgivings that are forever inciting him to unhealthy, cowardly and iniquitous practices such as are rarely or never resorted to by the lower animals. For good and for evil, he knows himself to be enormously superior to any living creature of whose existence he is aware. Thus it is hardly surprising that this knowledge, when taken in connection with his essential faith in immortality, should suggest to him the notion of a hereafter in which he may forthwith behold perfection or suffer in perpetuity. At this point, however (pages 78-81), his crowning achievement should begin to make itself felt. This achievement is perhaps still in an elementary stage; yet we have seen that the results of

man's disinterested research have already pointed decisively to the immense crudity of his intellect and personality relatively to the least imaginable sum of universal processes. The curious may no longer doubt that the soul identified with any earthly man exists at a prodigious distance from perfection; that, in proportion as it is intimately associated with the man's career in life, it must, after death, enter upon a long novitiate as either the student or the pupil of perfection; or, indeed, that it cannot be, do or suffer anything in perpetuity.

A completion of man's crowning achievement means, then, a diffusion of the spirit of curiosity in such strength and throughout such proportion of the race as shall ensure its becoming a dominant influence in human affairs. Barring a demonstrable degeneration, or early disappearance, of mankind, this is certain to happen sooner or later; it may already have happened, although still awaiting a conscious recognition. Once it is an accomplished and recognised fact, its implications must include the exhaustion of much of the arrogance and faint-heartedness of man. Any but the most backward members of the race should then realise that the simple faith, or instinct, of the lower animals may never be regained by man but that a rational belief in immortality is ready to hand, — can hardly, indeed, be overlooked. And as this belief acquires

greater weight in human deliberations, the consequences of a loss of simplicity must become proportionally fewer and less hurtful until a time when the degrading influence of skepticism and strained piety will possess but a historical importance as signalising a painful episode in the development of the race,— an interval comparable to a perilous crisis in the life of an individual man. Nobody will then presume, as heretofore, to depict the posthumous surroundings of a human soul; but everybody who helps to shape the career of humanity upon earth will have seized the necessities of an immortal life that bear upon this earthly destiny.

In formulating the belief in immortality to which all thoughtful people, regardless of antecedents, are clearly entitled, let us start from a postulate which is not only an inference inevitably to be drawn from the results of our consideration of the universe of permanence and change but would also seem, under any circumstances, the simplest and most suggestive assumption to be made by the men of today concerning man.

We may assume that the intellectual and emotional development of man is not without meaning in the universe; that the human faculty of logic, artistry, creative and responsive emotion, impersonal curiosity, is not a queer accident of physical evolution,— a brief episode in the life of a doomed

planet; a mere flash never to be equalled or excelled in the vast æons of a cosmic dusk.

In this postulate, the subject is given as the human faculty, — that which most obviously distinguishes man from all other products of nature observed by man. In accordance with the predicate, the following phases in the existence of this faculty become inevitable; let us state them in terms of permanence and change.

When man, as a race, shall disappear and his old abode become unsuited to the maintenance of animal life, the human faculty will persist as an element, whether dominant or subordinate, in universal processes. And though it long continue, as at present, to attack old problems without discovering the final solution and to evolve new ideals that always fall short of an absolute, its errors must become ever less obvious and more intimately suggestive of perfection. The only alternative — to wit, that knowledge and the subject of negation should eventually reach a plane of differentiation imperfect yet unsurpassable — would prove equivalent to a denial of our original assumption, inasmuch as such knowledge and existence would forthwith exhaust all their possibilities. The human faculty would then perish prematurely and with no hope of resurrection, thus rendering unaccountable, nugatory, inadmissible the

long-seeming, tireless quest of new experience that constitutes the total actual record of man.

Now, in this process of illusion supplying knowledge of reality, all the strands of anterior existence must be inextricably bound up; if a single one were lost, the human faculty must eventually dissolve in mystification and absurdity. Each wave breaking on the first island in the terrestrial ocean, each intuition, act, omission of each individual man, each vital tendency of each dying infant must continue as factors in the events of every age to come, and their importance in the triumph of change must be second to none. Thus, when knowledge of reality has reached a point where it verges upon perfection, behold our every self reconstituted and far more alive than before by reason of our more thorough participation in the general process of existence.

Passing over the intellectual and æsthetic aspects of human immortality as lying beyond the central purpose of the present work, we may proceed to consider (pages 86-94) the general bearing of a rational belief upon men's earthly conduct. The following statements, crude though they should appear to our immaterial counterparts, must be as indisputable as any statements that may be made concerning our earthly environment. Upon analysis, they are seen to be negative inferences.

As any one of us yields up his life upon earth and

emerges in a reconstituted state at the bidding of our successors in the human faculty, it must be by his earthly life that he will at first be judged and judging. No one should fear that a lifetime of honest and unrequited labour may go forever unnoticed and prove unavailing; and no one upon his death-bed may entertain a rational hope that the errors of his past life will be forgotten. We cannot conceive our immaterial successors (or counterparts of either our ancestors or our descendants) as having either the power or the wish to raise us in an instant to a state of beatitude or indifference. Their competence may indeed be limited, in accordance with the law of minimum change, to a comprehension of that portion, possibly infinitesimal, of universal reactions which suffices for the reconstitution of a man's total self and life as conceived by the man, himself, and by other men of his day. Hence we should be as unwise, while living, to expect important communications from our dead as we have been in trusting prophets who, however honestly, supplied us with pictorial notions of the hereafter.

A thousand deaths or only one may be in store for us; at all events, the differentiation inevitably belonging to the future is so extensive that no gauge of it may be found in errors already eliminated. And, from an ethical standpoint, the supreme importance of the hereafter lies in its earlier phases.

Here we shall find that our earthly deeds and all our secret thoughts, whether vicious or prudent, trivial or momentous, will appear to us as they appeared and were remembered upon earth, but with this much added: that they are now being laid bare to our contemporaries who may appraise them more justly than before by reason of the new experience that is becoming the property of all mankind. Also the judgments of our earthly posterity will undoubtedly contain many surprises.

We are now brought to the final theme of this work and crucial problem of humanity. That is to say, we must inquire (pages 94 *et seq.*) how an individual man of today may live and act for the best advantage of himself and hence for the best advantage of the race,— in other words, what are the highest and least questionable duties belonging to an earthly existence?

In general, the ethical implications of man's position in a universe of permanence and change are sufficiently obvious.

On the one hand, an absolute standard of good or evil is unattainable upon earth.

On the other hand, any standard is durable in proportion to its generality; that is to say, the more it excludes of the specific character of human acts, the longer it may serve as a practical guide; or conversely, since the most general propositions contain

the most of negation, all moral precepts are ephemeral according as they are specific.

When we examine (pages 99–107) the most general of all ethical formulas, — which is expressible in the endeavour to consider all others equally with oneself, — we find that all other formulas, if operative for a sufficient period of time, will inevitably be merged in this formula of equality. We also find that equality, or anything nearly approaching it, can never be established upon earth.

Thus it is seen (page 107) that our two separate lines of research have led us to a conclusion suggestive in the highest degree. For, in the first place, starting from the postulate (page 84) that the peculiar faculties of man are not a meaningless accident of cosmic evolution, we find that the faith in immortality — which, as we have seen, underlies even the most short-sighted and materialistic of human considerations — is rationally grounded in the implications of this postulate. Then, ignoring both the postulate and its implications, and proceeding (page 99) to a survey of the total possibilities of principles applicable to human conduct, we find that all forms of altruism are irresistibly tending to merge in a form that is unattainable upon earth. In sum, the results of our independent lines of research are, in each case, the same: — to wit, the supreme concern of mankind is an unearthly future,

and the supreme significance of all earthly concerns of a given man lies in their relation to this unearthly future.

Turning now (Part III) to the practical implications of a rational view of immortality, we find that, of all our familiar altruistic formulas, the two following are the most obstructive both of individual happiness and of racial progress.

(A)—Life is short; hence to everyone the best possible chance upon earth, regardless of undoubted or presumable incapacity for happiness.

(B)—The eternal soul of each living man is a charge upon the public conscience; no erring one should be abandoned to the powers of darkness.

These two products of skepticism and strained piety, though to some extent irreconcilable, one with the other, are often vouched for by one and the same person; each of them has long been a powerful determinant of civilised custom; each of them, barring an early disappearance or demonstrable degeneration of the race, is doomed to a progressive decline in importance. In the course of the following recapitulation, they will be referred to respectively as *A* and *B*.

As *A* loses weight, we shall perceive more clearly (pages 168–197) the futility of productive men and women assuming a direct responsibility for the souls of either savage or civilised beings who hold out no

promise of response to the most stimulating influences of the time.

Now *A* (which, for present purposes, is by far the more important of our two formulas) represents the liberty and equality of individuals. And liberty, as we have seen, is merely the name for a provisional, and once desirable, perversion of fact except in the ulterior sense in which everyone may rationally expect all experience (page 86); while anything nearly approaching equality is unimaginable upon earth (pages 99 *et seq.*). The decline of *A*, then, in connection with the decline of *B*, as above mentioned, would mean that any one bearing unmistakable signs of menace to the welfare and progress of a civilised community should not enjoy the freedom of this community up to the moment of his commission of an offensive act but should be segregated, along with others of like calibre, in such surroundings as would enable him, first, to find his own level and, then, to improve it relatively to his capacity. According as the force of our illusion of free agency is impaired, at the same time that present unfitness is more readily and surely referred to a meagre ancestral experience, feelings of humiliation and rancour amongst the segregated must become proportionally rare. Meanwhile, opportunities for such offences as rape (page 157) and individual murder (page 146) would have been removed to such an

extent as should enable us to dispense with the gaol and the gallows. Moreover, under a graduated and elastic system of segregation, data for eugenics should rapidly accumulate and lead to conclusions lying beyond the range of present speculation. The unruly and the licentious, far from being condemned to celibacy, would be encouraged to marry, although their choice would be subject to restrictions varying in accordance with the results obtained from earlier unions. Thus, bodily and other specific characteristics in respect of which the abnormal members of the race often show themselves superior to its normal members would be utilised for the highest purposes of mankind (pages 168-197).

The force of *A*, but feebly opposed by *B*, is strikingly evidenced in the most powerful of all unelemental determinants of human conduct: viz., in the impulse to accumulate property by all manner of means industrious, frugal, deceitful, violent. But a queerer paradox than is implied in *A* now pervades men's traditional methods of distributing the fruits of the earth and of their own toil. For we find (pages 226 *et seq.*) that, beyond the almost uniform necessities of life, the first advantage of ownership is reaped when the object owned is shared with another person. Yet the growing differentiation and proportionate skepticism of our kind have eventuated in a highly complex civilisation, with

greed and envy necessarily possessing such an importance in the daily routine as would have been incomprehensible to our simpler forbears. Prevalent notions of what constitutes productivity (pages 239-241) are demonstrably of the flimsiest character; an immense multitude of "producers," in the now honoured sense, are become pitiful obstructionists of both their own and their communities' welfare.

Whenever there is enough of the kind of production that we are accustomed to call such, its promoters must fall to fighting, one group with a foreign group,—otherwise with their dependents at home,—and so to destroying the property they have helped to create. But when property shall become subject to customs preventive of hoarding and theft, and when society shall be classified according to progressive standards of productivity, national barriers must disappear while racial and social wars will have no point of origin. On the other hand, the latter consummations cannot be conceived as preceding the former (pages 142-144).

War, as we all know, has an exceedingly glorious renown (pages 124-126). This renown, however, belongs almost entirely to past ages when a resort to arms was the only possible means of settling many disputes and when the strongest or the shrewdest in battle were practically certain to prevail. At pres-

ent, war has various aspects, dark or bright, of which the most important ones (pages 115-120 and 140-141) proclaim it, beyond question, a grave anomaly in the life of a race possessing a highly developed sense of control and logical responsibility. These are (1) its growing and peculiarly selective destructiveness, — the loss of the young and the capable, the disinterested and the courageous, being comparatively great while the incompetent, the sordid and the cowardly are seldom exposed to danger; — and (2) the time that is lost and the productive enterprises thwarted, — these far more precious now than in less exacting ages, — through impersonal curiosity becoming temporarily a drug in the market.

Evidently the proprietary madness is a serious menace to our posterity, — stands foremost, at the present moment, in the long list of ills proceeding from a loss in simple faith and a gain in crudely reasoned doubts. Wealth, to be sure, may still open avenues of altruistic development that many are eager to follow. These advantages, however, would be far more easily secured in a world lacking mediums of circulation. And as long as a man's riches remain undivided and his efforts for betterment lose force and continuity, he cannot be otherwise than miserable. For he is learning too late that happiness comes not to any one, old or young, who waits passively for it to descend upon him, —

in short, that there is no joy in the world but that of production (pages 239-240).

Eventually, — how soon, none may foretell, — all human efforts will doubtless be recompensed somewhat as follows. Any one satisfactorily performing a useful or promising piece of work will receive, in payment, a voucher entitling him to a proportionate part of the produce of others. This voucher will bear his name and have a limited time to run. Thus it will possess no value for another and will not be saved by the owner against a period of non-production. The providing of everybody with the bare necessities of life will be equal and automatic; in other respects, the race will still be divided into classes which, however, will be based upon progressive standards of productivity (pages 241-244).

The distribution of property and all other general concerns of mankind will then be regulated (pages 252-256) not by the votes or decrees of individuals but in accordance with a code that will have been subscribed to by every individual showing a tolerable competence for any productive vocation. This code will provide for a progressive alteration of its articles in consequence of the development of new conditions of life and at the instance of persons who, under the provisions of the code, are classified as competent to judge of the specific articles in question. Deliberate distortion of the code in further-

ance of the short-sighted aims of individuals will, for the most part, be easily corrected, there being no pecuniary medium of circulation to facilitate corruption. And any one who has helped to modify the code will be suffered forthwith to return to his normal pursuits without further preoccupations of government.

Turning again to our formulas of a traditional and now inadequate altruism (page 302), we find, in both *A* and *B*, the unhappy justification of mothers shielding their sons from death, disgrace and disappointment at any cost to posterity as well as conspiracies of humane and gentle souls to obscure the harmful propensities of weak brothers until dire calamity visits their neighbours (pages 217-221).

From the same sources posterity is again imperilled through both a moral and a legal prohibition of the use of habit-forming drugs (pages 198-211).

In *A* is seen the reason of the movement known as feminism (pages 212-216). The illusion of a practical equality of opportunities upon earth prompts a weaker, though consciously a no less noble, sex to strive for this equality with the stronger.

And the same formula, together with its obvious implications, is responsible for the paralysing atmos-

sphere of finality that so often envelops a scientific discovery or a notable work of art (pages 222-225).

In sum, the first and imperative duty of all thoughtful people must be to assail this outworn and most perilous altruism by all possible means and to replace it with an altruism in better keeping with the knowledge at our command and the exigencies of our intensely gregarious life (pages 257 *et seq.*). This evidently means the dissemination of a rational view of immortality, — a view representing the most serious efforts now feasible in the direction of absolute truth. If the enterprise is undertaken without fear and with reasonable understanding, its results are as certain as they would be auspicious. Amongst its most able promoters (pages 264 *et seq.*) should be found a large and distinguished class of malcontents who, at present, contribute little or nothing to the altruistic capital of the time.

Finally (page 276), man is undisputed master of the earth, and no obvious natural law threatens his early extinction. He is still subject to inordinate delusion wherever his dear ones or his most vital immediate interests are at stake. Let him but pause to consider how much of value these immediate interests and his dear ones' earthly lives certainly do not possess and he must perceive that his chief concerns are, first, an earthly posterity and, still more, an immaterial. Indeed, to ensure that the

highest exercise of human faculties upon earth shall forthwith be followed by a farewell to the old abode, man has but to say the word.

END

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